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NOTE ON ROMANIZATION
AND PLACE NAMES
We generally follow China's official romanization system, Hanyu pinyin.
Exceptions occur for people from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and
other places that use the Wade-Giles system. We have spelled people's
names the way they spell them in their own publications, including
Chiang Kai-shek, who is Jiang Jieshi in pinyin. Quotations from works
published in Western languages retain the romanizations used in the
originals, which in some cases differ from both pinyin and Wade-Giles. A
few places, like Manchuria, are familiar to readers in the English language
by names that are not related to the current Chinese names; in these cases
we have retained the more familiar names.
Most of the important places mentioned in this study are widely
known by more than one name. We have, therefore, listed below the
different names for prominent places that we encountered in the course
of our research.
Manchuria is known in Chinese as either the Three Eastern
Provinces (Dongsansheng) or the Northeast (Dongbei), the standard term
used in China today. Manchuria is the most common term in inter-
national English language usage (e.g., "the Manchurian Incident") and no
longer carries the imperialist flavor that it acquired when Japanese forces
created the puppet state of Manchukuo (Manzhouguo, Manchoukuo) in
1932. Manchuria also has a looser meaning, which obviates the need to
change the terminology for the period of the Japanese occupation or for
boundary changes that have occurred since 1949.
Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, the three provinces of Man-
churia, have taken several different forms and names over the years.
During the Republican period Liaoning was usually called Fengtien, but
it was also known as Shengjing (Sheng-ching, Sheng-king) and Liaodong
(Liao-tung). It encompassed much of present-day Jilin (Kirin) Province,
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while Jilin incorporated much of the territory of today's Heilongjiang
Province.
Yingkou, the first treaty port in Liaoning, was widely known in
Western languages as Newchwang (Niuzhuang), which was in fact a
town inland of the port where the Customs station was officially located.
Dalian (Ta-lien), Manchuria's most important port, was pronounced
"Dairen" in Japanese and appeared as Dairen in Western-language
publications of the Japanese government. In Russian it was called Dalny.
Shenyang, the capital of Liaoning Province, was called Mukden by
the Manchus and was also known as Fengtien.
North China traditionally includes the region containing today's
provinces of Hebei (Ho-pei), Shandong (Shan-tung), Shanxi (Shan-hsi),
Shaanxi (Shen-hsi), Henan (Ho-nan), and often the northern parts of
Jiangsu and Anhui.
Hebei Province was part of Zhili (Chihli) Province during the Qing
dynasty (1644-1911). In the Republican period (1911-1937) the northern
third of Zhili was divided between Rehe (Jehol) Province and Chahar
Province. In 1928 Zhili's name was changed to Hebei. After 1949 Hebei
lost a narrow southern section but added much of Rehe to its northern
border.
Qingdao, Shandong's main port, was known to Westerners before
1949 as Ch'ing-tao or Tsingtao, but Customs reports for Qingdao were
filed under the name of the town of Jiaozhou (Kiaochow) where the
Chinese Customs station was officially located.
Yantai (Yen-t'ai), the largest port on the north coast of the Shandong
Peninsula, was known as Zhifu (Chih-fu) before 1949 and is commonly
rendered Chefoo in Customs reports and other English language sources.
Beijing (Peking, Pei-ching—"northern capital") was changed to
Beiping (Peping, Pei-p'ing—"northern peace") after Chiang Kai-shek
established the capital of the Republic of China at Nanjing (Nanking) in
1927. The city became Beijing again in 1949.
Tianjin, the major port of Hebei Province, appeared as Tientsin on
most maps before 1949; the Wade-Giles spelling is T'ien-chin.
FOREWORD
This study examines the great movement of people from North China to
Manchuria in the early twentieth century. It combines the results of our
long-term research and draws on our different disciplinary approaches.
On the one hand, we work from a statistical record of the migration,
employing quantitative analysis to study relationships between fluctu-
ations in the migration and economic influences. This element of the
study builds on Gottschang's doctoral thesis in economics. He was
drawn to the migration both because it was a major event in modern
Chinese history and also because it provides an unusually clear example
of the forces that stimulate population movements in the course of
economic development. On the other hand, we highlight the effects of
migration on individual families. This discussion is based on Lary's
extensive examination of historical materials, many at the county level. The
most valuable and unique component of the historical study is a series of
interviews Lary conducted with former migrants in Shandong Province.
She describes that research as follows:
In 1984 I spent a wonderful spring moving around rural Shandong. I
was received with the warm hospitality for which Shandong is famous.
I interviewed former migrants to Manchuria, who were at first astounded
and then pleased that someone wanted to hear about what had been,
for most of them, the most important experience of their lives.
The Chinese government had just begun to approve fieldwork
projects by foreigners, and I went on the official Canada-China scholarly
exchange. My trip came fortuitously at the time when many counties
had started preparing new gazetteers, the first since the 1940s. There
was already an interest in digging up materials about the local past and
an awareness that much of this would have to be done through oral
history. My field research was interrupted after 1984.
I had hoped to return to Shandong the next year to continue; but
instead I went to Beijing to serve as resident sinologist in the Canadian
Embassy for two years. During that time I kept my investigation going
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informally. The great spasm of migration in the 1920s and 1930s had
dispersed Shandong people widely, and I seldom attended an official
banquet at which there were not people from Shandong or Manchuria.
Their migration experiences turned out to be an ideal dinner topic.
I returned to Shandong for a second field trip in May 1989. Kwas
in Jinan on June 3 when the news came through that troops were firing
on students and workers in Beijing. It was inconceivable to go out and
carry on academic research when students were being killed and the
whole academic endeavor was under harsh attack. In any case, the
Canadian Embassy ordered all nationals to leave China, and within
three days I was back in Toronto. Since then I have made one short visit
to Shandong.
When we discovered in the 1980s that we were both working on the
migration, we decided to work together. We felt that the vast scale of the
topic warranted a collaborative effort, and it was clear to us that our
approaches had much to offer in combination. The interviews and
historical study supply personal stories and offer insights into the moti-
vations and experiences of individual migrants. The statistical analysis
provides numerical evidence and conclusions for the migration as a
whole and its relationship to the larger forces at work in the Chinese
economy. The purpose of this book is to use the personal stories to put a
human face on the aggregate data, while the statistical evidence places
the individual experiences in a broader context.
The resulting work combines two perspectives: Lary is a British-
trained social historian, and Gottschang, an American-trained economist.
We believe these different perspectives produce a richer and more
nuanced picture of the migration than would emerge from a single
disciplinary framework. Although every chapter is a product of long and
intensive cooperative effort, some sections primarily reflect the work of
one author. For example, Lary developed sections in chapter 1 that
describe the migrants she interviewed and their home areas. She also
took the lead in the chapters on family, local places, and return migration.
Gottschang initiated most sections on statistics and the economy, particu-
larly in chapters 1, 2, and 4.
Over the years we have worked on this project, many people and
institutions have contributed valuable assistance. In China the Institute of
Economics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences provided access to
library resources and acted as our liaison to research institutions in
Shandong and Manchuria. We would particularly like to thank former
directors Dong Fureng and Zhao Renwei, and former assistant director
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Huang Fanzhang for opening important doors. Professors Wu Cheng-
ming and Mi Rucheng generously shared their extensive knowledge of
Chinese economic history. Shang Lie provided tireless assistance and
support. Other members of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to
whom we owe special gratitude include Ding Weizhi, Duan Ruoshi, and
Zhang Youyun. We would like to thank Ma Xiuqing of the Shandong
Provincial Government for his help in arranging research visits and for
assistance with interviews, as well as Lu Ren and Lu Yu of the Shandong
Academy of Social Sciences and Nie Liming of Weifang, Shandong. At
the College of the Holy Cross, Joel Villa provided technical expertise
with maps and photographs. Anne Gibson, of Clark University's
cartography service, prepared the final version of the maps. Several
anonymous readers provided valuable guidance for reorganization and
revisions. The calligraphy for the frontispiece was graciously supplied by
Tse Shui Yim, librarian emeritus of the University of British Columbia.
This project would never have come to pass without the good
services of our mutual friend and mentor, Thomas G. Rawski.
We owe special thanks to Karen Turner for reading and com-
menting on the entire manuscript, for serving as academic and stylistic






On a chilly April morning in 1938, sixteen-year-old Zhang Zhenbao
gazed at the docks of Dalian over the rail of the steamer he had boarded
the day before at Yantai on the north coast of the Shandong Peninsula.
Dalian was the gateway to Manchuria, China's rich Northeast, where he
was to work as a coal miner. Zhenbao had known since he was a small
boy that some day it would be his turn to go to Manchuria. That day had
finally arrived, although Manchuria was now under Japanese rule.
Zhenbao hailed from Dongguan Village, near the county seat of Laiyang,
set among the hills of the Shandong Peninsula. For many years men from
his village had journeyed to Manchuria in search of work. Over the past
decade and a half more than a hundred young men had left the village of
just over a thousand people, some for short periods, others permanently.
They went in groups, usually in the late spring, often led by older local
men who recruited workers for the Japanese mines. When they were
able, they returned in the winter, in time for the lunar new year. These
men were called swallows because of the seasonal cycles of their travels.
Zhenbao's family was very poor. His father, a farm laborer, could
barely support his four children, and his mother and sister had to beg
from time to time. By leaving home, Zhenbao spared his parents the
expense of supporting him; if he managed to send money home, he
would help the family even more. His departure, moreover, brought an
immediate windfall for the family: A local labor contractor {batou), who
was gathering men for a Japanese mining company, paid him a
recruitment bonus {anjiafei, "money to settle the family") of 40 yuan— as
much as many local men could expect to earn in a year. He gave 30 yuan
to his parents and kept 10 for traveling expenses. Then he set off for the
port of Yantai with the other young men from his village. This was the
first time he had been further from home than the county seat. After four
days they reached the port, where they were formally handed over to the
Japanese mine authorities for the short trip to Dalian.
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OVERVIEW OF THE MIGRATION
Zhang Zhenbao was typical of millions of workers who traveled to
the Northeast from the 1890s to the beginning of the Second World War.
During these years roughly 25 million people made the trip from the
densely populated North China provinces of Shandong and Hebei. Two-
thirds of them eventually returned to their home villages, while
approximately 8 million remained in Manchuria.1 This was one of the
greatest population movements in modern history: Settlement of the
western United States involved the migration of some 8 million people
between 1880 and 1950; about 4 million people migrated from western
Russia to Siberia from 1880 to 1914; and the exodus from Ireland between
1841 and 1911 was over 4 million. Only the great emigration of 52 million
people from Europe between the 1840s and the 1930s was significantly
larger than the migration to Manchuria.2
This migration was a crucial event in modern Chinese history.
North Chinese workers settled the plains and forests of Manchuria and
provided the labor that has made Manchuria a leading center of Chinese
industry since the 1930s. Their presence also ensured that Manchuria
would remain part of China, despite intense military and political
maneuvering by Russia and Japan from the late nineteenth century until
the end of the Second World War.
The migration to Manchuria seems at first glance to have a tidy
symmetry. North China was seen as overcrowded (renduo dixiad),
wretched, and poor, while Manchuria was considered empty (diduo
renxiad) and ripe for exploitation. Migrants moved from the crowded
place to the empty one, as naturally as water flows downhill. There is
certainly truth to this description. North China, Shandong in particular,
was terribly poor and brutally buffeted by nature. Out of the 268 years of
the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), droughts occurred in 233, floods in 245,
the Yellow River or Grand Canal overflowed in 127, and tidal
inundations occurred in 45. Only two years passed without disaster
striking some part of Shandong.3 Nonetheless, the population of North
China was huge and growing. Available statistics, though incomplete,
suggest that between the time of the Xinhai Revolution (1911) and the
early 1930s the population of Shandong grew from about 37 million
people to about 40 million, while that of Hebei rose from around 32
million to about 34 million.4 Shandong, always poor, seemed to get poorer
still as its population boomed.
Manchuria, on the other hand, only 160 kilometers away from Shan-
dong by the short sea crossing from Yantai to Dalian, was sparsely
populated and potentially rich, with empty land, minerals, forests, and
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great rivers. In 1914 only 36 percent of the arable land in Manchuria was
farmed, and though that percentage rose rapidly, by 1926 only 52 percent
was under cultivation. Slightly under a quarter of Manchuria's 243 million
acres was considered arable.5 Finally, migrants from North China faced
no major adjustments in Manchuria, save learning to deal with the fierce
winters and the mosquitoes. They did not need to learn a new language
or culture or even a new skill, since the development needs of Manchuria
called for large additions of both skilled and unskilled labor.
The problem with this neat dichotomy is that it does not automatically
produce migration; the equation is more complicated. Otherwise, a tidal
wave of people from North China would have engulfed Manchuria as
soon as the Qing dynasty removed restrictions on settlement in the late
nineteenth century. Instead, the migratory flow generally remained a
trickle to the end of the century, aside from brief bursts, as when
hundreds of thousands of people fled the North China famine of 1876-
1879. At the turn of the century, however, migration grew to a powerful
stream that swelled in the late 1920s and 1930s to a true flood. The
growth of the migration was clearly a response to new work oppor-
tunities in Manchuria—building railways, working in mines and factories,
clearing the wilderness, and growing soybeans. It was equally spurred by
the development of transportation, for while many people went to
Manchuria by traditional means—by fishing boat or on foot—most
twentieth-century migrants traveled by train or steamer.
The most spectacular aspect of the migration was its size. Yet the data
should be looked at with some caution: They should be understood in light
of China's huge population. Even so, the number of people making this
move was enormous. The migration made it possible to open up a vast
area, as did the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century settlement of
the western plains in the United States and Canada. While the settlement of
the western plains in North America comes closest to the Manchurian
migration, the political and social contexts were so different that the
comparison can only be superficial, touching on matters such as terrain,
climate, and natural resources.
The migration to Manchuria had one particular aspect that makes it
difficult to categorize in terms of its overall form and thus to compare with
other great migrations that may be classed as either urbanization or rural
settlement. It was neither a movement from the land to the cities —
urbanization—nor a migration from one rural setting to another, but a
hybrid of the two. Some of the migrants did settle on the land while others
moved from rural to urban areas, but these outcomes were incidental rather
than preordained. Since most migrants were engaged as contract laborers
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or moved through personal channels, the outcome of their migration was
determined by their employers rather than by their own decisions.
This migration is part of a continuum of population movement that
has marked twentieth-century China. Some of the largest movements were
refugee migrations. They included the flight into western China beginning
in 1937 as Japanese armies invaded northern and eastern China, followed
by the return migration after 1945, and then the exodus from China as the
Communists took over in 1949. These movements were quite different
from the economically driven migration to Manchuria. The huge internal
migrations in the centrally planned era between 1949 and 1978 were often
economic in intention—aimed at opening up borderlands and redis-
tributing population from densely populated areas to less crowded ones —
but they were orchestrated by the state and driven by political imperatives.
Fundamental problems were often neglected, much to the migrants'
detriment.6 Most recently the migrations of the reform era, which have
involved over 120 million people, have been overwhelmingly short-term
movements from rural areas to the cities and industrial zones in eastern
China. This current migration has many of the elements that characterized
the Manchurian migration, including reliance on contract labor and
personal networks. Likewise, Chinese emigration to Southeast Asia and to
North America, which coincided with the Manchurian migration, also
relied heavily on contract labor and personal ties. The major difference
with these international migrations was the racism and immigration
barriers the emigrants encountered wherever they went and the fact that
they remained aliens in the places to which they moved.7
THE TEXTURE OF THE MIGRATION
Migration from Shandong and Hebei (Zhili) during the Republican
period was summed up by the bleak expression chuang guandong (to
escape hardship by going beyond the pass). "The pass" was Shanhaiguan
(Mountain-sea Pass), the eastern terminus of the Great Wall, which
marked the effective boundary between North China and Manchuria.
The assumption was that people were forced to leave home by dire
poverty. This assumption was grounded in harsh reality—the long
catalog of suffering that was the life of many North China farmers. In the
Shandong social and cultural context, which was strongly centered on
family and home, to leave home for any reason but direst poverty was
unthinkable. At some level people recognized the importance of
economic opportunities elsewhere, but only to the extent that those
driven out of their homes had to have somewhere to go, a temporary
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escape. There was no sense of the lure of a new land; migration was seen
as something dismal but unavoidable.
A tabulated expression of this sense of expulsion from home emerges
from an investigation conducted by the Nankai Economic Research
Institute in April 1931. A team sent to various parts of Manchuria
interviewed 1,149 migrant families, of whom more than 90 percent were
from Shandong. Ninety percent had migrated after 1911, and two-thirds
of that number between 1925 and 1930, from 69 of Shandong's 108
counties. They gave the following reasons for their migration:





















summoned by family or friends
looking for brothers
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Source: Wang Yaoyu, "Shandong nongmin licun de yige jiantao,"
in Zhong-guo jingji yanjiu, ed. Fang Yanting (Changsha: Shang-
wu, 1938), 180.
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Although these statistics look only at families, not individuals, and
allow only a single cause for migration, they still present an over-
whelming internal unity: They give almost universally negative reasons for
migrating. Only eight of the 1,149 interviewed said that they were moving
to make money, and only two spoke of a positive desire to leave home.
Foreign missionaries in Shandong shared the view that migration
was essentially negative; permanent emigration was seen as a sad but
necessary solution to the province's overwhelming population problem.
Writing in 1911, R. C. Forsyth had this to say:
So scarce is the supply of food that many of the people are compelled to
migrate to the Provinces of Shansi and Shensi, and thousands annually
cross over into Manchuria. Under present conditions there seems to be
little hope for the people unless the Government can organise emigration
on a vast scale and so relieve the pressure of over-population.8
In the late Qing and early Republic, emigration did develop rapidly,
though very little of it was government sponsored. In the early 1930s
John Lossing Buck estimated an out-migration rate for the whole country
of forty-four per thousand, with the much higher rate of 133 per
thousand for males in North China.9 In 1938 Wang Yaoyu, working at the
Nankai Institute of Economic Research, estimated that migration from
different parts of Shandong in the early 1930s ranged from a low of 10
percent of the population to a high of 60 percent.10 The statistics in both
cases have flaws: It is often not possible to discover who is included and
who is not; some figures include local movements, such as girls marrying
out of their home villages, while others do not. It is also difficult to
disentangle short-term and long-term migrants. But even allowing for
these deficiencies, it is clear that a great number of people in Shandong
and Hebei were on the move.
Japanese writers presented a very different picture of the migration.
If the Chinese viewed the migration as a dismal but inevitable result of
poverty, the Japanese, who were creating many of the economic oppor-
tunities in the north, perceived the migrants as fleeing the nightmare of
China for the joys of Manchuria:
Warfare, prevalence of banditry, excessive taxation, and famines have
so harried the native population [of Shandong] that in desperation
those who can find the means to travel at all hasten to seek the benefits
of peace and order and the chance for better living conditions which
Manchuria offers.n
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Both the Chinese and Japanese views give generalized, undifferen-
tiated causes for migration, but in the most general sense they are right.
Shandong was poor. Manchuria did offer many jobs. But these two
factors explain only the basic preconditions for the migration, not who
went, or whether the correlation between poverty and migration was cast
in concrete. Nor do they explain why some people affected by the misery
of North China migrated to Manchuria, while others went into the army,
or moved to a town, or simply stayed in their villages and endured.
Our research shows that migration to Manchuria was a complex
process. When seeking the motives to migrate, however, moving beyond
stereotypes can be difficult because any large migration acquires a lore that
designates motive. Sometimes the receiving society dictates the motive.
The Statue of Liberty stands as the ultimate symbol of American lore that
says immigrants to the United States seek political, religious, or economic
freedom. Sending societies portray emigration in ways specific to their own
cultures and social systems. For the Highlands of Scotland, emigration in
the eighteenth century was a tragedy visited on the migrants by the cruelty
of absentee landlords. For Ireland, the great nineteenth-century emigration
was flight from a famine that the pitiless British had done nothing to
alleviate. In both of these cases the freight of migration was a sense of
expulsion. Scandinavians have viewed emigration more phlegmatically, as
a sensible course to take in countries where land was scarce. In China in the
late Qing and early Republic the prevailing lore held that migration was
unnatural. Migrants were either desperately poor or morally dubious and
moved away from home because they were in trouble.
Myths of migration tend to confuse what actually happened. This
study will show that the image of desperate migrants driven by extreme
poverty was a cultural construction and that migration took place not
haphazardly, but within well-defined channels. Those channels were
created by early migrants, and became conduits for further migration.
We will examine the family and village connections through which
people entered the migration stream, as well as the way migrants were
selected within their home settings.
What economic characteristics were common to those who migrated?
According to Buck's study, six out of seven families that produced
migrants fell below the national median in terms of landholding (3.3
acres), and tenant families were four times more numerous among
migrants than in the general population.12 However, a large survey on
out-migration conducted in 1935 by the National Agricultural Research
Bureau of the Ministry of Industry found that 49.5 percent of emigrant
families had 5 mu (.8 of an acre) of land or less, while another 37.4
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percent had between six and ten mu (1 and 1.7 acres). In other words,
most migrants were not from the lowest economic stratum.
Figures on landholding are tricky to analyze. Landholding figures
for a family in which only one male migrated (a very common phenome-
non) make sense only if we also know the total number of family
members. A family with many sons might send several away, even
though it had an adequate amount of land, while a very poor family with
only one son might not be able to let him go. Only when a whole family
left could the amount of land held be a crucial factor. A survey of 150
refugee (nanmin) households conducted in 1928 shows that even refugee
migrants were less land-poor than might have been expected:





Source: "Gesheng nongcun jingji yu nongmin yun-
dong," in Cunzhi 2.6 (October 31,1931):17.
In general, we can assume migrant families to have been poorer
rather than richer, but poverty was not a necessary condition for
migration. Truly destitute people usually could not afford to migrate,
except when forced to by disaster. Many migrants were poor, but others
were not. Migration to Manchuria did not primarily originate in
Shandong's poorest counties; some of the highest rates occurred in
relatively wealthy counties. Nor was landholding a completely reliable
indicator. Farmers in very poor counties often worked their own scant
holdings, while farmers in richer areas were more likely to be tenants —
yet either might decide to migrate. Additional factors came into play as
well: Laiyang, a rich county on the Peninsula, had a high rate of land
concentration and tenancy, and indeed many of the migrants from there
were landless. But the major stimulus for migration in that county was its
excellent migration networks. Gaomi County also had highly concentrated
landholding, with much property controlled by absentee landlords. But
in this case chronic banditry and military activity proved to be the major
stimuli for migration. In Linqu, a desperately poor county but one in
which many people owned their own land, it was natural disasters that
forced large numbers to leave. Clearly, no single economic cause can
provide a satisfactory explanation for this complex movement.
INTRODUCTION 9
FAMILY TIES: THE ENGINE OF MIGRATION
If Manchuria had more natural resources per worker than Shandong,
why didn't more Shandong people move every year? Why were there
few migrants in some years and many in others? On the other hand, if
Shandong society prized family and local ties above all else, why did
anyone leave home? What did it take to overcome the desire to remain at
home? The answers lie in two realms: economics and family relation-
ships. Family interests decided who went to Manchuria; economic
conditions determined the opportunities available at home and abroad.
The experience of sixteen-year-old Zhang Zhenbao in 1938 illustrates
this study's central theme: The driving force behind the migration to
Manchuria was neither the poverty of North China, nor the growth of the
Manchurian economy, but rather the deep and unquestioned commit-
ment of millions of North Chinese workers to aid their families by any
possible means. A defining characteristic of Chinese society is the im-
mensely powerful web of connections and obligations within the nuclear
and extended family and a great reluctance on the part of individuals to
be separated from family and home. Yet Chinese history is studded with
massive voluntary migrations, including the first great movement into
the Yangtze River valley in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., the
settlement of South China between the eighth and twelfth centuries, the
repopulation of Sichuan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and
the dispersion of millions of Chinese people— the Chinese Diaspora —
around the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.14 The
migration to Manchuria provides an opportunity to reconcile these
apparently contradictory realities of Chinese society. Unlike other major
Chinese migrations, historical or modern, the movement to Manchuria is
sufficiently well documented to allow for analysis of economic influences
and recent enough to permit interviews with former migrants. The
Manchurian migration can thus provide a multidimensional perspective
on the motivations and behavior of Chinese migrants generally.
The data and the accounts of the migrants interviewed for this study
show that in the great majority of cases the decision to migrate was not
an individual one, but part of a family economic strategy —a character-
istic aspect of migration in many countries.15 The primacy of family interests
countered the individual's reluctance to migrate. In fact, the strength of
family ties promoted migration for economic reasons. The wider the gap
between income-earning possibilities at home and elsewhere, the greater
the potential benefit to the family of sending off one of its members. The
importance of the family relationship provides a standard against which
we may measure the pressures for and against migration. Was the
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possibility of higher income an adequate incentive to leave the family? It
apparently was. Was the presence of Japanese occupation forces in Man-
churia sufficient to discourage leaving the family? Clearly not. Did the
effects of disaster at home warrant departure? In many cases they did.
Personal motivation was not the issue. The migrants expected to fulfill
a duty to their families —to leave home for part of their lives in order to
bolster the family income. They were not seeking better lives for them-
selves as individuals, but were contributing to the survival, at modest
levels, of the family at home. They were doing something that in quali-
tative terms was similar to taking a contract as a long-term farm laborer
or servant.
A corollary of migration as a service to the family is that the
individual expression of free will—the bold courage of the pioneer so
celebrated in the history and lore of migration to North America — is absent
here. There are no tales of triumph over nature or epic feats of endurance.
Instead the famous feats of courage that these migrants celebrated had
occurred in Shandong itself, in the Song dynasty (A.D. 960-1279) stories of
the "heroes of the marsh" from the traditional novel Water Margin {Shuihu
zhuan). The migrants saw themselves, and were seen by others, as stolid,
patient, and undemanding. They took pride in their ability to endure
hardship {chiku nailad), and they had very limited personal expectations.
Other reasons help to explain why this migration had so little drama
associated with it. The distances many of the migrants moved were short.
Trips to the southern parts of Manchuria took little time, and the journey
itself was not the deterrent to return that stormy Atlantic crossings often
were for emigrants to North America. Moreover, the migrants to
Manchuria were moving within China. They had no sense of leaving their
country or culture for another, and hence the psychological leap was
smaller than it would have been in an international migration.
Finally, Shandong migrants — though they probably never made the
comparison themselves — did not have to contend with the pervasive
racism experienced by Chinese moving abroad during the same period.
The majority of Shandong migrants moved into the bottom levels of
Manchurian society, as laborers, factory workers, and farmers. Their
dealings were with other Chinese, with labor contractors, and low-level
officials. They had little contact with either the substantial Chinese
merchant body in Manchuria or the Japanese managerial and military elite
who held leadership positions in the ports, railways, and major
manufacturing and extractive industries. They lived in an overwhelmingly
Chinese world, where their social and economic status, not their race,
determined their treatment or maltreatment.
INTRODUCTION 11
THE MIGRATION AND OTHER HISTORICAL STUDIES
The broad outlines and many details of the economic and social
history of North China have become increasingly clear through path-
breaking research since the early 1970s. Several key publications include
studies based on analysis of previously underutilized sources, such as
the extensive materials produced in the 1920s and 1930s by the South
Manchuria Railway Company (SMR), the national archives in Beijing,
and local records. This study of the migration to Manchuria builds upon
and complements many of these historical works, some of which
describe the economic conditions from which the migrants emerged,
while others examine protest movements engendered by similar
circumstances, such as the Boxer Uprising and secret society activities.
Two of the most important studies of North China's rural economy
were written by Ramon Myers and Philip Huang.16 Both Myers and
Huang find that farm family behavior was driven by market forces, one
of which was the imbalance between the labor markets of North China
and Manchuria. Labor shortages in Manchuria provided opportunities
for workers from Hebei and Shandong; they could increase family
income by taking advantage of the better wages and job opportunities
that existed to the north. Huang notes that in Hou Jiaying, a village in
northern Hebei near the border with Manchuria, cash tenancies increased
in the Republican period as more and more people moved to Manchuria.
Labor contracts shrank to only one year because so many young men
anticipated that they might move to Manchuria and refused to be tied
into long-term contracts. Huang also describes social changes in the same
village caused by the migration. People moved to Manchuria to make
money and when they succeeded, they brought their earnings home and
invested in land. New families had risen to the top of the social pile by
this process: Of the nine leading households in the village, five had
acquired their status through money earned in Manchuria.17
Myers, too, comments that the migration affected local labor
markets in Hebei and Shandong, reducing the labor supply, which led to
an upward drift in wages.18 However, he also describes the migration
largely as flight from chronic violence:
. . . the emigration of millions of peasants from north China to Man-
churia during the 1920s was principally due to the breakdown of peace
and order in the countryside and the great loss of property at the hands
of warlord armies. Peasants could cope with poor harvests and floods
by fleeing with their belongings to other areas, waiting until the
disaster had passed, and then returning. But the ravages of these troops
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was something else. It usually meant both loss of property and life, and
so one of the largest migrations of this century took place in the 1920s.19
More recent works, including books by Prasanjit Duara and
Kenneth Pomeranz, provide additional evidence on the economic causes
of the migration, but focus particularly on the relationship between
economic change, the national state, and local political structures.20
Duara, in a vein similar to Myers and Huang, finds that migration made
some contribution to prosperity in North China.21 Pomeranz analyses the
economic decline of the region along the route of the old Grand Canal in
western Shandong, caused first by the depredations of the Taiping
Rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century and then by the shift of long-
distance commerce to coastal steam shipping in the late nineteenth
century and to railways in the twentieth century. Pomeranz shows that
the decline in the region's importance was accompanied by political
neglect and the consequent weakening of the central government's flood-
control efforts, which exacerbated the effects of both floods and droughts
in the early twentieth century.22 In the face of long-term regional
recession and endemic poverty, migration became an important element
in the economy of western Shandong. In fact, "... before 1931,
remittances from Manchuria made up for the trade deficits of most
Shandong counties that ran them/'23
Analysis of rural protest movements has become another prominent
theme in the field of modern Chinese history. Most rural movements
grew out of conditions that were similar to those that fueled the
migration to Manchuria and were based on long local traditions.
Elizabeth Perry's work, for example, shows that in many parts of rural
North China there were long histories of relatively small-scale, but
persistent strains of spontaneous rural protest organizations, like secret
societies.24 Joseph Esherick has produced a detailed analysis of the
origins in Shandong of the most famous rural protest, the explosive and
tragic Boxer Uprising of 1899-1900.25 Esherick demonstrates that the
movement was based in popular culture, but that it was also related to
poverty, uncertainty, and natural disaster, problems that drove thousands
of other Shandong residents to migrate to Manchuria.
MEMORIES AND NUMBERS!
SOURCES OF MIGRANT INFORMATION
One overwhelming aspect of the migration to Manchuria in the early
twentieth century was its scale. At its height, the only metaphors that
made sense were watery ones — torrents, floods, tidal waves, inundations
of migrants. Photographs of tens of thousands of migrants arriving in
Dalian, all young men in farmers' clothing, portray a nameless mass of
workers headed to the north (see p. 14). For Lary, following one of the
major migrant routes — traveling by ship from Yantai to Dalian in 1984 —
the sight of the huge crowd waiting in the dark after the night crossing,
standing silently on the same great circular flight of stairs at the old
South Manchuria Railway wharf in Dalian, conjured up the vastness and
anonymity of the earlier movements.
In a sense, the migrants were anonymous. All accounts of the
opening up of Manchuria mention the critical importance of Chinese
labor in neutral, inanimate terms. Workers are discussed in terms of
wages, recruitment, and efficiency; occasionally they appear as trouble-
makers or labor organizers. Farmers are discussed in terms of the
amount of land settled and agricultural production. Chinese also figure
in the formal records as bandits, soldiers, Christian converts, or plague
victims. Only rare observers, notably Owen Lattimore, describe them in
fuller human terms.
Former migrants who were interviewed for this study bring distinct
concerns, motivations, and aspirations to the story of the migration. The
statistical record traces the ebbs and flows of the mass movement within
which their stories took shape. This chapter first describes the circum-
stances under which the interviews took place and profiles the home
counties of the informants. It then discusses the sources from which the
aggregate statistical record was compiled.
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Immigrants arriving from Shandong.
The South Manchuria Railway Wharf at Dalian, 1927.
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W H O WERE THE MIGRANTS?
Little in the written record of the early twentieth century addresses
individual migrants and their stories. The migrants did little to draw
attention to themselves: They were not politically involved; the vast
majority of them were illiterate —they wrote few letters and kept no
diaries. They seldom appear in fiction. While the farmers of Jiangnan
were portrayed in the writings of Lu Xun and Mao Dun, Manchuria was
featured in the work of only one widely read author, Xiao Jun, and his
output was tragically small. His most famous novel, Village in August,
published in 1935, dealt with Manchuria in the context of Chinese
resistance to the Japanese. After that, his voice was silenced by the
Communist literary bureaucracy, which found his views too salty and
forthright and so managed to destroy one of China's great literary
talents. Chinese intellectuals of the 1930s, the group most likely to be
vocally sympathetic to the oppressed, tended to see migrants as ciphers,
not people. They saw the vast movement as a sign of rural China's
bankruptcy: The migrants were forced to leave home because of poverty,
oppression, and corruption. They were part of a movement that has been
translated most evocatively as the "exodus from the villages" (licuri).
The migrants got no more attention under the Communists, for they
were not considered heroes of either resistance or class struggle. Their
labor had fueled the Japanese drive for domination, and Communist
expansion in Shandong took place largely without their participation.
The migrants had left a province where major Communist base areas were
clawed out during the late 1930s and 1940s, creating legions of real
heroes whose memories were of interest to the new authorities.
Much of the social-science literature on migration is written in imper-
sonal terms, as indeed is a good part of the literature on rural China. It
tends to rely heavily on statistics and to avoid anecdotal and personal data.
Statistics are comfortable and they seem less prone to distortion than
personal stories, but they can be inaccurate. Of equal importance, statistics
reveal only part of the story of migration, the numbers involved. Only
personal sources, whether contemporary surveys or later interviews, can
reveal other aspects— the bases of the decision to migrate, the channels of
migration, and the success or failure of the migration.
No migration is made up of faceless ciphers. While common themes
can be expressed statistically, there are also a myriad of individual,
personal stories that give texture to a mass movement of people. It is
these stories that can clarify details and explain variations within the
migration. Since there are few contemporary written records about the
individual migrants, we must rely on interviews with survivors and their
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descendants to tell us why and how they left home, what their intentions
were, and how well they succeeded. Migrants to Manchuria came from
all over North China, but the greatest numbers came from Shandong,
where the interviews for this study were conducted.
Former migrant Wang Kongde. Ling County, Chengguan, April
12,1984.
Former migrants Hou Shangjian, Hou Shangrui, Hou Shangyu,
Hou Xiaolun. Ling County, Fenghuang Township, April 13,1984.
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Shandong People and Traditions
The people of Shandong have always believed that they were born
into the most historic province of China. Shandong is the "sacred
province/7 the home of Confucius and Mencius, and the "country of the
rites" (liyi zhi bang), where Confucian rituals have been practiced
longest and are most richly developed.1 This tradition is reflected in a
strong emphasis on family history, recorded in family records (shipu).
Besides the celebrated Kong (Confucius) and Meng (Mencius) families,
the Chunyu family of Huang County traces its line back to the Spring
and Autumn Period (770-476 B.C.).2 Family tradition has a deeper sense
of antiquity in Shandong than anywhere else in China.
Shandong was also the birthplace of Zhuge Liang, one of China's
few military heroes, the great strategist of the Three Kingdoms period
(A.D. 220-280), who was later turned into a folk hero in The Romance of
the Three Kingdoms. Normally Chinese tradition is unkind to military
figures. Indeed, "military tradition" is a contradiction in terms, since
tradition implies respect, something the military rarely enjoyed in China.
But Zhuge Liang was an exception. He was famous for cleverness and
stratagems, not brute force, so Shandong could be proud of him and
enhance its cultural preeminence with martial fame.
The third distinct tradition that colors the Shandong character is that
of Liangshanbo, the marshy area in the west of the province inhabited by
the tough, swaggering heroes of the Water Margin. These heroes, though
fictional, were vivid and exciting, whether they were killing tigers,
getting drunk, or taking on corrupt officials. They were brave (sometimes
stupidly so), strong, down-to-earth, and decent.
Each of the three traditions is grounded in a different part of the
province, but Shandong as a whole counts all three its own. These
traditions have given the people pride and a sense of self-worth that
compensates for widespread material poverty. Shandong people think of
themselves as brave, sociable, decent, and morally courageous.3 They are
good at enduring hardship, reliable, physically tough, strong, and
handsome. Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky all had Shandong bodyguards,
recruited in Vladivostok. The Hong Kong police force also recruited
Shandong men.4 Some of China's most notorious anti-heroes also came
from Shandong, including three of the Gang of Four and Kahg Sheng,
head of the secret police, whose death in 1975 was greeted with as much
rejoicing as the Cultural Revolution allowed.5
The first foreigners in Shandong also saw the local people in a
positive light. Baptist missionaries who established the first Christian
mission in Shandong in the 1870s saw the people as "the most stalwart
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and vigorous of all the Chinese/'6 The German colonists of the late
nineteenth century had a high respect for them, especially the young
men, who embodied Germanic ideals of manliness and courage. Baron
Ferdinand von Richthofen, the intrepid explorer who "found" Shandong
for Germany, described the Shandong people as "intelligent and upright,
and fit to develop into an advanced generation."7 His account was
published two years before the Boxer Uprising, which might have
changed his mind, but he would not have departed from the admiration
expressed by a fellow German:
The Shantung people distinguish themselves, in favorable comparison
to the people of the southern provinces, by generally powerful
physiques, tall, well-built, manly forms, fresh, healthy complexions
(dark yellow-grey to brown-grey) and other external manifestations of
superiority. The facial expression is intelligent.8
The characteristics that the Shandong people saw in themselves, and
that others saw in them, made them ideal candidates for opening up the
Manchurian wilderness. Just as "stout peasants in sheepskin coats" from
Eastern Europe were enlisted to settle the Canadian prairies, the inhabi-
tants of Shandong were deemed an appropriate labor force for the
development of Manchuria, not just because they were geographically
close to Manchuria, but because they were the right kind of people,
physically and psychologically. The sturdiness, ingenuity, and positive
outlook that enabled Shandong people to endure the rigors of life in
Manchuria were abundantly apparent in the former migrants Lary
interviewed in 1984.
Interviews and Informants
Eighty people, two of whom were women, gave interviews on their
migration experiences. Generally the informants were elderly men who
had spent varying lengths of time in Manchuria. They came from nine
counties—Ling, Huimin, Binzhou, Boxing, Zouping, Linqu, Gaomi, Laiyang,
and Penglai. The interviews were arranged by the Shandong Academy of
Social Sciences (SASS), and Lary was accompanied first by an official
from the provincial government, and then by a population studies
scholar from SASS,9 in addition to representatives of the district and
county governments. Most informants were interviewed in their villages,
or occasionally in the county jiaodaisuo (guesthouse). The villages were
known to have been places of heavy migration or were close to the
county town. Only two villages were clearly out of the ordinary—
Zhangxilou Production Brigade in Ling County is a village with an
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average household income over three times the province average, and
Fengjiacun in Zouping is the home of Feng Yuexi, a member of the
National People's Consultative Congress.10
The interviews all took place in groups, for no woman, especially a
foreign one, could meet privately with a man. The interviews were
conducted without interpreters; when the local dialect was unclear, one
of the entourage would translate into standard Mandarin. The group
setting usually created a comfortable atmosphere; by the time tea, nuts,
fruit, candy, and cigarettes had made the rounds, all were quite relaxed.
There was a fair amount of joking and teasing, and when one person was
speaking others often intervened to make corrections, or to amplify
stories. The group setting seemed to encourage more accuracy and less
hyperbole. Elaborate tales transparently bored other informants. One
woman's rambling, emotional tale of being taken off into something close
to slavery put two of the informants to sleep.
From the start it was clear that no one wanted to fill in a question-
naire. The informants regarded the collection of formal statistics with
suspicion. Such a project would also have been unproductive, since their
experiences were so different. As a consequence, each informant first was
asked for basic details about leaving home and the size and condition of
his or her family at the time. They were then asked to tell their own
stories. Most were eager to do so. They launched into vivid descriptions
of their experiences, often prefaced with a reproach that it took the visit
of a foreigner for them to have a chance to tell their stories. The stories
were not standardized, and few were bland or dull. The informants
injected humor whenever they could, but reliving what had often been a
hard and cruel past was not easy for many of them. The admissions of
men unable to send home remittances, or the stories of exploitation,
particularly at the hands of family members, were very moving.
The interviews revealed a great deal about how rural people coped
with one major handicap, illiteracy, which shaped their consciousness in
intriguing ways. They could not use maps to show where they had gone.
Geography for them was not spatial; they measured distance by how
long a journey took by a certain mode of transport: "I walked five days to
get from my village to Yantai," or "I went by train to Sankeshu in three
days." Their maps were their families and their connections at home and
away, a network that linked known people, not places. This personal
world was engraved on their minds. All informants could give detailed
information about every family member, living or dead, without pausing
or faltering. The family was clearly the critical framework of life.
The migrants showed great ingenuity in coping with illiteracy. First
were the external ways: They relied on literate relatives or neighbors to
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help write letters or fill in forms or they paid for the services of letter
writers. But illiterate people also develop different kinds of memory than
those who can write down what they need to remember. Being illiterate
made it essential for them to train their minds to store information
accurately, since that is where all their personal and economic records
resided. The informants had precise memories for money, the most impor-
tant information they had to retain. They remembered exact figures and
almost always stated, without prompting, the particular currency in
which the money had been held. They had migrated during a period
when multiple currencies were in circulation, and precise knowledge
about the currencies and their relative values was crucial to avoid being
cheated. Some coped with currency confusion by expressing money in
terms of the amount of a commodity that a certain sum would buy. Zhao
Qingfu's family sold their Gaomi County farm in 1939, before they left
for Manchuria, for the cash equivalent of 1,250 jin (625 kilograms) of
beans; this amount paid their fares and presumably gave them a chance
at a new start in Manchuria.11 In 1941 Hou Shangjian of Ling County
brought back enough money after a year working in Manchuria to buy
90/IH (45 kilograms) of beans. This was not to say that he actually bought
the beans, but that this was the easiest way for him to express how much
he had earned.12 Sometimes the migrant or family actually did use the
money in the way its value was expressed. In 1945 Hu Huiliang's older
brother sent home the proceeds of two years7 work as a rickshaw puller
in Dalian, enough money for his father in Zouping to buy an ox.13
The migrants were less accurate about chronological time. They
remembered things that had happened to them in terms of their age at
the time, and they often had to struggle to put a year to the age. They
often got dates wrong, but never by more than a year. This problem
seemed to arise when they switched from calculating age in terms of sui,
where the child is one year old at birth, to chronological time counted in
nian (calendar years). Many counted time in the traditional dynastic form:
They remembered dates as they had been cited in different periods.
Up to 1949, years were designated Minguo (after the Republic), and
for post-1949 they used Western calendar years. One man, Zhang
Guangwen, even announced the year of his birth as the Qing reign
year, XuantongS (1910).14
Most informants referred to places by the names they had when the
migrants first went there —present-day Dandong was Andong, Chang-
chun was Xinjing, the "new capital" of Manchukuo. Political correctness
seemed not to be an issue. Few informants seemed to have much sense of
the momentous events that had occurred during their lifetimes, including
the Manchurian Crisis and Japanese expansionism. They had experienced
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Japanese brutality as employees of Japanese companies, but there was no
connection in their minds between their maltreatment and a Chinese
nationalist response. They made pro forma expressions of gratitude to the
Communist Party, especially for land reform, but real enthusiasm was
reserved for the reforms that started in 1978. The great events of the past
had receded or had never impinged on them. If this was true of events
within China, it was even more so of international events. In Linqu there
was a lingering memory of people who had gone away to Canada, but no
knowledge that this was the migration of workers going to France via
Canada during the First World War.15 The events that were crystal clear
in their memories were local ones —the activities of bandits, the
marauding of warlord troops, and above all the brutality of the natural
world. Their indifference or lack of awareness regarding larger events
probably resulted from the conditions in rural society: They lived in a
world not yet unified by mass communication; news and information were
limited and difficult to come by even for the elite.
The political world also presented dangers. The modern history of
Shandong has done nothing to dissuade people from avoiding political
participation. In Republican China, Shandong politics meant the military.
In living memory of the informants and their parents, Shandong had
endured major military upheavals: the Boxer Uprising and its aftermath;
Germany's aggressive development of the Peninsula; the Japanese
incursion of 1914 to oust the Germans; Japan's departure in 1922 and
return in 1928. These events took place against a background of incessant
warlord conflicts and uninterrupted banditry. Shandong was a province
beset by warfare. Civilians stayed as far away as possible from the military
and thus from politics. Even though Shandong was a major target for the
Japanese, it was not a major site for anti-Japanese agitation, at either the top
or bottom of society. In late 1937 the Shandong governor, Han Fuju,
withdrew his large armies in the face of the Japanese invasion from the
north. He apparently considered this action prudent and was amazed to be
treated as a traitor when he met with Chiang Kai-shek and other senior
generals. He was executed soon afterwards. The Xuzhou campaign, fought
in the first half of 1938 in northern Jiangsu and southern Shandong, was
fought mainly by troops from southern and western China, under the
command of the Guangxi general Li Zongren. Many Shandong troops,
including Han Fuju's, had already joined with the Japanese.
The Chinese Communist Party had great difficulty developing
political consciousness in Shandong. Only after long years of frustration,
towards the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan, were they able to
develop significant liberated areas in the central mountains, the eastern
mountains, and the western marsh area. The Civil War was hard fought in
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Shandong and swung back and forth several times before the Guomindang
fled to Taiwan, taking large numbers of Shandong soldiers with them. The
experience of politics after 1949 was different, but not much more
encouraging. Shandong went through all the political upheavals visited on
China as a whole, plus two specific to the province. One was the widespread
building of dams during the Great Leap Forward; the second was the
organized migration of large numbers of people to Manchuria in the late
1950s and early 1960s. Both events caused huge disruptions in local life.16
The informants had lived hard lives, and time had not been kind to
many of them. Most looked older than they were; few had any teeth left;
none had the sleek veneer of success. But they had a moving dignity and
a quiet tranquillity (some of them may have been frozen with nerves),
interlaced with humor. They could laugh about what had happened
before because their children were leading better lives. That was enough
reward for the hardships they had suffered.
Map 2 Shandong Province with interview sites.
HOME AREAS OF THE INFORMANTS
Shandong looks like a well-defined natural entity on a map. The
bold peninsula extends northeastward into the sea, pointing straight at
Korea. Together with the Liaodong Peninsula of Manchuria it forms an
entrance to the Gulf of Bohai. The Shandong Peninsula's base is anchored
to the North China Plain in the northwest and southwest; in the center it
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slopes up into the imposing mountain range of the Central Massif, which
includes China's most sacred mountain, Taishan. The Grand Canal
crosses Shandong from south to north near its western border, while the
Yellow River flows from west to east just south of its northern land
border. The strongly etched lines of the coast and the waterways suggest
a self-contained region.
This geography creates an appearance of cohesion not always
mirrored in political reality, for Shandong has been a province of marked
internal divisions throughout its history. During the Warring States
period (475-221 B.C.), the area was divided into two large and several
small states. Shandong's classical name, Qi-Lu, still frequently used,
combines the names of its two large states, Qi and Lu. Geographical
divisions are still important: Shandong has six administrative districts
{diqti), but in popular thinking it is divided into four traditional regions:
Luxi ("west Lu"), Lunan ("south Lu"), Lubei ("north Lu") and Jiaodong
("eastjiao").
The Yellow River's geographic reality also has to be approached
with some caution, because it has changed its course often enough to
make it difficult to think of as fixed in place. From the beginnings of
recorded history until the Northern Song (twelfth century), the Yellow
River entered the sea north of the Shandong Peninsula. It then moved
south of the Peninsula, where it stayed, emptying into the sea through
various mouths until 1854, when it moved north again. In 1938 it shifted
to the south once more, after dikes were blown upriver in a futile attempt
to halt the invading Japanese army. In 1947 it was redirected back north.
With each shift came devastating floods and massive loss of life; in the
1938 flood almost a million people in Henan and Jiangsu were killed, and
another twelve million injured or displaced. Each crisis necessitated a
major rearrangement of the Shandong economy.17
The regions of Shandong differ considerably in prosperity. The
Peninsula and the counties to the west of it on the northern slope of the
Central Massif have always been prosperous, and a few counties actually
rich. They benefit from the moderating influence of the sea on the
climate, and from alluvial soils that support a rich agriculture. The
Central Massif, on the other hand, has always been an area of great
poverty, beautiful but barren and arid. These two regions are part of the
same geological formation as the Liaodong Peninsula of Manchuria.
Lubei, Luxi, and Lunan are part of the North China Plain, with a harsh
continental climate, an agriculture perilously dependent on erratic
rainfall, and, depending on the course of the Yellow River, threatened by
floods. Lubei is plagued by soil leaching, evident in its famous "white
fields," where the soil is frosted with alkalies. Lunan has a mountainous
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northern section, the southern foothills of which are fairly fertile; this is
where Qufu, the home of Confucius, lies. In the 1920s Lunan's
desperately poor southern area on the North China Plain was part of the
Badlands, a zone of lawlessness and banditry that spread across parts of
Anhui, Henan, and northern Jiangsu, as well as southern Shandong. Luxi
was as poor as Lunan, but had a different topography; its land was low-
lying, usually sandy, and often waterlogged. Here lay the marshes of
Liangshanbo — today largely drained—home of the heroes of the Water
Margin.
These conventional divisions between the regions of Shandong are
not drawn on the map as the administrative divisions are, but they are
the ones local people use. For discussing the migration, they make better
points of reference than the administrative divisions.18
In the late Qing and early Republic, communications were poor
through much of the province. The great north-south route of traditional
China, the Grand Canal, had fallen into disrepair and was barely
passable. The Xiaoqing River, just south of the Yellow River, was used
for local traffic, but the Yellow River itself was not navigable. There were
very few roads; in the late Qing there were really only two, one running
north-south through the western part of the province, the other running
east-west just south of the Yellow River and along the Bohai coast.19 The
road from Qingdao to Yantai did not deserve the name. The first
automobile journey taken along it, a promotional gambit by the Qingdao
Chrysler distributor, came only in 1926. It took two and a half days to
travel about 150 kilometers. The distributor had these encouraging
words to say about the car: "The motor took deep sand, dust, ruts, holes,
plowed fields, river beds, rocks and water with wonderful ease/'20
Shandong's first modern improvement in transportation came with
the construction of two railways. The Jin-Pu Railway, which began
operation in 1910, ran from the port of Tianjin in Hebei, south to the
Yangtze River town of Pukou. It traversed Shandong from north to
south, passing through the provincial capital of Jinan. In Jinan the Jin-Pu
line connected to the Ji-Jiao line, which had opened for operation in 1904
to connect Jinan with the German leasehold at Qingdao.21 The logical
extension of that line, from Qingdao across the Peninsula to Yantai, was
not built until the 1950s.
The home counties of the informants demonstrate the wide diversity
of geographic and economic conditions within Shandong. They all boast
a long history and strong provincial identity, but each has a clear local
personality. While the counties described below do not constitute a
comprehensive sample of migrant home localities, they do provide a
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good cross section of the types of areas from which a large portion of
migrants came.
Ling
Ling County lies on the North China Plain southeast of Dezhou,
about twenty miles east of the Jin-Pu Railway. The plain is flat, but
deeply scarred with gullies and dry river valleys; as people say of
Saskatchewan, "the parts that aren't flat are lower/' Village houses, built
of bricks or adobe of the same dun color as the soil, almost blend into it.
The soil is alkaline, and there are patches of white frosting on many
fields where the salts have leached to the surface.
The history of Ling County goes back to the former Han (206 B.C-
A.D. 220). It has always been poor, always exposed to droughts, floods,
and locusts. In the 1920s and 1930s it was tortured by bandits. The
gazetteer compilers recorded mournfully:
It is not worth listing bandit troubles individually in the gazetteer.
Some people think it would be better to say nothing about them. But in
a hundred or a thousand years time, how will any reader know about
the anguish of the bandit turbulence that has so disturbed the people?22
In the 1920s Ling County was a backward place.23 Economic
development was slow in coming—in fact the county had been through a
process of economic contraction in the late Qing as loss of Grand Canal
trade hit Dezhou and the surrounding district.24 According to land
reform statistics, in 1945 the county had just over 350,000 people in
93,000 households. There were 4,124 landlords, who owned 32 percent of
the land; 68 percent of the population had some land, and 42,000 were
landless. Fifteen percent of the population migrated at some point during
the Republican period.25
Huimin
Huimin is a middle-sized county with poor, alkaline soil, located
northeast of Jinan on the north bank of the Yellow River. It has the same
harrowed landscape as Ling County. Its long history has been one of
grim poverty. Here is a description of Wutingfu, the prefecture in which
Humin lies, from just before the 1911 Revolution:
. . . the country lies so low that from time immemorial it has suffered
from the inroads of the waters of the Yellow River, and flood and
famine have been frequently experienced in all parts of the prefecture.
As a consequence, life is hard, the standard of living is low, the
population, which is said to number some two millions, is probably
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stationary, and from this part of Shandong there has always been a
steady stream of emigrants seeking a livelihood in more favoured
regions.26
The poverty was not evenly distributed. In the 1920s and 1930s, the
north of the county was poorer than its south, and it was from the north
in particular that people were recruited as migrant workers, through
recruiting chains stretching north to Tianjin. There are no contemporary
statistics on Republican-era migration, and the figure assessed from oral
interviews, 1,948 for the entire period, is much too low for a population
at land reform (1946) of 395,000.27
Binzhou, Bin County
Binzhou also lies north of the Yellow River, next to Huimin. It is a
recent creation, a major expansion of the old town of Beizhen. The
southern part of Bin County was hived off in 1982 to make Binzhou, and
this area is still rural, though technically part of the city. Binzhou is
important because it is the site where a ferry, and more recently, a bridge
cross the Yellow River; this is a key route for people going to Beijing from
southern China.28 The land attached to the town is fertile, but vulnerable.
Its villages lie between two great dikes along the Yellow River, the first
actually holding the river in, the second a back-up in case of flood. When
the river flooded in 1932, it inundated these villages. This danger made
the land undesirable, and most of the populace have remained
squatters.29 People here have little sense of permanency, only an uneasy
feeling that they are living where they really should not.
Boxing
Boxing is a small county south of Bin County, across the Yellow
River. It is connected to Jinan by the Xiaoqing River, and is about thirty
miles north of the Jinan-Qingdao Railway. A county administration has
been here since the Warring States period (475-221 B.C.),30 and historical
remains go back even further, to the Shang Dynasty (sixteenth to the
eleventh century B.C.).31
Boxing is not naturally blessed. The soil is poor and productivity is
low; in the 1920s land had so little value that it was not concentrated in
landlord hands; in 1922 there was a tenancy rate of less than 10 percent.32
Parts of the district are waterlogged and produce only osiers, rushes, and
willows, the raw materials for Boxing's major handicraft industry, woven
baskets and furniture.
The Franciscan Order of Quebec maintained a small mission in Bo-
xing. When Father Bonaventure Peloquin arrived there in 1915 he saw:
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. . . an immense, denuded plain, reminiscent of those of the Canadian
West, with, here and there, like so many baskets of greenery scattered
over the surface of a tranquil sea, innumerable little villages and
Zouping
Zouping, located directly east of Jinan, is one of the most famous
counties in China. Here in the 1930s the governor, Han Fuju, sponsored a
well-known agricultural experiment that was run by Liang Shuming, the
ranking expert on local development. The county's agricultural
conditions were intensively studied at the time.34 Since 1986 it has been a
research site for the Committee on Scholarly Communications with
China.
Zouping is a small county, with low hills in the south, and a flat
plain stretching north almost to the Yellow River. In 1931 it had a
population of just under 160,000 people, 95 percent of them farmers.35 Its
communication lines run west along the Xiaoqing River to Jinan and
south to the Jinan-Qingdao Railway at Zhoucun. The building of the
railway in 1904 turned the county town from a thriving center into
something close to a backwater, with all the Jinan-Qingdao traffic
passing along the railway rather than through the town.
Linqu
Linqu, situated to the southeast of Jinan, is a stunningly beautiful
mountain county, with rich red soil, soaring peaks, and sheer cliffs. It is
also terribly poor, because the mountains are arid and bare. The county
sits in a cul-de-sac at the end of the road from Yidu; to its south lies the
heart of the Central Massif, useless for agriculture, but a paradise for
bandits.
Linqu is not only poor, but also has a long history of natural and
manmade disasters. The following is a list of major disasters from the
early part of the century:
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ice storm, locusts, drought
harvest failure, drought
earthquake, torrential rain and hail, bandits
late snow, locusts, torrential rain, bandits
hail, heavy rain
continuous rain, bandits






torrential rain, locusts, soldiers
heavy rain, hail, bandits
heavy rain, bandits
extensive banditry
Source: Linqu xianzhi, 1935, 38-40.
In twenty-seven years only two passed without a natural disaster,
and only six without some military or bandit trouble. The greatest
disaster, a four-year drought, occurred in the early 1940s. The county got
occasional help from the Red Swastika Society in Jinan before the
Japanese invasion, but for the most part residents had to cope on their
own. They either starved at home or left the area for a short time. At
least half of the population—recorded at 380,000 during land reform
(1945 and 1946) — migrated at some stage, most in the early 1940s.36
The silk industry that developed in the first years of the Republic
gave new hope to the people of Linqu. By 1920 there were over a
thousand looms in operation, providing plenty of employment and
making Linqu appear to be a copybook example of diversification as a
means to cope with agricultural uncertainty.37 But the new industry was
vulnerable to changes in distant markets: The success of artificial silk in
1920s Europe and Japan practically killed Linqu's silk industry. Prices
that had boomed through the early 1920s collapsed, and by 1931 over a
hundred silk merchants had gone bankrupt.38 The Japanese invasion also
had a devastating effect on trade with other counties and destroyed
many sideline activities that had bolstered family incomes39
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The rugged terrain of Linqu.
The people of Linqu see themselves as straightforward and having a
sense of humor; they are imaginative in dealing with the rough hand
nature has dealt them. Indeed, the local cuisine includes a specialty
derived from poverty —deep-fried scorpions. It is a specialty because
courage, patience, and skill are needed first to catch the scorpions, then
to remove the poison.
Gaomi
Gaomi lies on the plain that crosses the waist of the Peninsula. It is
bleak terrain, flat land deeply scored with gullies; only in the west do
low hills rise to break the flatness. Its recent history has been dominated
by the Jinan-Qingdao Railway, which brought prosperity and allowed
the people to leave easily, but also made them vulnerable to foreign
pressure, first from the Germans and then from the Japanese. It also
opened them up to press-ganging by Chinese armies. Military activity,
especially of small irregular units (zapai), was almost indistinguishable
from banditry. From the early 1920s on, the high level of insecurity drove
the wealthier rural inhabitants into the county town or to Qingdao for
protection.40
In the spring of 1928, for example, much of the countryside of
Gaomi was infested with bandits. At first they demanded contributions
only from the rich, and only every ten days or so, but soon they started to
make daily demands from all households, rich and poor. The county
authorities did nothing to help, except to provide weapons to villagers
who asked for them. One village that did resist, Cuijia jicun, was
destroyed and all the villagers murdered.41 The local people's terror of
bandits was so absolute that it drove many to flee to Manchuria.
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Gaomi had a population in the mid-1930s of about 500,000, almost
all of them farmers. Land ownership was heavily concentrated; only one-
third of the land was owned by independent farm proprietors, while
much of the rest was owned by absentee landlords living in Qingdao. In
one township, Kangzhuangzhen, landlords and rich farmers owned 75
percent of the arable land. Tenant indebtedness was a serious problem
and the cause of many sudden departures. The recorded migration
figure for the Republican period was about 38,000, though this did not
include seasonal migrants, another very large figure. Gaomi was
politically more divided than many counties/There was strong support
for the Guomindang in the county town, while the rural areas favored
the Communists. The county was liberated twice, once in 1946 and again
in 1949, and each time large numbers of people fled.42
Gaomi has a strong tradition of popular culture and a rich
agricultural history. The movie Red Sorghum, based on a story by Mo
Yan, a local writer, was made there. Set in the late 1930s just before the
Japanese occupation, the film gives a sense of the tough, resourceful,
cheerful farmers of the county, able to endure almost anything and still
live their lives with gusto.
Laiyang
Laiyang is another beautiful area, with gentle hills covering 70
percent of the county. The remainder is a fertile plain, part of it boasting
the golden "oil sand" {yousha) on which grow groves of ancient pear
trees whose fruit has made Laiyang famous throughout China. The
county lies on the Peninsula to the northeast of Qingdao and stretches to
the coast at its southern end. Until recently its communications were
poor; the long-planned Qingdao-Yantai Railway that now passes through
the county was not completed until 1954.
Laiyang's agriculture has always prospered, given the richness of
the land, but this richness also led to a concentration of landholding and
an extensive tenancy system. Seventy percent of the land was controlled
by landlords or rich farmers.43 The county's huge population put
pressure on the land and by the late Qing people were forced to go
elsewhere for work. Young men were used to migrating by the time that the
great movement to Manchuria got underway; they left Laiyang to work
either as artisans or traders, but some also to set up substantial businesses in
Manchuria.44 The actual population during the Republican era is difficult to
calculate, since the boundaries were changed several times. County
authorities estimated that about 23,000 people, possibly 5 percent of the
population, migrated. Ninety percent of these were poor farmers.
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A pear orchard in Laiyang.
Laiyang has a strong cultural tradition and was known in eastern
Shandong as a center of learning. In the late Qing the Wang family of
Laiyang achieved the almost incredible feat of having three living jinshi
among its members.45 At that time the county center was described as "a
well-built city, having substantial walls, and having numerous ornamen-
tal arches in its streets/'46 To this day the county town appears prosperous
and attractive, its streets clean and tree-shaded, its buildings neatly painted.
Penglai
Penglai is a coastal county, at the juncture of the Gulf of Bohai and
the Yellow Sea. It was formerly the seat of the prefecture of Dengzhou
and a great historic center. Just outside the town is the sheer cliff said to
have been the jumping-off point for the Eight Immortals; the islands of
the immortals were said to lie somewhere off its coast and be visible to
the fortunate. The cliff has always attracted tourists, including Qinshi
Huangdi, first emperor of China, and Han Wudi, the most active
emperor of the Former Han. Many visitors recorded their appreciation of
the site in calligraphy. These inscriptions were later carved in stone and a
great collection of them resides in the temple buildings on the cliff and in
the gardens below. This collection is all that survived the destruction of
this "center of feudal superstition'' carried out by the Red Guards.
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Dengzhou was also a major naval station during the Ming (1368-
1644), but its harbor, Shuicheng (Water City), silted up and is only now
being dug out again. During the Republican period there was no port
because the water was too shallow for steamers. People going to
Manchuria went either by sailboat from the beach or caught a steamer at
Yantai, a treaty port where the harbor was maintained.
The agricultural areas surrounding Penglai must be among the most
beautiful in the world. Hills slope up gently from white beaches, the soil
is a soft red, and villages with solid stone houses nestle into the folds of
the hills. The climate is gentle, nature is abundant, and it is hard to
understand why the Immortals were looking for paradise elsewhere.
Penglai developed a mercantile tradition as early as the Ming
dynasty. Large numbers of people were involved in trade as small shop-
keepers and itinerant traders on the Liaodong Peninsula, less than a
hundred miles across the mouth of the gulf. By the end of the Qing the
tradition of leaving home permanently was well established and many
villages had parallel settlements (haiwaicun) across the water in Liaodong.
The first foreigners in the area, American missionaries, liked the
local people:
The people of the hsien are. . . simple, kindly, well-disposed to
foreigners, industrious and fairly reliable, with a good deal of character,
yet slow to receive the gospel.47
STATISTICAL RECORD OF THE MIGRATION
Problems with the statistical record turn on two issues. The first is
the technical question of how the statistics were collected and their
reliability. It is always dangerous to put too much faith in statistics, but
nowhere is this more true than in the records of Republican China. In the
Republican era, statistical accuracy was still a novel concept, and the
means of generating reliable data scarcely existed. No one understood
this problem better than Franklin Ho (He Lian), who at the age of 30
returned from the United States with a Ph.D. in economics from Yale to
establish the Nankai Institute of Economic Research in Tianjin:
When I initiated my research in 1926, my chief objective was to acquire
an empirical knowledge of the Chinese economy, which necessarily
rests on quantitative measurement of economic facts. Through the years
of experience in research at Nankai, however, I became convinced that
quantification of the Chinese economy is hazardous and must be
treated with extreme caution. Reliable statistics are the function of a
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high degree of statistical consciousness by the public, on the one hand,
and universally competent statistical staff on the other. In China, to say
the least, we were extremely deficient in both. In collecting quantitative
data oneself in China, one had to face the possibility of a misun-
derstanding of a numerical question by the subject. If one relied on
statistics compiled by others, the possibility of error was compounded;
one had not only to deal with the error inherent in the lack of a
statistically conscious public, but also with the possibility of error
stemming from the incompetency of the compiling statistical staff.
Statistical time series in China are the most defective. In most cases they
are not comparable from period to period. Coverage differs in each
case, and I would hesitate to waste too much time on them. Even for a
specific point of time, statistics are sometimes misleading. Before I
attempted to employ such statistics, I should want to know how the
statistics were compiled, who compiled them, and for what purpose
they were compiled. Of the statistics compiled in China, statistics
compiled for case studies, I found, were more reliable than others.48
The second question concerns where the figures were collected, and
by which nationality, at the sending (Chinese) end or the receiving
(Japanese) end. Chinese statistics looked at who had left. Data collected
in Ding County, Hebei, in the 1930s, for example, focused on those who
had left home but were still tightly connected to the family economy. The
statistics did not include brides, and in fact registered only twenty-two
females; but they did include men who had moved only short distances
to another part of the county. They also included a large number of
"unclear" responses, without specifying whether it was the family who did
not know where the relative was, or the data collectors. The statistics for
the nearly 700 men break down into four almost equal categories:











Source: Li Jinghan, "Nongcun jiating renkou fenxi," in Shehui
kexue, 2.1 (Mar. 1931): 113.
These are some of the best statistics available, since they were collected at
the Ding County experiment site of the Mass Education Movement and
were published through the most reputable of the new social science
journals. Still, they have to be treated with caution.
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The Japanese statistics counted the number of people who arrived in
Manchuria. They give a greater sense of security, since they are neat and
were collected efficiently by a large staff and processed through a highly
organized system. But they have their own inherent weaknesses. They
were collected by the agents of a dominant foreign power that became an
occupying force in 1931. There was no obvious trust between subjects
and collectors. The data were collected in part to control people, to
exclude them if they were sick, and to send them in specific directions.
The interests of the subjects were often diametrically opposed to those of
the collectors; if false information had to be given, it would be given.
Finally, many people simply avoided being counted, usually by traveling
overland or arriving in a vessel that did not go into the docks.
Is it then possible to find reliable data on migrant numbers? A good
starting point is Franklin Ho's own work. In 1931 he published a
description of the migration entitled Population Movement to the North
Eastern Frontier in China.49 Drawing his data from a series of studies
produced by the Research Department of the Japanese-owned South
Manchuria Railway Company, Ho noted: "Though the movement of
population from other parts of China to Manchuria on the Northeastern
frontier had grown steadily since the beginning of the Tsing [Qing]
Dynasty, no systematic statistics, whether official or nonofficial, relating
to the extent of such movement, had been compiled until 1923. In this
year the Research Department of the South Manchuria Railway
Company began the publication of annual statistics on the total volume
of Chinese immigration into Manchuria/'50
SMR Studies
The South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR), often referred to as
Mantetsu, an abbreviation of Minimi Manshu Tetsudo Kabushiki Kaisha,
was founded in 1906. Half of its original capital was provided by the
Japanese government and half by private investors. The SMR leadership
considered the company to be an arm of Japanese colonial management
and employed the Research Department to gather intelligence for that
purpose. Fortunately, the Research Department employed highly trained
social scientists, who conducted some of the most insightful economic
and social surveys carried out in North China in the 1920s and 1930s.51 In
his major study of the North Chinese rural economy published in 1985,
Philip Huang concludes that while the SMR researchers neglected the
" attitudes, values, and thoughts'' of Chinese villagers, they nonetheless
produced "the most precise and detailed body of information available to
us on pre-Revolution Hebei-Shandong villages/'52
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The SMR's first effort to analyze the migration intensively took
place in 1927 and produced a study called Minkoku juroku nen no
manshu dekasegi sha (Migrant workers in Manchuria in 1927).53 The
researchers collected information from the Chinese Maritime Customs
service, local offices of the SMR, and local government agencies at each
of the four main points of entry to Manchuria: the ports of Dalian,
Yingkou, and Andong, and the land route through Shanhaiguan. The
study estimated total migration for the years from 1923 through 1927 by
examining the data available for each of the entry points and making
adjustments where the data appeared deficient.
For the port of Dalian, the SMR researchers used passenger data
recorded by the port Water Police. They considered this series to be
generally reliable even though it did not include infants and was
inconsistent in its coverage of women. The only passenger data for the
other two ports were the figures reported by the Maritime Customs,
which the SMR researchers modified to allow for biases that were
reported by local sources. Passenger data reported by Customs for the
port of Yingkou were assumed to underreport the actual numbers by the
same rate as the difference found each year between the Customs data
and the Water Police reports at Dalian. They were adjusted accordingly.
At Andong the passenger records and reports by local Chinese police
revealed that about 10 percent of recorded arrivals and departures each
year were on their way to or from Dalian rather than North China, while
a further 20 percent were not migrants. The level of migration for each
year was therefore estimated as 70 percent of the figure reported by the
Maritime Customs.54
Movement in and out of Manchuria by the land route presented the
greatest measurement difficulties. The largest number of land migrants
traveled from Hebei on the Bei-Ning Railway to either Shenyang or
Huanggutun. Most then continued their journeys to destinations north of
Shenyang by rail or on foot. The Bei-Ning Railway did not keep complete
passenger records, so estimates of this flow were based on surveys that
counted passengers traveling north from Shenyang on the SMR during
the annual peak period of in-migration, from February through June.
There were also many migrants who simply walked from Hebei to
Manchuria. No record was made of their passage, and the SMR
researchers could estimate their numbers only roughly by referring to the
volume of railway passenger traffic. For the first six months of 1927 it
was estimated that 163,701 migrants arrived on the Bei-Ning line and
that 36,372 entered on foot.55
The SMR Research Department published additional studies of the
migration in 1928, 1929, and 1930.56 Comparable data on migrant
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numbers were gathered and published in the SMR periodicals, Manchu
sangyo tokei (Manchurian industrial statistics), and Romu jiho (Labor
review), in 1931,1932, and 1933.57
After the state of Manchukuo was established under Japanese control
in 1932, an elaborate labor certificate system for immigrants was
developed and put into effect in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The
Manchukuo government first issued "Regulations Governing the Entrance
of Foreigners" in 1933 for the purpose of excluding individuals considered
undesirable.58 Beginning in 1935 the regulations were enforced by an
agency called the Dadong Gongsi (Ta-tung Kung-ssu, the Great East
Company), which established offices at Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao,
Weihaiwei, Yantai, Longkou, Tanggu, and Shanhaiguan, with branch
offices in several other towns and cities. It was responsible for examining
all Chinese workers who wished to migrate to Manchuria and issuing
certificates to "those who were deemed safe to enter Manchoukuo." In
1935 this system was strengthened by a new set of labor regulations
which fined ship captains who carried migrants without certificates and
required them to return such migrants to their ports of departure.59 The
new Labor Control Commission also specified the total number of
migrants to be admitted in each year and the number in each of four
occupational areas: farming, construction, mining, and unskilled labor.
Article V of the 1935 Regulations specified the content of the
laborers' certificates as follows: "Every agent handling foreign laborers
shall issue to each foreign laborer before the latter's entry into this
country a certificate of identification containing the following facts: 1)
Permanent place of domicile; name and age; 2) Kind of labor; 3) Place of
entry; 4) Destination/'60 Migrant data gathered by the certificate system
from 1937 through 1942 were published by the SMR in its economic
reports.61
Customs Records
The SMR and Manchukuo agencies provided reliable data for the
period from 1923 to 1942, but for the years before 1923 the only
systematic data on the movement of people between North China and
Manchuria were the numbers of sea passengers noted by the Chinese
Maritime Customs Service in its annual reports on each of the treaty
ports. The Maritime Customs Service of the late Qing dynasty was a
curious institution, staffed at its upper levels by foreign nationals
primarily from Britain, Europe, and Japan, who maintained a strict ethic
of efficiency and loyalty to the Chinese government. Following China's
defeat in the Opium War, the foreign powers imposed customs practices
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and terms on China, with the result that the Customs Service was
insulated from much of the chaos that plagued the Chinese government
during the late Qing and the Republican era.62
Before the 1890s the passenger data in Customs reports appears to
have included only a small fraction of the migrants. In 1876, for instance,
when drought and famine in North China caused hundreds of thousands
of refugees to flee to Manchuria, Customs recorded only 618 passengers
leaving Yantai for Manchuria and only 8,562 people embarking at Tianjin
for all destinations.63 At this time most migrants still made the crossing to
Manchuria on sailing junks that were not subject to supervision by
Customs. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, a major share of
the passenger traffic was carried by steamships, which were bigger,
faster, and more reliable than junks, and were more consistently monitored
by Customs. In the 1890s the Maritime Customs reported passenger
figures that were much closer to the levels of seaborne migration
reported by other sources. In 1893 over 44,000 Chinese passengers were
recorded leaving North China ports for Manchuria, and in 1900 over
120,000 passengers were reported.64
Some of the Customs commissioners believed that the annual
reports seriously understated passenger figures. This suspicion was
confirmed at Yingkou in 1899 and 1901. Outbreaks of plague at the port
in these years resulted in medical examinations and enumeration of all
departing passengers. These independent passenger counts found
significantly larger actual numbers of passengers on each ship than the
total reported.65 In 1927 the South Manchuria Railway researchers found
that ships routinely carried more than their authorized capacity of
passengers, even though they always reported numbers within their
rated limits.66 The Railway researchers were able to estimate the size of
the shortfall for the years from 1923 to 1928 by comparing Customs
passenger data for Dalian with records maintained by the harbor Water
Police. They found that the number recorded by the police exceeded the
Customs total by an average of 18 percent in the six years from 1923
through 1928.67
Despite the persistent tendency to undercount, the Customs
passenger series is consistent with the major historical events that
influenced the migration. The number of passengers recorded entering
Manchuria by sea rose steadily in the early 1890s, declined sharply
during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and 1895, then surged at the turn
of the century as construction of the South Manchuria Railway caused
the demand for labor to explode. By 1902 the annual total was over
200,000. The only significant drop below that level occurred during the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and during the pneumonic plague
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epidemic in Manchuria in 1911.68 After 1928 passenger data were no
longer published in the annual Customs reports.
Of course, the passenger data include some travelers who were not
migrants and do not include migrants who traveled by routes that did
not go through the treaty ports. Fortunately the SMR studies from the
1920s explain how the passenger data related to the total numbers of
migrants. By following the Railway's adjustments, it is possible to
reconstruct migrant data for 1891 to 1922 that are consistent with the
series for 1923 to 1942, resulting in a continuous statistical description of
the migration for the fifty-two years from 1891 to 1942. The numbers are
illustrated in Figure 1.3 and appear in Appendix Table I.69
Observations on the Data
Figure 1.1 shows that annual migration numbers rose substantially at the
turn of the century, when the first railways in Manchuria were
constructed. From 1895 until the early 1940s there was a steady increase
in migrant numbers, from an average of less than 40,000 a year between
1891 and 1895, to over a million each year in the late 1920s and again in
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the late 1930s. The rising flow was interrupted only by the Russo-
Japanese War in 1904 and restrictive immigration policies of the
Manchukuo government in the early 1930s. The figure also shows that
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return migration closely followed out-migration in most years, but that
the difference between the two could vary considerably, from net losses
for Manchuria in a few years, to gains of over half a million in 1928 and
the late 1930s. (For details on return migration, see chapter 4.)
Because the data were gathered at the relatively few routes into
Manchuria, the annual flow can be divided into migrants coming from
two broad home areas. Most migrants who lived on the Shandong
Peninsula to the east and north of the railway between Jinan and
Qingdao departed from the ports of Longkou and Yantai (Chefoo) on the
north coast of the Peninsula. This was the case with Zhang Zhenbao and
his companions. Migrants from western Shandong and Hebei—many
from areas on the North China Plain—could either make the entire trip
by land, or they could take ships from Qingdao or Tianjin. The separate
streams of migration from the Shandong Peninsula and Hebei-West
Shandong appear below in Figure 1.2. The numbers are given in
Appendix Table 2.
Figure 1.2 shows that the level of migration from the Shandong
Peninsula was remarkably stable, reflecting the area's proximity to
Fig. 1.2 Migration from the Shandong





Manchuria and its long tradition of sending off "swallows" each spring.
After the turn of the century annual migration rarely fell below 200,000
and only once rose above 300,000. The average number of migrants per
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year for the entire 52-year period was 181,000, and the standard
deviation was 79,000, less than half of the average. The flow from Hebei
and western Shandong, on the other hand, was much larger, averaging
over 300,000 migrants per year, but it was also much more variable. The
numbers after 1902 ranged erratically between a minimum of 15,700 in
1904 and a maximum of over 1.2 million in 1940, with a standard
deviation of 276,000, nearly as large as the average.
The importance of migration to an area depends not just on the
numbers of migrants, but also on the size of the population. In 1933 the
population of Hebei, including the Beijing Metropolitan District, was
reported as 34.6 million, and the population of Shandong was reported
as 40.6 million, of whom 14.3 million resided in Jiaodong District—the
Peninsula. In other words, although less than 20 percent of the combined
populations of Hebei and Shandong resided on the Peninsula, it supplied
almost 40 percent of all migrants. Figure 1.3 shows the portion of the
population of each of the two broad home areas that migrated each year,
expressed as the rate of migration (migrants per thousand population).
Fig. 1.3 Rate of Migration from the Shandong Peninsula





GO OO. Q O O \ Q s O \ Q s Q \ Q \ G s O s O s O \ G \
Year
The data appear in Appendix Tables 3 and 4. On average, over 2.5
times as many people per thousand went to Manchuria from the
Peninsula each year as from the other home areas, demonstrating again
the more permanent role of migration in the Peninsula's economy.
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The importance of circular migration70 to the population of the
Peninsula is emphasized in the Longkou Trade Reportfor 1916:
That emigration is the keystone in the whole life-structure of the entire
population of this vast and populous district will be understood when
it is realized that of three sons in a family invariably two leave home to
seek their luck for a shorter or longer period in the North.71
In the 1860s, Ida Pruitt said of Penglai:
From almost every family a son went to Manchuria to seek his fortune,
for trade was in their bones and the rocks of the homeland were bare. A
good sailboat could get there, threading between the islands, in two or
three days if the weather was fair.72
For much of the Peninsula, particularly the coastal regions,
migration was not just a reaction to hard times, it was a basic element of
the local economy.

PUSHES AND PULLS: FORCES
THAT SHAPED THE MIGRATION
The former migrants interviewed for this study traveled to Manchuria
because they believed they could earn more money there than at home.
As with most voluntary migrations in other times and places, the various
forces that observers reported were important to the migration primarily
because they affected income-earning possibilities.1 And income pros-
pects at both ends of the migration were most directly influenced by
economic growth — or the lack of it. In the case of early twentieth-century
China, the most dynamic improvements in the economy were stimulated
by the arrival of modern production methods, modern transportation,
and international trade. At the same time, the economy was often
damaged by natural and manmade disasters that retarded growth over
wide areas and pushed many migrants from their homes.
Other considerations pushed some migrants toward Manchuria and
pulled others away. For many potential migrants the decision to venture
far from home was eased by signing on with a recruiter. Recruiters
removed the uncertainty and risk of going through a job search in
Manchuria, although they also took part of the migrants' earnings —
sometimes a very substantial part—as their fees. Some migrants were
drawn to destinations other than Manchuria, including places as distant
as South Africa and France. Job prospects in Manchuria were also
affected by the arrival of immigrants from other countries, including
Russia, Japan, and Korea.
43
44 SWALLOWS AND SETTLERS
MIGRATION A N D T H E E C O N O M Y
Economic change in China and abroad during the late Qing brought
opportunity for some but removed it from others. After the Taiping
Rebellion cut off trade between north and south China in the 1850s,
many people in western Shandong lost their livelihood as the grain trade
on the Grand Canal dwindled to nothing.2 Linqing, on the Grand Canal
at the Shandong-Zhili border, declined from a considerable trading
center into a backwater after the Taipings captured it in 1855.3 Traffic on
the Grand Canal was not restored with peace, but was supplanted by
faster and cheaper steam transportation, first by ship, then by rail. The
vagaries of foreign trade and export-led production also produced
instability in employment. Wei County, in central Shandong, was one of
the first areas in China to grow substantial amounts of the "bright
tobacco" used in manufactured cigarettes. The crop promised great
profits, but also exposed growers to a range of risks from disease to price
gouging to price fluctuations on international markets.4 Yantai (Chefoo)
was hit by a permanent foreign market disaster, when after the First
World War women in Europe and North America started bobbing and
shingling their hair, thus drastically reducing the demand for hairnets.
At Yantai, the center of the hairnet industry, workshops that had once
employed 17,000 people by 1926 employed only 2,000. Former workers
in the industry and their families had to look for another source of
income.5 For many people, migration to Manchuria was the answer.
Incomes
Numerous studies have documented the job opportunities and higher
income levels in Manchuria. Franklin Ho, writing in 1931, remarked, "As a
distinct pioneer belt and with the growth of industrialization, Manchuria is in
need of more laborers than they themselves can supply for the development
of industry, mining, and agriculture. Opportunities for employment are
plentiful and wages are relatively high/' He found that in Jilin and
Heilongjiang Provinces a migrant from Shandong working as an assistant
farm hand could earn " about $130 Harbin currency a year, or almost three to
four times as much as he could earn in his native district/'7
An SMR study on migrants published in 1940 compared real wage
levels of Chinese workers in Manchuria and North China by calculating
the portion of daily wages that was required for eating expenses in each
area. Among the Chinese construction workers and coal miners surveyed
in Manchuria, an average of 46 percent of each day's wage was spent on
minimal food needs, while the comparable figure for single cargo
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handlers and spinning mill workers in Qingdao was nearly 60 percent.
Another SMR study published in 1941 divided total wages by living
expenses for six occupations in North China and Manchuria, then
compared the ratio of this "real wage" rate in Manchuria to that in North
China. In the occupations surveyed, net income rates in Manchuria were
between 47 and 118 percent higher than in North China.
Table 2.1 Ratio of "Real Wages"















Source: Toiku Shiro, "Hokushi ni okeru tai man
rodo ryoku kyokyu no kinkyo" (Recent condition
of the labor supply for Manchuria in North
China), in Mantetsu chosa geppo 21.1 (January
1941): 178, Table 1.
History, Geography, and Jobs
Why did Manchuria offer more jobs and higher wages? The
fundamental reason was that there were far fewer people relative to the
available natural resources in Manchuria than in Shandong and Hebei.
Population density was low in Manchuria for several historical and
geographic reasons, the most basic of which was that there were few
natural transportation routes, particularly in the north. Although
Manchuria had been linked to North China from the earliest eras of
Chinese civilization, it was also sufficiently isolated to prevent full
integration with China before the twentieth century. Archaeological
evidence indicates there were close ties between North China and
southern Manchuria as early as the prehistoric and Yin-Shang (roughly
1766-1122 B.C.) Chinese cultures, and when the Great Wall was first
pieced together by the Qin dynasty at the end of the third century B.C.,
the eastern end is said to have encompassed the southern tip of
Manchuria, including the Liaodong Peninsula.9 Nonetheless, for most of
its history Manchuria was only tenuously connected to the periphery of
the extensive North China marketing networks.10 Manchuria did not
develop dense regional marketing systems like those that had emerged
centuries earlier in the other major regions of China until railways were
introduced.
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Manchuria was historically divided by its geography into two
distinct economic and cultural zones. The southern half of the fertile
Manchurian Plain is drained by the Liao River, which flows south to the
Gulf of Bohai, providing transportation toward the markets of North
China. This region was inhabited from ancient times primarily by
Chinese farmers and was controlled in some periods by strong Chinese
empires. The northern part of the plain, however, is drained by the
Songhua (Sungari) River, which flows north to the Heilongjiang (Amur)
River, away from China. This region and the mountainous areas to the
east and west of the central plain were home to nomadic and semi-
nomadic tribes that Chinese governments rarely controlled.11 In three
periods when the Chinese state was weak, coalitions of tribes from
Manchuria invaded China and established dynasties. The last of these
occurred in 1644, when the group of tribes that called itself the Manchus
seized control of all China and ruled as the Qing dynasty until the
Republican Revolution of 1911.12
The Qing controlled all of Manchuria, but intentionally hindered its
economic development. The labor shortage that drew migrants into the
region from North China in the twentieth century had its origins three-
and-a-half centuries earlier, when the prolonged series of campaigns
waged by the Manchu banner armies against the forces of the Ming
dynasty decimated the population of Manchuria. By the time the
conquest was completed, the population of Manchuria had dwindled to
around three million people.13 For a brief period the Qing government
encouraged resettlement of southern Manchuria by willing migrants and
thousands of convicts and political exiles. In the 1660s, however, Manchu
leaders decided to prohibit Chinese migration in order to preserve the
Manchu way of life and to retain control over valuable products of the
region, notably ginseng root and furs, especially the sable. To enforce the
ban on migration, two lines of willow trees, known as the "Willow
Palisades/' were planted along the periphery of the traditional area of
Chinese settlement in southern Manchuria. Troops were stationed at
checkpoints along the palisades.14 The penalties for ships' captains who
helped migrants move to Manchuria were harsh; the mid-Qing legal
code stipulated 90 strokes of the bamboo, two-and-a-half years' exile,
plus confiscation of the boat as punishment.15
Nonetheless, the official prohibition did not completely stop
migration into Manchuria, a fact the Qing court was well aware of. An
edict from the Kangxi Emperor in 1707 noted that in Manchuria, "We
saw people from Shandong everywhere, some hundred thousand living
as merchants or working on the land."16
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Few of these people were officially sanctioned settlers; most hoped
to quietly make a reasonable living as squatters on the rich land and
avoid detection by the authorities in their remote locations.17 A Japanese
journalist later gave a lyrical description of the historical process that had
brought the settlers there:
When the Chinese entered Manchuria they walked with the furtive
steps of a thief. Indeed, they were law-breakers —criminals in the
eyes of the Manchu law. They bowed in the dust before the Manchu
landlord: got the job of a petty farm labourer. Their one passion
seemed to be patient, eternal toil. Nothing stopped them in their
work. And in that manner they laid the foundation of economic and
financial power. But they never made speeches over it. When their
Manchu landlords wished to lease the land they spoke, for they
were ready to put up the money. When the land changed hands, it
was from the hand of the original Manchu owner to that of a
Chinese tenant farmer. Settled on their own piece of land, they
called across the Yellow Sea to their kinfolk whom they had left in
their home villages in Shantung. The kinfolk came and joined them.
The history of the Agricultural Development of Manchuria is the
story of the Shantung Coolie, nothing more.18
Many banner troops and local officials regarded settlers as an asset.
Banner garrisons were expected to support themselves by farming, and
bannermen on active duty were sometimes rewarded with pieces of land
rather than money. Thus many bannermen in Manchuria held tracts of
land which they were eager to rent or sell to Chinese farmers. In
addition, Chinese farmers, artisans, and merchants supplied the
bannermen highly desired goods and services, and they were a valuable
source of taxation revenue for local governments.19
The prohibition on immigration was officially relaxed in times of
famine in North China.20 A massive wave of refugees entered Manchuria
during the great drought and famine of 1876 to 1879, one of the worst
natural disasters in Chinese history. It devastated much of Shaanxi,
Shanxi, Henan, Hebei, and western Shandong, with a death toll believed
to number over ten million people.21 In 1876 Chinese officials told the
Customs commissioner at Yingkou (Newchwang) that nearly 900,000
migrants arrived in South Manchuria that year: some 80,000 arrived by
boat at Yingkou, around 600,000 landed on the Liaodong Peninsula, and
about 200,000 entered by the land route through Shanhaiguan.22
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The settlers, legal or otherwise, concentrated most densely in the
Liaodong Peninsula; further north government efforts to keep the
Manchu heartland free from Chinese settlement, plus the inhospitable
climate and the lack of efficient transportation routes, kept the
population far below what the land could support. At the end of the
Qing, most of the land in the north was still virgin and was beginning to
attract unwelcome attention from Russia and Japan. When the Qing
authorities finally decided to open Manchuria to settlement—the
northern parts in 1860, and the whole area in 1887—it was to counter the
growing threat of Russian expansionism.23
Once Manchuria was opened, it inspired great excitement, not only
among Russians and Japanese, but among other foreigners who saw it as
one of the last frontiers in the world. The scarcity of labor was seen as
one of the few obstacles to rapid development. By the end of the Qing the
population of Fengtian, the southern part of Manchuria, was reported to
be around 18 million.24 But the central and northern zones remained so
seriously short of labor that in 1901 Alexander Hosie, the British consul
at Yingkou, estimated that only one-fifth of the arable land in Manchuria
was under cultivation.
Railways and Migration
The most important barrier to economic growth in Manchuria was
removed at the turn of the twentieth century when the Chinese Eastern
and South Manchuria railway lines brought steam-powered transpor-
tation to the Manchurian Plain. In 1896 the Qing court granted Russia the
right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway across northern Manchuria to
the port of Vladivostok. In 1898 Russia also received the rights to lease
Dalian and Port Arthur (Lushun) and to build the South Manchuria
Railway to connect the Liaodong Peninsula to the Chinese Eastern
Railway.26
Ironically, while Russia intended the two railways to extend its
control over Manchuria, they actually provided the means and the
stimulus for the massive influx of Chinese settlers that ensured
Manchuria would remain Chinese.27 When construction began in 1898,
migration from Hebei and Shandong soared as tens of thousands of
laborers sought work on the railways. In that year the Newchwang
Customs commissioner at Yingkou remarked in his annual report, "The
increase apparent in the number of those who arrived is owing to the
engagement of numbers of coolies required to build the Russian railway.
Each steamer that arrived from Chefoo [Yantai] and Tientsin was literally
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packed with coolies, some of the steamers which came in from Tientsin
to this port being specially chartered to convey coolies/' Between 1897
and 1900 the number of migrants recorded entering Manchuria from
North China ports grew from about 42,000 to over 122,000, and in 1902
the total exceeded 213,000.28
When the railways were opened to traffic in 1902, migrants were
able for the first time to travel quickly and relatively inexpensively from
the docks at Yingkou and Dalian all the way north to Heilongjiang. The
influence of the railways on the settlement of Manchuria was profound.
At the end of the nineteenth century Jilin and Heilongjiang were still
relatively lightly populated, with an extensive, frontier-style economy as
opposed to the intensive agriculture characteristic of the North China
Plain.29 The completion of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchuria
lines linked Jilin and Heilongjiang to the ports of Vladivostok, Dalian,
and Yingkou. Steamship traffic quickly drew Manchurian products into
regional and world markets, fostering lively trade with Japan, western
Europe, and North America. With growing markets for agricultural
exports — dominated by a booming trade in Manchurian soybeans —and
easier, cheaper transportation, large numbers of farmers from North
China streamed onto the plains of northern Manchuria during the next
three decades.30
Russia's dominance over railway development in Manchuria was
brief. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War in
1905, awarded Russia's rights over the Liaodong Peninsula and the South
Manchuria Railway line between Changchun and Dalian to Japan.31
From 1906 until 1931 Manchuria was a complex patchwork of Chinese,
Japanese, and Russian spheres of authority. Northern Manchuria was
dominated by the Chinese Eastern Railway, which remained under
Russian control until the Russian Revolution of 1917. In the 1920s the
railway was managed jointly by a Chinese-Soviet board, but it became a
subject of dispute and finally the cause of an undeclared border war
between China and the Soviet Union in 1929. Meanwhile, Japan held the
Liaodong Peninsula, the South Manchuria Railway, the strip of land
through which the SMR ran, and a host of smaller rail lines, mines, and
other industrial and commercial projects.
The Russian and Japanese enterprises received the most attention,
but there was also a growing number of railways under Chinese control,
including the important Bei-Ning (Beijing-Shenyang or Peking-Mukden)
Railway. In addition, commerce, agriculture, and light industry were
mostly Chinese-owned, and the civil government and military forces in
all but the leasehold areas were also Chinese. This Chinese government
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was not, however, the national government, but the warlord regime of
Marshal Zhang Zuolin. When he was assassinated in 1928 by elements of
the Japanese Army in Manchuria,32 he was succeeded by his son Zhang
Xueliang, the " Young Marshal/' who was driven out of Manchuria by
the Japanese Army in the so-called Manchurian Incident of 1931.
The importance of the railways to economic growth is illustrated by
the following data on the "average cost of transportation of agricultural
products to markets outside the hsien [xian, county] in silver dollars per
ton-mile" in the early 1930s:























Source: L. Buck, Land Utilization in China: Statistics,
Chapter 9, Table 5. Note: Similar figures from a variety of
sources are given in Ralph William Huenemann, The
Dragon and the Iron Horse: The Economics of Railroads in
China, 1876-1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1984), 222-25.
The lower cost of railway and steamship transportation opened new
markets for many traditional Chinese products, such as peanuts, eggs,
and sesame seeds.33 The most dramatic impact was on the soybean trade.
By 1929 Manchuria produced 61 percent of the world's total soybean
output.34 Many of the jobs migrants obtained —in farming, transpor-
tation, or oil pressing—were directly related to the soybean trade, while
thousands of others worked in service trades supplying everything from
shoes to meals for the bean workers.
Even traditional forms of transportation that had declined so
precipitously along the old Grand Canal were stimulated in most areas
by the rise of railway and steamship traffic. While trains and steamships
took over much of the long-distance hauling, nearly all local
transportation still relied on sampans, junks, carts, porters, and pack
animals. The rapidly growing volume of regionally and internationally
traded farm products still had to be moved from the farms and towns
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where they were produced to the sparse network of rail lines and
steamship ports.35 In 1900 the Customs report for Yingkou commented
that "the growth of commerce induced by cheap and speedy conveyance
in steamers must surely demand many more junks to feed the Treaty
Ports from non-treaty places on the coast/'36 In 1908 British consul
Alexander Hosie reported a tripling of the boat traffic on the Liao River,
which carried produce from the South Manchuria Plain to the port of
Yingkou and returned with salt, iron, and general cargo.37 The Customs
decennial report for 1922 to 1931 remarked that traditional shipping
continued to function with surprising success in the face of steam
competition, due mainly to the overall increase in commerce, and also to
a reduction in piracy achieved by the steamships and the presence of
modern gunboats.38 In fact, Customs data on junk entries in the annual
reports indicate that junk traffic in the Gulf of Bohai more than doubled
between 1910 and 1928.


























Source: CMC, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports io? Tianjin, Yantai,
Dairen, Yingkou, 1910-1928.
Railways and steam shipping also contributed significantly to
increased employment in China's small modern sector. The railways
themselves were important employers of labor, particularly during the
construction phase. In 1899 the Customs commissioner at Yingkou
reported that over 200,000 Chinese laborers were at work constructing
the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER).39 In 1935, when administration of the
CER was transferred from Soviet authorities to the SMR, it employed
10,716 Chinese workers.40
Modern industry constituted only a small part of the Chinese
economy in the early twentieth century, but it grew rapidly where it was
served by rail or steamship transportation and had access to foreign
trade. Coal mining, for instance, was directly linked to railway expan-
sion. The first railway in North China was built in the late 1870s to
service the Kaiping Mines at Tangshan in northeastern Hebei.41 As early
as 1899 the CER opened several coal mines along its route in Man-
churia.42 A major goal of the German colonial plan for Shandong was to
exploit the mineral resources of the Peninsula; coal mines were
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developed within the zone of the Shandong Railway concurrently with
construction of the track. German mining activity in Shandong also
generated concerted competition from Chinese-owned mines at the
urging of the provincial authorities.43 The Fuxun coal mines near Shen-
yang, the largest mining operation in China, were first developed in
modern form by the SMR,44 and their rapid expansion directly affected
migration through a recruiting system instituted to alleviate shortages of
mine labor in 1918. Between 1918 and 1921 an average of 15,000 mine
workers were recruited in Shandong and Hebei each year.45
Describing itself as "the carrier of the light of civilization into
Manchuria/'46 the South Manchuria Railway Company operated a wide
range of modern enterprises including hotels, harbors, a shale-oil
distillation plant, the Anshan iron works, and a host of public works such
as schools, hospitals, and research facilities. Between 1907 and 1936 over
60 percent of SMR capital outlays were invested in holdings other than
railways, and between 1933 and 1936 less than half of the company's
receipts were railway revenues.47
Railways were also introduced in Hebei and western Shandong—
but not the Peninsula —around the turn of the century. The Beijing-
Hankou Railway, which ran south from Beijing through western Hebei,
began carrying limited freight in 1901 and was completed in 1906 (see
Appendix Table 5). The Beijing-Liaoning Line, originally begun in 1878
at the Kaiping Mines north of Tianjin, was extended in stages north to
Shenyang and south to Tianjin and then Beijing. When it was completed
in 1907, it became the main artery between North China and Manchuria.
The Tianjin-Pukou Line ran south from Tianjin through Jinan and
southern Shandong and thence to the Yangtze River valley. It began to
carry traffic in 1910 and was completed in 1912. The Shandong Railway,
also known as the Jiao-Ji (Kiao-tsi) Line, was the most significant
economic result of Germany's endeavors in Shandong. Running from the
port of Qingdao across the base of the Peninsula to Jinan, it began
carrying traffic in 1901 and was completed in 1904. Taken together, these
lines formed a very sparse network for the size of the area and the
population they served, but as in Manchuria, they restructured the
economic landscape, opening domestic and world markets to products
that previously had been traded only locally or not at all.
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Figure 2.1 shows that the volume of rail traffic in Hebei-West
Shandong was very close to the volume in Manchuria until the 1920s,
when warlord conflicts caused freight tonnage in North China to
stagnate and decline, while growth in Manchuria went on unabated. The
effect on employment and incomes, however, was much larger in
Manchuria because each ton of freight served a considerably smaller
Fig. 2.1 Rail Freight Volume in Hebei-West
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population. At the turn of the century the combined population of Hebei
and Shandong was around 66 million, while the number of people in
Manchuria was about 24 million. By the mid-1930s the population of
Manchuria reached some 40 million, while Hebei and Shandong held
about 76 million.48 Figure 2.2 shows that as soon as the Chinese Eastern
and South Manchuria lines went into operation, railway freight per
capita in Manchuria was over four times as large as in Hebei and
Shandong and was never less than twice as large.
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Fig. 2.2 Railway Freight Tons per Capita, Hebei-West
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Foreign Trade and Migration
The rise in foreign trade that accompanied the growth of modern
transportation also increased income-earning opportunities for many
workers. Figure 2.3 shows the growth of total net foreign trade (imports
plus exports minus re-exports) in Manchuria, the Shandong Peninsula and
Hebei-West Shandong.
As with the railways, the impact was greater in Manchuria than in
North China. As the source of modern production technology, foreign
trade was closely linked to the growth of modern economic activities.49
Many of the materials and machines required for the construction of
industrial facilities were imported from abroad. Of 1,244 engines
delivered to railways in China proper between 1897 and 1930, only 58
were constructed in China —all at the Tangshan workshop of the Beijing-
Liaoning Railway— while the others were imported from America,
England, Germany, France, and Belgium.50 Between 1913 and 1936
imports supplied approximately 44 percent of the iron and steel and 70
percent of the machinery used in China.51 Machinery, transportation
materials, iron, steel, and other metals accounted for a steadily rising
share of China's imports, from 7 percent in 1913 to 14 percent in 1920 to
25 percent in 1936.52
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Fig. 2.4 Trade per Capita: Shandong Peninsula,




j . . . Hebei-West Shandong
y— Manchuria
Year
56 SWALLOWS AND SETTLERS
In foreign trade as in railway traffic the advantage enjoyed by
Manchuria in most years after the turn of the century was even larger in
per capita terms. Figure 2.4 demonstrates that beginning in 1901 the
importance of foreign trade relative to population size was substantially
greater in Manchuria than in either the Shandong Peninsula or in Hebei-
West Shandong. In fact, over the forty-year period from 1891 to 1931
there was no growth at all in the foreign trade of the Shandong
Peninsula. Trade at the northern Peninsula ports reached its peak in 1901
and the figures for the 1920s are nearly the same as those for the early
1890s. In other words, people living on the Peninsula received none of
the benefits of the expanded foreign markets that generated thousands of
new jobs in Manchuria.
Disasters and Migration
Disasters exerted perennial pressure to migrate. In a survey of over a
thousand migrant families conducted by the Nankai Economic Research
Institute in 1931, 27 percent of the respondents identified disasters of
various types as their reason for leaving home.53 Natural disasters ran the
gamut from flood to drought to insects to disease. Manmade disasters
were usually associated with warfare. There was constant lament about
military turbulence and the related disruption of daily life, especially in
areas frequented by zapai—small military units independent of any
superior command. Sometimes the damage was done by actual fighting,
for example, that which accompanied the Northern Expedition of 1927-
1928,54 or the earlier Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, in which
some20,000 civilians died in southern Manchuria.55 More often, however,
devastation was brought about by the demands the military made on the
civilian population for food, labor, animals, money, and taxes.56 In 1925
there were a quarter of a million soldiers in Shandong, eating up three-
quarters of the provincial budget and making constant additional
demands on the areas in which they were stationed.57 In 1929 a map of
Shandong showed six distinct military commands, including those of the
central government and the Japanese; about a third of the province had
no single command, but was "overrun with brigands and remnants of
armies.'58
Civilians especially feared military press-ganging—men being
seized not to be soldiers but to serve as porters.59 The danger of press-
ganging was greatest near major roads or railway lines or close to a port;
the military "recruiters" did not want to go further than they had to.
Press-ganging took place with depressing regularity along the railway
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line from Jinan to Qingdao, and the fear of press-ganging forced many
young men to flee.60
But no area was immune. In 1930 a student who returned for the
summer to his home in Lu County (southwestern part of the Peninsula)
found the place beset by soldiers involved in the war between Nanjing
and the combined forces of Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan. The greatest
fear for the local people, as it had been for the past decade, was press-
ganging, which had led about 20 percent of the young men to leave the
district over the previous decade.61
An immediate economic result of warlord-era fighting was the
serious disruption of transportation as armies commandeered all
available vehicles.62 The detrimental impact of the civil wars on Hebei
and western Shandong is plainly evident in Figure 2.1 in the reduced
railway freight traffic of the 1920s. A less direct economic result was
disruption of the nationwide financial market. In 1911, for instance,
fighting related to the Republican Revolution did not touch Manchuria,
but Chinese banks throughout China and Manchuria all suspended
operations, and merchants were unable to obtain the credit they needed
to purchase stocks of goods, causing a serious decline in trade.63
North China was notoriously vulnerable to natural disasters. Floods
often wreaked tremendous physical destruction in the low-lying regions
of Hebei and western Shandong, particularly along the Yellow River.
Topsoil was washed away. Houses, crops, and animals were destroyed,
reducing not only the size of the harvest and levels of trade in the year of
the flood itself, but also jeopardizing the ability of the population to
return to normal economic activities in subsequent years.64 Canals and navi-
gable rivers became blocked by silt, and roads and railways were washed
out. Floods had the greatest impact when they were followed by one or
more additional years of natural disaster. The terrible famine of 1920
resulted from a sequence of catastrophic events which began with a flood
that inundated 15,000 square miles in Hebei in 1917, continued with poor
harvests in 1919, and culminated in a lethal drought in 1920-1921.65
The most deadly disasters were droughts. The drought-famine of
1876-1879 killed between nine and 13 million people in the provinces of
Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Hebei, and Shandong. The drought-famine of
1920-1921 affected nearly 25 million peasants in roughly the same area.
Mortality was greatly reduced due to railway food deliveries, but the
number of deaths still reached approximately 500,000.66 Desperate
measures taken during drought-famines inflicted lasting damage on
farm resources, since farm families were sometimes forced to eat their
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livestock, their seed grain, and even weeds and the leaves of the trees
that helped to prevent erosion.
Disasters were not limited to North China. In both North China and
Manchuria dense population concentrations and primitive sanitary
conditions allowed communicable diseases to spread with great speed.
The most severe disease to affect the migration was pneumonic plague.
Several times in the early twentieth century it swept down the railway
lines and trade routes from Mongolia and northern Manchuria, where
trappers were infected by fleas from plague-carrying marmots and rats.
The rate of mortality was high. The worst epidemic of plague occurred in
the winter of 1910-1911, causing an estimated 70,000 deaths in
Manchuria.68 Cholera and influenza also caused extensive fatalities.69 In
some cases afflicted areas were quarantined, as at Yantai, where, during
the epidemic of 1910-1911, ships were prevented from calling at the port
for four months.70
Banditry also afflicted both North China and Manchuria. Even a
small number of bandit raids could virtually paralyze commerce over a
wide area, as happened in response to the activities of the brigand called
White Wolf in North Central China in 1913 and 1914. Reductions in
commerce were reportedly caused by increased bandit predation in
Hebei and Shandong in 1918.71
The severity of the bandit problem in North China rose during the
warlord era of the 1920s, as the numbers of the destitute increased,
swelling the ranks of potential desperadoes, and as modern arms became
more readily available from the warlord armies.72 In Manchuria the
bands of mounted brigands known as hong huzi (red beards) terrorized
settlers in the hills and forests and in some cases were strong enough to
defeat regular troops.73
A representative picture of the incidence of different types of major
disasters in the Shandong Peninsula, Hebei-West Shandong, and Manchuria
between 1891 and 1931 can be drawn from the "conditions affecting
trade" sections of the annual trade reports written by the Maritime
Customs commissioners for the treaty ports and Customs stations in
North China and Manchuria. The following table lists the years in which
events occurred that caused one thousand or more deaths or affected at
least 25 percent of the Shandong Peninsula, Hebei-West Shandong, and
Manchuria:
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Sources: CMC, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports (annual), from the following treaty
ports and Customs stations: Yantai (Chefoo); Longkou (from 1916); Qingdao (Kiaochow)
(from 1899); Tianjin (Tientsin); Qinhuangdao (Chinwangtao) (from 1901); Yingkou
(Newchwang); Harbin (from 1907); Jilin (Kirin) (from 1907); Shenyang (Moukden) (from
1907); Andong (Antung) (from 1907); Dalian (Dairen) (from 1907). Harbin district included
the border crossings ofthe CER at Manzhouli on the west and Suifenhe on the east, as well
as the Heilongjiang River port Aihe (Aigun), and the Songhua River port Sanxing.
Shenyang (Moukden)and Jilin (Kirin) were not border points, but Customs officials were
stationed there and made annual reports.
Several points emerge from Table 2.4. First, since large-scale disasters
took place in only six years out of forty on the Shandong Peninsula and
in nine years in Hebei and western Shandong, they cannot account for
the high level of migration that characterized the entire period. Second,
Manchuria actually experienced more years with major disasters (eight)
in this period than the Peninsula, and only one fewer than Hebei and
western Shandong, another indication that fear of disasters was probably
not the most important motivation for most migrants.
RECRUITMENT
Much of the migration from Shandong and Hebei consisted of " self-
starters" (zifa), people who left home on their own or went with groups
of friends or relatives. But many other migrants were formally recruited
by people who needed labor. Among the people who recruited large
bodies of labor in Shandong and Hebei were foreigners. One of the
earliest foreign enterprises to recruit labor in North China was the
Kaiping Mining Company, in Tangshan, Hebei. The mines began
operation in the late 1870s, and at first tried to recruit labor directly.
However, the company encountered so many difficulties finding suitable
workers and getting them to work hard that it moved to a system of
contract labor, under which a labor contractor signed up to cut coal from
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a specific area of the mine and provided his own labor to do so. By the
turn of the century the contract labor system was fully established, and
two-thirds of the labor force neither worked for the company nor were
supervised by them.74
The contract labor system was cheap and convenient for the
employer. It seemed a new system, given that the foreign companies
using it were new, but in fact it emerged from traditional systems of
recruiting short-term agricultural labor. The recruiter, commonly known
as a baton, was a local man whose specialty was making connections
between those who needed labor and those who wanted work.
Landlords and rich farmers made use of these labor suppliers to find
workers for the busy periods of agriculture. The system had worked
traditionally as a "rational, indispensable feature of the countryside/'75
As new demands for labor arose, often in a sporadic way, the contract
labor system expanded to supply labor for industrial and mining
ventures and even for work abroad.76 An employer contracted with a
supplier of labor for a certain number of men, left all the arrangements to
the contractor, and paid the workers' wages directly to him. It suited
everyone's interests, even in one sense the workers. Although they were
left open to maltreatment and gouging by both contractors and
employers, it was a reliable method of getting work in a system that had
no impersonal means of recruiting labor, such as advertisements or labor
exchanges.
When it came to labor recruitment for foreign countries, Shandong
was a favored place because it had a reputation for producing strong,
hard-working men with high levels of endurance. These advantages,
coupled with the presence in Shandong of foreign missionaries and
businessmen who could supervise recruiting for special purposes, such
as laborers for the trenches in France during the First World War, made it
an ideal place to find workers.
An early example of direct foreign recruitment occurred from 1889
to 1903, when laborers were recruited in Shandong and Hebei and
shipped north to build the Chinese Eastern Railway.77 Other recruiting
efforts for a variety of purposes soon followed. At the end of the Qing,
British agents started recruiting workers from the Jiaozhou area for the
mines in the Transvaal,78 while the Japanese recruited in Qingdao for the
coal mines in Fengtian through the Fuxun Coal Mines Worker Recruit-
ment Office set up there. As the range and scale of labor migration grew,
the recruitment process became more complex. Additional layers developed,
including labor companies, supercontractors, and subcontractors. Labor
contractors still found the men in the villages, but now instead of
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supplying them direct to an employer, they supplied them to foreign
agencies and firms based in China. By the late Qing there were several
foreign firms based in Tianjin and Yantai (Chefoo) whose main business
was supplying labor.
Through the 1920s foreign agencies continued to recruit Shandong
men. One of the more improbable recruiters was the Agricultural
Department from the tiny Spanish colony of Fernando Po. Male workers
were offered five-year contracts, at U.S. $12 per month. It was not
difficult to find people willing to go at that wage, and 1,700 volunteers
showed up. However, the new Nanjing government, full of nationalist
fervor, opposed such a blatant example of the coolie trade, and the men
had to be paid off—they got$10 Mexican, essentially as a windfall79
Recruitment for Manchuria's Mines and Factories
In the early stages of the migration, before personal networks were
established, formal recruitment was an important means of marshalling
labor for the mines and the factories of Manchuria, as it had been in other
parts of China when modern mining and manufacturing started. Three
systems were used. First, direct recruiting offices were established in
cities in Shandong and Hebei. The Fuxun Mines maintained recruiting
offices in four cities in Hebei and three in Shandong.80
Second, Chinese agencies provided an indirect recruitment system.
The Japanese used Chinese recruiting companies, particularly in Tianjin,
which acted as brokers for them. These companies subcontracted to
professional labor contractors. Recruitment through labor contractors
became standard practice for China's mines, accounting for up to 80
percent of the workers hired. The contractor was often hired by the mine
as a foreman and paid directly by the company. He kept at least 10
percent of the workers' wages as his commission, but he made most of
his money by supplying food and lodging at inflated prices, and by
advancing workers money to send home, or to gamble.81
At its worst, when it lacked any moderating personal connection
between the contractor and his workers, this form of recruitment led to
serious abuses. Workers could be treated virtually as slaves. In 1935 local
authorities discovered a group of 200 destitute men at Tianjin Station.
They had been recruited from Hejian (southwest of Tianjin) for road
work in Heilongjiang by a contractor who gave each of their families a
200 yuan recruitment bonus. When they met men returning from
Heilongjiang who told them that they would not be paid up north, the
new recruits refused to go on. But they did not have enough money to
return home.82 In Dalian a Japanese recruiting company headed by Aioi
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Yoshitaro began developing a massive complex of worker dormitories in
1911. Eventually he built a string of eighty-nine dormitories, which could
house 13,000 men. Although the management claimed that this was a
model facility with heating and sanitation, in fact it "closely resembled a
jail" in which the jailers were 300 baton, each controlling his own group
of workers, most of whom came from Shandong.83
Third, a more personal version of the baton system, called the
oyakata (head coolie) system, paid an existing employee to produce a
group of workers, feed them, manage them, and have them ready for
work each day. Under this system, Japanese companies gave the
employee money to return to his native place at the end of one season to
recruit workers to come back with him to Manchuria at the beginning of
the next84
In 1930 SMR officials carried out a demographic survey of a small
group of migrants. Out of 2,571 groups (11,284 men) arriving at Dalian
and Yingkou, 884 were groups of new workers being transferred by
"people who had gone back to escort them to Manchuria."85 This was the
least exploitative form of recruitment, since the new laborers were
recruited by people from their own native place (laoxiang). Long-
standing personal connections made excessive exploitation difficult,
especially if the baton wanted to recruit men the next year.
None of these systems helped to put together a strong labor force.
They were cheap ways of recruiting labor, but inefficient over the long
run because few men signed on for more than one year. Each season
much of the new crop of workers had to be trained. Some Japanese
companies, such as the Fuxun Mines, decided that these systems were
too old-fashioned, "an obstacle to rational production"; by the 1930s they
hired almost all their workers directly.86
But most employers found that they saved so much money in wages
and so much trouble in management that they continued using them.
One of their greatest attractions was that the indirect systems supplied
labor without complications. It was unnecessary for managers to learn
Chinese—workers could be dealt with entirely through intermediaries.
The companies needed labor to staff their new enterprises, and they
bought it just as they did any other input for the production process.
Management treated most labor impersonally even though the ties
that produced the workers were often personal ones. At one remove, the
Japanese relied on the tight Chinese system of personal connections to
get them the workers they needed. The Japanese were not, however,
doing anything novel. The contract system was the mainstay of Chinese
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recruitment for the construction of the North American railways, the
Panama Canal, and the Trans-Siberian Railway as well.87
And Chinese contract labor is still supplied abroad today, though
now by the state rather than through personal connections, to areas such
as the Middle East that need cheap temporary labor. Today it is the state
that makes the profits: Laborers work for Chinese wages, but the govern-
ment collects at much higher levels.
Recruitment for the Land
People moving to settle on the land seldom went through the formal
recruitment processes that workers and miners did. Some responded to
official proclamations from Manchurian government agencies that were
posted in Shandong and Hebei, as well as in Manchuria itself, describing
officially sponsored colonization projects. The Lobei project, for example,
almost on the Heilongjiang border with the USSR, was widely advertised
in North China and offered over a million mu of land for settlement.88
Much more commonly the new migrants went through established
personal channels to join relatives or people from their native places who
had migrated earlier. By the mid-1920s, the Lobei settlement was so well
established that recruitment of new migrants was largely done through
personal channels, and special inducements were hardly relevant.
OTHER MIGRANT DESTINATIONS
Manchuria was the major destination for Shandong and Hebei
migrants, but migration streams to other places also developed. To the
extent that other destinations became attractive, the pull to Manchuria
was somewhat reduced. The eastern parts of Mongolia were considered
almost a part of Manchuria and took the overflow of rural settlers into
northern Manchuria.
There were also significant movements into Shaanxi from southern
Shandong at the end of the Qing. Shaanxi had been devastated and
depopulated by a succession of tragedies in the second half of the
nineteenth century: the Taiping Rebellion, the Moslem Rebellion, and the
great famine of 1887-1888. There was plenty of uncultivated land and
empty houses and villages. The Qing government officially encouraged
Shandong people to move there, and some did, though the overland
journey took up to two months.89 Other people went further afield.
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Siberia
Beginning in the 1890s some thousands of workers traveled by
steamer each year from the Shandong port of Yantai to Vladivostok,
where they were employed on the Chinese Eastern Railway and in other
Russian enterprises in far eastern Siberia. The recorded number of
passengers averaged 7,900 per year in the 1890s and swelled to average
over 22,000 per year from 1900 to 1916, with several thousand a year
added from the port of Qingdao after 1908. This traffic peaked at nearly
70,000 in 1907, but fell off sharply after the Russian Revolution in 1917
and eventually dried up altogether due to the border dispute between
Russia and China in 1928.90
Transvaal
Immediately after the Boer War, the demand for workers in the
Witwatersrand gold mines increased rapidly, while the number of
Africans willing to work in the mines declined. Business interests
proposed a scheme to bring in large numbers of Chinese workers, who
were thought to be cheap and docile. The new British administration
concurred, for it was desperately concerned to see postwar South Africa
become prosperous to give ex post facto justification to their claims for
supplanting the Boers. Between 1904 and 1907, 63,695 Chinese laborers
landed in South Africa, 93 percent of them from Shandong and Zhili,
shipped out through Qinhuangdao in Hebei and Chefoo in Shandong.
This was an easy time to recruit labor, since the Russo-Japanese War had
just broken out in Manchuria, putting economic development, and
therefore job growth, on hold.91
The scheme did not go well. The Chamber of Mines Labor Impor-
tation Agency, which handled the recruitment, expected Cantonese-
speaking workers from South China and hired organizers and inter-
preters accordingly. When the northerners arrived, it was almost
impossible to have any contact with them or to " manage" them well. Far
more serious was the virulent opposition to the scheme from two quite
different sources: one was the nativist anti-Asiatic movement, both in the
Transvaal and in Britain; the other was the liberal antislavery group, who
regarded the coolie trade as being very close to slavery.
The superintendent of foreign labor, an experienced hand with Chinese
laborers in the Straits Settlement, to meet the difficulties of managing
obstinate laborers, decided to permit 'slight corporal punishment7 in
'cases of breaches of discipline and trivial offenses, for which it was not
considered necessary to prosecute7. It was impossible to draw the line
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between slight and severe punishment, and, besides, any such
punishment was contrary to law and contract. Cases of flogging were
reported in England where the whole Chinese question had entered
domestic politics. The defeat of the Unionist Party, and the taking over
of the reins of government by the Liberals in January 1906 was largely
caused by the Chinese labor question.92
The opposition to the scheme became so strong that in 1907 it was
formally canceled, leaving a two-year period for those in the system to
get home.93
France
During the First World War recruitment for labor in foreign
countries reached its height in Shandong. The British, French, and
Russians all recruited Shandong workers to replace their own young men
who were at the front. The British recruited at first in Weihaiwei, taking
about 50,000 men, and then moved their recruitment westwards. The
British Consulate in Jinan was responsible for recruiting men in that
district and sending them to Qingdao, where they departed for Europe.
All along the railway from Jinan, offices run by missionaries were set up
to recruit workers. Their job was to give health tests, cut the men's hair
(queues), have them wash, outfit them with new clothes, inoculate them,
and then have them put their marks on contracts. The men were then
sent off in a paramilitary organization. Between April 1917 and February
1918 twenty-two vessels left Qingdao for Europe, taking 50,315 men.
Later contingents brought the total to 150,000.
The contracts stated their name, place of residence, and the recipient
of their recruitment bonus.94 The terms of their service were detailed,
listing all items the men were entitled to, from a bonus paid to the family
of 10 yuan per month, to wages of 1 to 1.5 francs a day, to their gear on
departure (an overcoat, a set of clothes, boots, hat, scarf, wash basin, tea
bowl, kettle, palliasse, life belt, etc.), to their food while in France (10
ounces of meat, bread, and flour per day; 8 ounces of rice and vegetables;
2 ounces of pork; 1 ounce of sugar and butter; and 1/2 ounce of salt, tea,
peanut oil). Tobacco and matches were issued twice a week, and dried
fruit, tooth powder, soap, towel, toothbrush once a month. The men
worked ten hours a day, with half a day off each week.
The French used a Chinese company, the Huimin Company, to
recruit some 40,000 workers for them. The contracts were more generous
than those arranged by the British, stipulating 5 francs a day, but with
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deductions for food, lodging, clothing, and life insurance, so that the men
actually got 2 francs a day.
These terms may have seemed generous enough to encourage men
to sign on, but not everything was supplied as agreed. The living
conditions in France were bad, and many of the men died of the damp
and cold in northern France. But at least their fate was known. Nearly all
were returned to Shandong soon after the end of the war, unlike the
thirty-three skilled workers recruited in 1917 to work in an airplane
factory in Russia. Those men went off on a two-year contract and were
never heard from again.
The Transvaal situation was more exploitative and the trenches of
France more dangerous than conditions encountered by migrants to
Manchuria. Manchuria was also less foreign, with no language or
cultural barriers. But it is unlikely that potential migrants made informed
comparisons between Manchuria and other possible destinations before
deciding where to go. Those who went beyond the Chinese world were
almost always recruited. The recruitment schemes were localized, and
people had one choice —whether to go or not. They could not choose
where to go.
Recruitment of Shandong workers for exotic sites like the battle-
fields of France and the mines of Africa received a great deal of publicity,
but never constituted a major alternative for family survival strategies
because they were always limited in size and duration. The largest single
case was the one-time movement of 150,000 men to France, a number
smaller than the average annual migration to Manchuria from the
Shandong Peninsula alone.
MIGRATION TO MANCHURIA FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
Workers from North China were not the only people drawn to
Manchuria. Economic opportunities and political rivalry between Russia,
Japan, and China motivated substantial numbers of Russians, Japanese,
and Koreans to move to Manchuria in the early twentieth century.
Beginning in the late 1890s Russian workers, engineers, technicians,
administrators, and military personnel were brought into Manchuria to
build and operate the Chinese Eastern Railway and to administer the
railway zone and towns through which it passed. Russian officers and
engineers also operated a large fleet of steamships on the Songhua and
Heilongjiang Rivers. Harbin was established as a base for the railway
and remained predominately a Russian town until the late 1920s. In 1930
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there were 140,554 Russians in Manchuria.96 By 1937 their numbers had
declined to around 60,000.97
When Japan acquired the South Manchuria Railway and the
Liaodong Peninsula, the Japanese counterpart of the Russian migration
brought thousands of Japanese technicians, administrators, and other
urban workers to southern Manchuria. By the end of 1937 there were
nearly 400,000 Japanese living in the towns and cities of Manchuria.98
The goal of settling large numbers of Japanese farmers in Manchuria
fared less well. At least five major official programs for "mass
immigration" from Japan were planned, beginning in 1914 with a scheme
for subsidized settlement of former Japanese soldiers in the SMR zone
and culminating in 1936 with the adoption of a grandiose twenty-year
plan to locate five million Japanese farmers in Manchuria.99
In each case detailed surveys were carried out in the prospective
settlement areas, the farmers received subsidies of money, land,
equipment, seed, and livestock, and supporting facilities such as training
institutes and research centers were established.100 Even after such
painstaking preparations, however, few Japanese farmers could be
enticed to leave their homes. Those Japanese farm families who did go to
Manchuria found a harsh environment and an agrarian economy
thoroughly dominated by Chinese farmers and merchants. By the end of
1937 there were only 21,000 Japanese living in the rural areas of
Manchuria.
The largest number of non-Chinese immigrants were Koreans. In
the early years of the twentieth century Korean farmers began to
establish rice-growing communities in the lightly populated valleys
along Manchuria and Korea's mountainous border. Unlike the politically
fostered migrations from Russia and Japan, the migration from Korea
was motivated simply by the desire for farmland. Of the three groups,
only Koreans remained a significant element in the population of
Manchuria after 1949. By the end of 1937 there were 988,000 Koreans
living in Manchuria, of whom 76 percent were farmers.101
In 1910 Japan annexed Korea to the Japanese empire. From that
time on Japanese officials took particular interest in the affairs of Korean
immigrants in Manchuria; in at least one case Japanese troops were sent
across the Yalu River to defend Korean settlements in Manchuria from
Chinese bandits. In another instance a clash between Chinese and Korean
settlers, known as the Wanbaoshan Affair, contributed to the rising
tensions that resulted in the Manchurian Incident of 1931.102 After the
formation of Manchukuo in 1932, Japanese leaders devised plans for
large-scale Korean immigration, similar to the "mass-immigration"
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schemes for Japanese farmers. But like the Japanese farmers, few
Koreans were tempted to move into the Manchurian Plain. The great
majority remained in the eastern regions of Liaoning and Jilin, where
they are still the predominant population today.103
STATISTICAL INSIGHTS INTO MIGRANT MOTIVATIONS
When we view the migrant data presented in chapter 1 in light of
the economic and disaster information outlined here, it is evident that the
overall course of the migration closely followed the growth of economic
opportunities in Manchuria. Statistical analysis finds strong correlation
between migration numbers and levels of railway traffic and foreign
trade in Manchuria.104 The data also indicate that when economic
conditions in North China improved, as reflected in railway traffic and
foreign trade volume, migration tended to decline. The economic
correlation is strongest for the migrant flow from Hebei and western
Shandong, and weakest for the Shandong Peninsula, where the economy
was largely stagnant, with neither railway development nor growth in
trade. It appears that people from Hebei and western Shandong tended
to go to Manchuria in larger numbers when conditions at home declined1
or those in Manchuria improved, and were more likely to stay home
when circumstances improved. Migration from the Peninsula, however,
tended to vary little except when Manchuria was afflicted by major
disasters, indicating that migration was a deeply ingrained element of
the local economy.
The data also shed light on the effects of disasters. Many migrants
did indeed move to Manchuria to escape drought, flood, famine, war-
fare, and disease, but migration continued unabated in most years when
disasters did not occur. However, disasters in Manchuria — particularly
the wars and the epidemic of pneumonic plague in 1910-1911 —caused
significant declines in migrant numbers. In other words, while disasters
at home constituted a contributing push, they were not the major moti-
vation to migrate.
The economic motivations that appear to be characteristic of the
migration as a whole are brought into even sharper focus in the accounts
of the migrants themselves. Conditions at home and the prospect of
higher incomes to the north persuaded families throughout North China
to send out their sons to supplement the family livelihood at home.
FAMILY AND MIGRATION
THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY
The social and economic confusion that accompanied the decline of the
Qing dynasty and the chaos of the early Republic put great strain on the
Chinese family. As the bedrock of support and protection for Chinese
rural society, the family had to survive intensified pressures as other
social structures weakened with the crumbling of traditional society.
Modern-minded intellectuals and revolutionaries might denounce the
family and family-centered attitudes (jiating guanniari) as part of the
incubus of backwardness that oppressed the poor, but for most Chinese,
the family was still their only frame of reference, and it determined their
lives and livelihood.
The family was the major source of economic security and emotional
comfort in an increasingly hostile world. In return it made great
demands on its members. It was their duty to serve the family, to make
whatever contributions they could to the family economy. In an
uncertain world this meant they had to help diversify the family's
income. Family members had to seek and grasp any opportunities to
earn extra money; if such opportunities were limited at home, then they
had to be sought elsewhere. This might mean working as a hired hand
nearby, or it might mean going further, to the cities or into an army.
From the late Qing on a new opportunity for enhancing family welfare
emerged: migration to Southeast Asia from Guangdong and Fujian, or to
Manchuria from Shandong and Hebei.
Migration could mean the departure of the whole family, but most
often it meant sending single young men away so that most of the family
could stay at home. Migration promised to benefit the family through
remittances and the reduction of mouths to be fed at home. Family
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interests decided who would go and who would stay in much the same
way that they determined other key decisions for individuals, such as
when and whom a person should marry. The life course of many young
men in areas that produced migrants was largely set: they were born,
grew up, went away for a while, returned, got married, and thereafter
stayed put. Migration was simply a stage of life. In Ling County the local
authorities estimated that during the Republican period one in three men
migrated to Manchuria at some stage of their lives.1
The inarticulate Confucianism of the masses —the belief that the
family had to be preserved in its native place at all costs, close to the
graves of the ancestors — mitigated against permanent emigration.
Ironically, at the same time, family togetherness and warmth was
sacrificed in migration; the welfare of the family demanded that
individual members suffer long periods of separation for the greater
good of the family. It also demanded that individuals go away without
being consulted about their own desires; the family had to send the most
suitable person out. Collective family needs took precedence over the
wishes of the individual. This was not a peculiarly Chinese feature of
migration. Tamara Hareven's description of Quebec workers moving to
Massachusetts in the late nineteenth century is strikingly similar:
Both career choices and economic decisions were made within the
family matrix. Families might be described as being composed of units
that were switched around as the need arose. Each unit was relied upon
and used when appropriate. Following such strategies, families timed
the movement of members in response to both individual schedules
and external conditions.2
In Shandong, as in Quebec, the individual's moral obligation to the
family went without question:
The sense of duty to the family was a manifestation of family culture—
a set of values that entailed not only a commitment to the well-being
and self reliance or survival of the family but one that took priority over
individual needs and personal happiness-3
The demands that the family put on the individual in migration
were paradoxical. The family obliged individuals to go away, for uncer-
tain prospects of gain, while at the same time cutting them off from the
immediate comfort of home. This might seem to weaken the family, but
in fact the effects were to strengthen it. Migration was a sign of commit-
ment; rather than lounge around at home the young man was doing
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something useful. The prolonged absence of husbands, fathers, or sons
seemed often to strengthen the ties of affection rather than weaken them,
because migration inevitably brought homesickness. And economically
migration was a sure winner; the migrant was a net saving to his family
while away, and, if he did not disappear altogether, might enrich the
family on his return.
The Shape of the Family
Shandong farm families in the late Qing and early Republic were
not large. In 1935 the average number of "mouths" per household in
Zouping, a relatively affluent county, was 5.1.4 Most were two-
generation, nuclear families — a couple and their children. While this was
the immediate economic and emotional unit, the one which made direct
demands and for which direct responsibility was felt, it was not the full
extent of the family. This was the "small family" (xiao Jiating) or
household (hu). Beyond it were close relatives —parents, brothers —living
in the same village, and beyond these ties were kin connections. In a
province where most villages were single-surname villages, the tie to the
village was a close family tie. Other connections, which encompassed a
larger sphere of more distant relatives and included neighbors, will be
discussed in chapter 4.
The extended family connections, those beyond the household, had
direct implications for migration: They provided a support system.
Migrants could leave without disaster facing those who remained.
Brothers could look after elderly parents or help sisters-in-law left alone.
A new bride could live with her in-laws until her husband returned. The
extended family also provided a haven in case of failure. If dire necessity
dictated, the migrant had a home to return to. The support system made
it easier to migrate when the opportunities arose.
Inheritance and Migration
The strong sense of family identity ensured the return of many
migrants. The Confucian ideal of a large family of many generations
living harmoniously together was buttressed by an inheritance system
that gave equal shares to all sons. This created a powerful bond. So long
as the family still possessed property, each male had some material
expectation from it. In Western systems, second and subsequent sons
were "spares," who would inherit only if the elder brother died without
sons. Others had to leave home once they were adult, going into the
army, the church, the cities, and as emigrants to foreign countries. No
expectations kept them at home. But under the Chinese system,
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permanent departure from home was unthinkable, unless the family was
completely destitute.
The sense of continuing connections and inheritance rights could
survive over long periods of time. Reginald Johnston, as administrator of
Weihaiwei, Shandong, in the late Qing, presided over a case in which the
lapse of a century had not extinguished the rights to inheritance:
Another litigant whose long residence abroad had had no apparent
effect on his general outlook, came to me very recently with the
complaint that on his return from Manchuria he had found his land in
the possession of a neighbour. "I went to Manchuria as my family had
not enough to eat/' he said, "I came home this year and wished to
redeem the land I had mortgaged before I went away. But I found it
had already been redeemed by my neighbour, a cousin, and he refuses
to let me redeem it from him." On being asked when he had mortgaged
his land and emigrated, he replied, "In Chia-ch'ing 3" — that is in 1798.
He was merely identifying himself with his own great-grandfather-5
The inheritance system, however equitable, had a built-in flaw: It
was a system of partible inheritance. Although the ideal was that
inheriting males would stay together and hold their property in common,
there was no formal or legal mechanism to force them to do so. Instead it
was possible at the time of inheritance to split the family and divide its
possessions, a procedure known as fenjia (dividing the family).
Fenjia is regarded as something undesirable and is discussed with
regret, because it means a departure from the ideal of a large family.
Another problem with dividing the family and its possessions is that
division can leave every member of the family with inadequate land
holdings unless it is a wealthy family. The inheritance system of
primogeniture widely used by landowners in Europe was designed to
ensure that land holdings never got too small to support a family; it
sacrificed the prospects of younger sons to make sure that land passed
intact from oldest surviving son to oldest surviving son. A modern version
of the system prevents the subdivision of farm land in English-speaking
Canada. In China the Confucian system valued all sons, treated them with
a degree of equality and gave each the right to a part of the family
property. But too many sons could damage a family irretrievably. After
one or two transfers of property the slices of the pie became too small to
support individual families, unless they found extra income elsewhere.
This situation was the stimulus for several informants' migration.
In a large family, division of assets might send one or more sons
away. Wang Bingguang's father was one of six sons; at the fenjia on the
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death of his father, he got only one rnu (.16 acre) of land, not enough to
support a family. When he heard of a possibility of work in Manchuria,
he left instantly. He had another, more pressing reason to leave; he was
being harassed by his employer because of the accidental destruction of
some farm equipment. His departure left his family destitute until they
were able to join him in Manchuria some time later. A chain of disasters
that had started with the prolific procreation of his parents finally came
to an end.6 Meng Jingen came from a family impoverished by a combi-
nation of too many sons and a fenjia. His grandfather's land had been
divided among six sons; Meng's ia\hex had six children of his own and
then died. At that point the family could no longer feed all its members,
so fourteen-year-old Meng was sent away to work in Manchuria. Jiang
Lanqi's father was one of six brothers, each of whom got only 2 damn (a
local version of the mu) at the fenjia. This was not enough land to
support a family. Jiang had to go to Dalian to work and sent money
home regularly.8 Wang Yuxiang's grandfather had to migrate because
after his family's fenjia between five brothers, his part was only 1.2 damu
of land, not enough to support his own children.9 Gao Xuchang's family
could not live on the three damu of land his father inherited at the fenjia,
so Gao and three of his brothers were sent to Manchuria, leaving only the
youngest son at home.10 In all these cases division of family property
exacerbated an existing problem—the shortage of land. A supposedly
equitable system of inheritance turned a holding that had once supported
all family members into separate units that were not viable.
FAMILY MIGRATION STRATEGIES
Migration was seldom a casual affair. Families usually had an
implicit strategy, tied to the family's future, which determined their
decisions. They thought about migration long before it was undertaken.
Relationships and connections came into play, and decisions were made,
usually in terms of enhancing the family income. The process was
seldom open and explicit, and few informants identified a specific person
who made the actual decision about who was to go. The usual expression
was "it was decided in the family." However vague the identity of the
decision makers, families of the migrants had specific goals. The most
important was supplementing the basic family income through
remittances, but there were other compelling goals as well.
Raising Money for Specific Purposes
Families often sent members off as migrants in order to acquire
land—not in the place to which they migrated, but back home in
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Shandong. The opportunities for greater earnings outside the home
province made this a logical way to accumulate capital. It was, however,
logical only so long as it was limited to a few people. Too many people
sending home money to buy land could push up prices, thus negating
the whole exercise:
One consequence of the foreign remittances from overseas labourers
was a steady increase in the value of agricultural property in Weihai-
wei, and the redemption of mortgaged land.11
Another common purpose for migration was to raise bride price for
the marriage of a son. Marriage was an expensive business. As a son
approached marriageable age, parents had to think carefully about
accumulating sufficient money, especially in a family with many sons.12
Despite the desirability of having many sons, such families could seldom
afford to pay bride price for all their sons, or meet the standards of a
girl's family, without extra income. According to Martin C. Yang's 1930s
study of Taitou (near Qingdao), a family could be quite selective about a
daughter's partner, since it was accepted that young men might marry
girls from lower social backgrounds than their own:
The prevailing opinion is that one should not select a daughter-in-law
from a family that is much more prosperous than one's own, otherwise
the bride may compare the new household unfavorably with the house
she has left, complain about the deprivations, and feel superior to the
other daughters-in-law.13
A girl's family had considerable range in looking at a boy's family—
its wealth, the number of sons, the boy's character. The boy's family
would have to be able to provide well for a girl before her parents agreed
to a marriage. Temporary migration permitted the boy's family to raise
funds for the wedding and for setting up the new couple within the
groom's home or as a separate household. Either way new quarters had
to be constructed.
Another reason young men had to make good offers for brides lay
in the unequal ratio between men and women in Shandong. According to
the population statistics compiled by the Minzhengting (Civil Admini-
stration Department) in 1930, the ratio between men and women was
116:100. This figure was not broken down by age group, but if it
prevailed among individuals of marriageable age, it suggests that some
men may have had difficulty finding brides.14
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Typically young men went away for two to three years in their late
teens, then returned and married immediately. This produced a relay
migration within families, in which each son would go out at the
appropriate stage of his life cycle. If the migrant failed to earn as much as
expected, then the marriage was delayed. Some migrants married very
late, though few as late as Guo Baofu. Guo migrated in 1927, just after he
had gotten engaged at age eighteen. He worked as a rickshaw puller in
Harbin, never earning more than a pittance. In 1935 he came home after
his parents died, but just long enough to pawn the land he had inherited.
He returned again when his grandmother died, and, to pay for a
respectable funeral, he sold his house. He went back to Harbin again, this
time as a back scrubber in a bath house. He continued at this job until
1955, by which time demand for back scrubbers had fallen off
dramatically. At last he returned home for good and finally married his
fiancee, who by this time was 54.15
Risk Splitting
In response to the insecurity of Republican China, many families in
Shandong engaged in partial family migration. This was a longer-term
strategy than the search for remittances to keep the family afloat or for
money to cover specific expenditures. Those who left might be gone for a
long time. With some members away and some at home, a single disaster
could not destroy the family. The Zhao family were artisans in Laiyang;
there were four sons. The father worked as a glazier in Benxi, Liaoning,
for thirteen years, between 1913 and 1940. The oldest son, a bank clerk in
Dalian, stayed there permanently. The second and fourth sons stayed at
home, working as shoemakers, while the third son (the informant) spent
four years in Benxi with his father. Having little confidence in long-term
security at home, the family divided, although their ultimate aim was to
maintain themselves in Laiyang. Splitting up seemed to give them a
better chance of doing this than simply staying at home.16
Splitting the risk could develop into a local pattern. When enough
families in one village followed this strategy, they often created a
separate kin-village in the Northeast—a "village across the sea"
(haiwaicun). Many villages in Manchuria were set up by one small
family or a group of villagers with the same surname; their new villages
bore names such as Tangjiacun (Tang family village) or Fanjiacun (Fan
family village).17 This strategy combined relay and partial family
migration. Those who migrated permanently were the anchors for the
relay migrants as well as risk insurance for the family if times were hard
at home.
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Migration by part of the family also provided advance protection, a
kind of insurance, for a family that might need an escape from a future
crisis at home. In some cases a private tragedy tipped the balance. In
1939, for example, Zhao Qingfu's mother died in Gaomi. His father could
not manage the three children by himself and so sold his farm and took
his family to join an older brother in Kaitong (Tongyu), Jilin.18 The fact
that he had a migrant brother helped him avoid difficulty at home. In
other cases natural disaster created a crisis. Many of the Linqu drought
victims in the early 1940s went to join relatives in Manchuria. Zhao
Yongting's enterprising mother, a widow, took her four children to
Liaoyang as the famine deepened at home. She sold her possessions for
train fares and joined her late husband's cousin, who found them all
jobs.19 When the twin disasters of drought and locusts gripped Ling
County in 1943, large numbers of people fled to family members in
Manchuria. Five of the six members of Zhang Xincheng's family went off
to join an uncle who was pioneering on the Heilongjiang-Inner Mongolia
border. He had set up his own Zhangjiacun (Zhang family village) there
and was glad to see his relatives. They were glad to be alive, but felt that
life in the north was only marginally better than death. They went home
as soon as they could, after seven long years.20
To escape famine or disaster was not easy—the totally destitute did
not have the energy to move or the money to pay the expenses, however
modest, of their journey. The head of the chamber of commerce in Harbin
in the early 1930s, Zhang Fengting, reported that almost all refugees
from southern Shandong had been able to pay their own travel expenses,
sometimes by selling or mortgaging land or possessions, and had close
relatives in Heilongjiang. Otherwise, they would have had to "stay home
and die in misery"{kunsi zai benxiang)21 The splitting of the family
could make the difference between life and death.
Moreover, splitting the risk worked both ways. When hard times hit
in Manchuria, as they did after the Japanese occupation in 1931 and the
Japanese defeat in 1945, families could in turn flee to their relatives in
Shandong. Inevitably, though, splitting the risk for the family also
changed the nature of the family. The ideal of a large family living
together could no longer be attained and gradually lost some of its
appeal.22
The classic family strategy in migration elsewhere, chain migration,
where one member of the family establishes a bridgehead and the others
follow one by one until the whole family is reunited in the new land, was
not particularly common. The first choice of Shandong families was to
support the family at home, not to move it.
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Chain migration was also impeded by the difficulty of getting brides
for men who settled permanently in Manchuria. It was considered a
rough, crude place, especially dangerous for women, who were thought
to be susceptible to a malady colloquially referred to as "cold disease"
(hanbing). Owen Lattimore reported on the scarcity of women in the
frontier areas in the early 1930s and the very high bride prices there.23
Gao Puchun's whole family fled from the famine in Linqu to Kaitong
(Jilin) in 1942. Almost destitute, they were forced to beg to survive, even
though they could have resolved their financial problems by marrying
off Gao's two elder sisters. His mother, however, refused to let them
marry in Manchuria. She insisted on waiting until they could return
home to find husbands for her daughters.24 One poor man from Laiyang,
Wu Liantian, who had settled in Manchuria and was desperate to marry
someone from home, succeeded only by marrying, almost in secret, a
widow with five children. Theirs was such a disastrous match that the
woman was willing to join him rather than remain on her own at home.
The couple subsequently had four more children and never returned to
Shandong. To judge from the comments of relatives, this was partly due to
the shame of their marriage. But a more important reason was that Wu
Liantian still had not repaid the money he had borrowed from his cousin
fifty years earlier to pay for his fare.25
Some families of girls living in Manchuria were willing to lower
their standards in their search for a match. Wang Xibiao went to Fuyu,
Jilin, in 1934 when he was nineteen to marry the girl he had been
engaged to since he was eleven. He came from a poverty-stricken family,
his father was dead, and there were three other brothers to look after his
mother. He was married off to save money for the family, since his
marriage required no bride price. His telling of his story made clear that
he had been the surplus son in the family and that he had been sacrificed
for the good of his family, leaving a wound that time had not healed.26
MIGRATION AND FAMILY C O M P O S I T I O N
The family member most likely to migrate was the young male, old
enough to work, young enough to be adaptable, and not critical to the
family economy at home. Young men were also the people in demand for
the hard, tough work in the mines and factories and on the railways and
the virgin lands of Manchuria. In most parts of Shandong, migration was
overwhelmingly male. The figures from Deping demonstrate this pattern:
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Year
1919
Table 3.1 Migrants from Deping,






Male percentage of total
84.5
Source: Deping xian xuzhi (1935), 310-12.
Data gathered by the SMR at the other end of the migration show a
similar breakdown; men accounted for 86 percent of all migrants
receiving certificates to enter Manchuria from 1936 to 1941.27
Families had to have more than one son to send out a young man,
for one son was still essential at home. A 1935 report of agricultural
conditions in Zhaoyuan, an area of systemic migration, found that any
family with two or more sons would send one away, usually one with
some ability who would no longer "feel comfortable at home" after he
heard about the world outside.28 A report from Guangcong in southern
Hebei divided the families in one village into two categories: those with
one son who supplemented their farm income with handicrafts, and
those with two or more sons who sent one out each year as a "swallow,"
a migrant who left in the spring and returned in the autumn.29
It might seem natural to choose the migrant by rank, with the oldest
son staying at home to look after the parents, the younger, less important
ones migrating. However, this pattern seems not to have been a strong
one. In many parts of Shandong migration was a routine stage in the
lives of all young men, a rite of passage that, like marriage, marked the
beginning of adult life. Provided there was someone to leave at home, it
made little difference which son went. In Penglai most young males
expected to go to Manchuria after they had finished a few years of
school. In 1935, 19 percent of the males between the ages of 15 and 24
were "somewhere else" (tawang), most of them in Manchuria.30
Often the choice of who went took into account a young man's
ability to make something of himself. Suitability rather than rank
appeared more often to be the basis of this decision; the son thought best
able to adapt to the harsh conditions of Manchuria and most likely to
make money was chosen. He might be physically stronger, or
psychologically well adapted to endure hardship, or smarter. Gao
Xuyuan, who left home when he was fifteen, was chosen for his
intelligence as the family migrant by his own poor family, and relatives
for whom he would work in Changchun. He worked in Changchun as a
bookkeeper, then in Beijing as an accountant. He was away from 1930 to
1949, and for most of that period sent money home regularly —an ideal
migrant.31
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FAMILY H E L P IN MIGRATION
The family played a key role in arranging migrations. Almost half of
the informants interviewed for this study had migrated with family help:











Source: Lary interviews, spring 1984.
Early in the interviewing process it seemed likely that some family
relationships would emerge as more important than others in terms of
aiding migration, but in fact no consistent pattern appeared. While a
clear distinction existed between close and distant family relationships
(the latter falling into the fellow-villager or laoxiang category), even
within the close family, many different relations came into play, maternal
as well as paternal. Young men went off to join their fathers, older
brothers, or paternal or maternal uncles. Sun Hongshan left home in 1934
to join his maternal uncle who was in Fusong, Liaoning, growing
ginseng. It was a flourishing business, and the uncle spread the benefits
among his relatives; his nephew made 230 yuan in three years, a huge
income at the time. Wei Xianying, from the same village, made the
journey to Manchuria at fifteen with a paternal cousin (tangxwng), to
work at a job in Shenyang with one of his second cousins (bi'aoshu).32 Yu
Shulin went off to Shenyang in 1936 to join his cousin (biaoge) who had
migrated the year before. Shulin had already been apprenticed to that
cousin, a carpenter, and finished his apprenticeship in Shenyang. His
cousin then got him a good job in a Japanese factory.33
Helping someone to move was the basis for further relay migration.
The help one young man received, he repaid to other relatives younger
than himself. In just a short time a person could move from being helped
to helping others. Guo Baomeng migrated seasonally for five successive
years. At first he needed help, but by the last two years it was he who
was guiding his younger brothers.34 At fourteen, Zhang Congchang left
his village in Ye County and went with relatives to Yingkou, where he
worked as a laborer. Then he moved on to Vladivostok, as a bodyguard
in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Finally, still quite young, he
started on his real career, first as a bandit, then as a soldier, and
eventually as a warlord.35 In the course of this career, he did many
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dreadful things, acquiring one of the worst reputations in the region. In
1925, for example, at the behest of Japanese industrialists, he used his
troops to brutally crush a strike by Chinese workers in Japanese factories
in Qingdao.36 Nonetheless, he also made careers for thousands of other
men from the Peninsula, first his own relatives, then people from his
immediate neighborhood, then from Ye County, and ultimately from the
Peninsula as a whole.
Departure Costs
Migration entailed certain costs, at a minimum travel expenses. The
family members who stayed at home often had to assume these costs and
take over the responsibilities of those who left; in effect, they made an
investment in the migration. Reginald Johnston cites a case from Weihai-
wei at the end of the Qing, where, after a fenjia, one brother took out a
mortgage on a second brother's land to pay the fare for the second
brother's migration to Manchuria. The brother who stayed at home
eventually bought out the other, but when the migrant returned after
many years, he still had the right to redeem his mortgaged land from his
brother.37 Mortgaging land was still a means to pay for fares forty years
later. When Liu Zhengzhong left Binzhou in 1941, his family raised the
fare by mortgaging two rnu of land.38 Many migrants left indebted to
their families, a heavy moral burden that compelled them to make
money before they dared show their faces at home again.
Arrival Arrangements
One of the most important ways in which family members who had
already moved helped relatives was to provide services to new migrants,
first sending information on jobs and wages before migration, and then
finding jobs and shelter when the new migrant arrived. This greatly
reduced the risks of migration, and migrants were more likely suited to
work opportunities. Family members already settled in Manchuria
probably had little interest in relatives from home arriving unless there
was work available, for without work they might have to support them.
If life was hard for the earlier migrants, which it usually was, their
welcome for relatives might be less than enthusiastic. People who had
migrated from Boxing did not encourage their relatives to join them, but
if they showed up anyhow they helped them to find jobs.39 If the migrant
was doing well, the attitude might be quite different. Jing Wenguang's
uncle did so well after his move to Shenyang in 1925 that twelve years
later he sent fare money home for his younger brother and his family.
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Two years later he did the same for another brother because he needed
reliable labor for his vegetable business.40
Recruitment Bonuses—Anjiafei
The quickest way to provide financial help to one's family through
migration was to be recruited by an agency, Chinese or foreign, which
paid anjiafei to men as they left to work away from home. Some of the
most generous bonuses came from foreign governments who recruited
men to work as laborers during the First World War. The men were paid
10 yuan on departure; thereafter their families received 10 yuan a month,
which was either sent to them by post or picked up by the relatives at a
recruiting station—there were stations in Qingdao, Wei County, Zhou-
cun, and Jinan. Twenty thousand people were served regularly at Jinan,
and 25,000 at Wei County. These stations also handled mail between the
men in France and their families and provided information on how the
war was going.41
The migrant could probably not keep the entire amount of his
payment if he was recruited indirectly by a local labor contractor, for the
recruiter would expect his cut. When Zhang Zhenbao went to Jilin in
1938, his total anjiafei was 60 yuan, of which the recruiter took 20,
leaving 40 yuan for Zhang and his family.
Anjiafei payments were especially attractive in hard times. In 1940 a
large group of men were recruited in Huimin during a period of
prolonged drought. The attraction was the 15 yuan anjiafei, which most
of them turned over immediately to their families. Very few of these men
came back from Manchuria at the end of the same year with any money
in their pockets because they were cheated by their employers, but at
least they had helped their families to get through the drought by giving
them the money they received before they went away.43
The anjiafei was the only chance most farmers ever had to acquire a
large sum of money. This fee was also paid for men going into the army
and was the standard means to recruit soldiers in many areas. Normally
the army or the labor contractor was careful to hand the money over only
after the recruit was under custodial control, but there were instances
when a bold man might get hold of the money and disappear. Usually
though, this happened only when the local situation was chaotic. One
enterprising fellow used his anjiafei from the army to finance his migra-
tion. In early 1945 Sun Zhiguo's father took money from the local puppet
army, but then used it, presumably in some haste, to buy railway tickets
to Manchuria for himself and his family.44
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FULL FAMILY MIGRATION
Normally the strategy of preserving the family in its native place
meant that the core family stayed at home, while certain members were
sent elsewhere to work. But sometimes moving the whole family seemed
the best course. This was the case with many migrants who settled on the
land in Manchuria, for the promise of land was great enough to induce
landless farmers to move. Exactly who these people were, in terms of
their economic status, is hard to pinpoint. The settler families could not
have been destitute, since the cost of migrating was so great that some
capital was needed. Nor could they have been families with members too
young or too old or debilitated by malnutrition, since the ferocity of the
Manchurian climate would put their lives at risk during the pioneering
stage. The most likely candidates were units of extended families that
had been divided through a fenjia.
Family migration also occurred in times of disaster. In 1927 Shan-
dong was ravaged by warfare as the old warlords resisted the northern
movement of Guomindang troops. Many of the migrants in that year
were refugees from manmade disasters (renhuo). A breakdown of the
refugees arriving in Jilin indicates that the majority of them were
traveling as families.
Table 3.3 Refugees Arriving in





Source: Chen Hansheng, "Nanrnin de Dong-
bei liuwang," 1934, 339.
Linqu, in the Central Massif, experienced two phases of family migra-
tion. One occurred in 1926-1927, when bandit violence forced many
families to flee. The second, much larger migration of families came
during the dreadful drought that gripped the county in the early 1940s.
At that time 49 percent of the population, or 168,000 people, were driven
away by the complete lack of food. A few went to neighboring counties
to wait out the drought, but the majority (128,000), probably aware that
the drought would not end soon, left for Manchuria.46 What happened in
Daxingzhong village was typical. Of 163 families, ninety left, that is, 400
out of 730 people. One hundred of those who stayed behind died of
starvation. When the drought was over, 190 people returned, but many
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stayed on in Manchuria. In 1984, when the village's population was
1,700, the village authorities were still in touch with 90 families living in
Manchuria, about 400 people.47
Family Abuses
The role of the family in arranging migration was not necessarily
altruistic or benign. In fact, as in other migrations, family exploitation of
certain members was not uncommon. The warmth and affection one
might associate with family ties were often absent; in their stead harsh,
calculating arrangements were devised to exploit family ties for cheap,
reliable labor. Frequently senior members of a family wanted to bring
younger relatives over for their own convenience. Jiang Lanqi joined his
father in Dalian when he was fourteen, in 1926, and worked at various
jobs with him for five years. His father always took all his wages.48 When
Gong Wenxue joined his older sister in Dalian in 1936 at the age of
twelve, her husband got him a job as an apprentice making Japanese
snacks —and also kept all the money he earned over four years.49 Gong felt
doubly unfortunate: Not only did he never see the money he earned, he
had also trained for a profession that became obsolete after 1945. Qu
Rongyu worked as a carpenter for three years for his father's cousin
(shuboshii) in the mid-1930s without ever receiving more than his board
and lodging.50 Wang Guiqian went with his father to Manchuria when he
was seventeen, in 1939. His father took both his anjiafei and the wages he
earned. He came home with no money.51 Telling their stories more than
forty years later, these men still felt a keen sense of injury that their
relatives had exploited them. There was no question in their minds that
they had been exploited.
Another form of family cruelty was to keep a married couple
separated when they wanted to be together. Families often kept a young
wife at home as hostage to guarantee her husband's return. The aunt of
Ma Xiuqing, from the Yantai area, was married to a man who had gone
to Manchuria. They were very attached to each other. When he came to
fetch her to Manchuria, his mother refused to let her go because she
feared she would never see her son again. Faced with another separation,
the two committed suicide together.52
Escaping the Family
The ideals of Confucianism prescribed a united, orderly family, with
harmonious relations based on respect, but not every family achieved
this goal. Many families were full of anguish and animosity. Some people
found family pressures unbearable, particularly in the case of unhappy
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marriages. The only way for a man to escape an unhappy marriage was
to migrate, but there was no such escape for a woman. Reginald Johnston
described a common practice in Weihaiwei:
If his wife's family is numerous and wealthy, the unhappy man who is
wedded to an untamable shrew, is often driven to desperate expedients
to break his chains. He may, indeed, emigrate to Peking or Manchuria—
the usual resorts of persons who find life unbearable in Weihaiwei.53
Li Yunsheng abandoned his wife in 1934, when he got into financial
trouble. She and their daughter had to return to her natal family. Their
marriage had not been happy because of her fierce (lihai) temper. He
took some time to get on his feet in Manchuria, but eventually married
again and had three children. Only in old age did he return, in 1975, after
his second wife had died. He tried to resume his first marriage. The two
old people lived together for six months, but their relationship was as
disastrous as ever, and they split up again.54
Migrations were also explained by unhappy relationships between
incompatible relatives forced to live in the same household. Informants
most often mentioned quarrels between brothers. Relations could get so
bad that even dividing a household did not solve the problem. A single
village could not contain the warring factions, and one or both parties
would have to leave.55 Departures were also blamed on bad relations
between sisters-in-law. In Laiyang it was reported that two brothers and
their wives had migrated because the relations between the wives and a
third sister-in-law were so appalling.56
Effects of Migration on the Family
The process of migration changed the family and its roles. In the
most obvious way it created distance between members. But the distance
was most often physical, not economic or social, and the process of
migration sometimes actually articulated and pointed up family ties.
Family roles became very clear when they were no longer performed.
Although migration was frequently designed to enrich and strengthen
the family, it often took little account of present needs, either economic or
emotional, and could have devastating effects.
Married migrants often left their wives and children behind because
the purpose of migration was to allow the family to continue at home.
But who cared for their wives while they were away? The ideal of the
family support system was not always realized. Some wives depended on
remittances, a precarious source of income. Others lived as part of their
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husband's extended family, but often in pitiful conditions, especially if the
husband had migrated soon after the marriage. Dependents might be
abandoned: In Taitou, a widowed father was forced to live by begging, to
the great shame of the family, because one son had gone off to
Manchuria and sent no money home because he was "idle/' while the
other was "unfiliar and had married a widow who refused to look after
her father-in-law.57 An equally tragic story told to Reginald Johnston
underlines the separation anguish that migration could cause:
My second son, Ts'ung Chia-lan, went to Manchuria a few months after
his marriage. This was eight years ago. He went abroad because the
family was poor and he wanted to make some money. His wife was
very miserable when he went, and begged him not to go, but he
promised to come back to her. He disappeared, and for years we heard
nothing of him. His wife made no complaint, but she was unhappy. A
few months ago a returned emigrant told us that he had seen my son in
Manchuria. When I saw that this news made his wife glad, I sent my
elder son, Chia-lin, to look for him and bring him home. My elder son
was away for more than two months, and never found him. Then he
returned by himself and told us there was no hope of our ever seeing
Chia-lan again. His wife heard him say this. We tried to console her.
She said nothing at all, but two hours after my elder son had come
home, she took a dose of arsenic and died. She was a good woman, and
no one ever had a complaint to make against her. She had no child.58
The wives of many of those interviewed had an equally harsh lot.
Liu Huanwu left his wife of three months with his parents when he
migrated in 1940. He did not return for ten years and sent money home
only once, though he worked all the time in Xinjing (Changchun) and
lived with people from the same village.59 Some wives returned to their
natal families, but among the informants only when the husband had
had to flee. Feng Yuexiu's grandfather had to flee from creditors one
night in 1927; he had his own brick kiln, but got into financial difficulties
when a load of bricks was spoilt. He was away for twelve years, during
which time his wife had to be supported by her own family. He returned
one day without warning, and the family went back to the life it had lead
before, as if the twelve-year hiatus had not occurred.60
The most pathetic wives were those who had to fend for themselves,
without help from either relatives or their husbands. Some managed to
get by with handicraft work, usually spinning and weaving. Li Chuan-
zhen married at the age of twenty-three in 1935 and migrated to Man-
churia immediately after his marriage. He did not see his wife again for
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seventeen years. He wandered around Manchuria all that time, never
earning enough money to send home. His wife lived with his mother and
eked out an existence by weaving.61 Zhang Shuyun left his wife and two
children to work in the Fuxun Mines. While he was away they had to beg
to survive, since he could not send any money home.62
Separation was often a hard, lonely period for both husband and
wife. Husbands, however, had much greater access to comfort and enter-
tainment than did wives, since rural society was puritanical and
regarded a woman on her own as an invitation to disaster. One of the
main arguments in a contemporary attack on migration was that the
separation of married couples would lead to rape, seduction, adultery,
jealousy, and marital disharmony.63
In Nanyang (South China), men who were separated from their
wives at home might take a second "local" wife if they were doing well
enough to afford it. Among the Shandong informants there were only
two such examples, both from Zouping. Li Yunsheng's case is described
above. Zhang Xuefu, a tinker, left his wife and three children in 1939 for
Manchuria. He never sent any money home, and it soon became clear
through the grapevine that he had taken up with another woman. He
eventually had four more children with the wife in Manchuria. Some of
these children came to Shandong for visits, but Zhang never returned.
His disapproving neighbors made it clear that "never returned" meant
"never dared to show his face again."64
One side effect of separation was birth control. Yu Shulin went off in
1936 at age twenty-five, leaving his wife and a small child. He did not
come back for eleven years and sent money only once. Once he returned
two more children were born.65 Liu Zhengzhong married when he was
seventeen and migrated when he was twenty, in 1941. He did not come
back until 1946, though he was good about sending money. Only after
his return did his family start to grow—eventually he and his wife had
four children. Liu Huanwu, from the same village, did even better;
though his first child was not born until eleven years after his marriage,
he eventually had six children.66
The demands of the traditional family on the migrants were
particularly acute. Migration for many people was the start of a period of
loneliness and deprivation, financial and emotional, endured in the
expectation, not very often fulfilled, that the migration would make the
family rich. Men lived in extreme discomfort and had to be prepared to
put up with harsh treatment from their employers. Nonetheless most
informants did not criticize a system which could be seen to have
victimized its members. Although the pain of their experience was still
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vivid, they did not blame the family, except in cases where the family
relationship had deteriorated into that of employer and unpaid servant.
Nor did departure from home weaken control by the family over absent
members. There were plenty of rebels against the family system in
Republican China, but not many among the poor of Shandong.
Keeping In Touch
If migration was to strengthen a family, then the people who went
away had to be able to keep in touch with those who stayed at home.
This was made possible through the extraordinarily efficient Chinese
post office, the only truly national institution to survive China's period of
warlord turmoil and division. There was, however, one major problem
with corresponding: almost all the migrants and their families were
illiterate and could not write or read letters themselves. But letters did go
back and forth. Some were prepared by professional letterwriters, others
by friends and laoxiang with some education. Liu Huanwu, who had
had three years of schooling, wrote letters to his own family and for
other migrants from the same village. Some of these were sent by post;
others were carried by relatives or friends going home.67 The uncle of Cui
Dengwen, however, was out of touch with his family for thirty-four
years because he could not write.68 His example was cited as extreme, but
other informants told similar stories. Wu Benzhi was away from 1928 to
1969, with only one visit home in all those years. He did not send money,
and his family assumed that he had died. But he virtually rose from the
dead —out of the blue, 50 yuan arrived at his parents7 house in 1956 and
contact was resumed. By 1969 he was ready to retire. His brother, who
had no son, wanted Wu's son to be his heir, so the family moved home to
Laiyang.69
The local authorities today feel a responsibility to keep in touch with
people who are away. In 1984, the Pangjiaxiang authorities knew about
all the people and their descendants who were "outside"; they knew
where each one was and had maintained direct contact by letter
(tongxiri) with one-third of the thousand or so households that traced
their roots to Pangjiaxiang.70 Many villages had detailed information
about former inhabitants, which assumed considerable significance when
long-term land leases were being distributed (see chapter 5).
Village and township authorities keep track of internal migrants,
while county authorities generally run a bureau known as the Office of
People Abroad, (qiaowu/u). In 1984 the Gaomi Qiaowuju had precise
details of 500 local people living abroad, including one Sun Lansheng,
who worked for Air Canada.71 The office in Laiyang was aware of one
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man, surnamed Nie, still alive in France at age ninety-seven, who failed
to return from digging trenches in the First World War.72 Ostensibly
these offices exist to maintain contacts with people from the community,
as a reinforcement of local loyalties; but in the background is a hope that
if local people do well elsewhere, they may be persuaded to make a
generous donation to their hometown.
REMITTANCES
There was no clearer way of underlining the continuing connection
to home than the sending of remittances {huidui). This was the primary
purpose of many individual migrations; money was either sent home or
brought home at the end of the work season. Migrants could send money
home in many ways, none of them perfect. Several methods, however,
were good enough to risk. Had the transfer of money been too risky, the
migration would have very likely dried up.
Post Offices
The most obvious way to send money was through the Post Office.
By the mid-1930s, Shandong had more extensive mail lines (48,677 kilo-
meters) than any other province except Sichuan (55,507 kilometers).
Third highest was Henan, with 35,631 kilometers. Shandong lines were
divided as follows:













Source: Chu Chia-hua, China's Postal and Other
Communications Services (Shanghai: China
United Press, 1937).
The Post Office had an unusual reputation in Republican China for
honesty and efficiency. With a network of offices across the country, it
was often the most convenient way to make financial transfers. Its
couriers were considered reliable:
What Herodotus wrote twenty-three centuries ago of the Greek
messengers of his time "neither snow, nor rain, nor heat nor the gloom
of the night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their
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appointed rounds'' is as fittingly applicable to the humble couriers of
the Chinese Post Office today.73
Large amounts of money passed through the Shandong postal
system. In 1926, at the beginning of a peak period of migration,
Shandong post offices handled 18,543,400 silver yuan in various kinds of
postal transfers, with a net inflow of 11,261,200 yuan.74 Commercial
transactions accounted for much of this money, but at least some was
sent home by migrants. The county post offices of Ling County, not a
commercial center, handled 158,961 yuan that year, with a net inflow of
131,833 yuan.75 We can assume that a large part of this came from
migrant remittances.
Some migrants used the Post Office regularly. Zhang Hongbao sent
money home to Zouping two or three times a year by postal order;
altogether each year he normally sent about 30 to 40 yuan (Manchurian)
or about 10 percent of his income. His family cashed the postal orders at
the district post office. Li Gongshui, from the same village, sent 50 to 60
yuan a year. Both men were dockers in Dalian, earning about the same
amount of money.76
Migrants to Manchuria had to find other means of sending money
home after 1932, when the Chinese Post Office network in Manchuria
was closed down, with the loss of 50,278 kilometers of mail line.77
Although an agreement to restore postal traffic was signed in 1934
between Nanjing and the Manchukuo government, the service did not
reach earlier volumes, and in 1937 it was again interrupted by war.
Banks
By the mid-1920s the three main cities in Shandong—Jinan, Qing-
dao, and Yantai—all had branches of most of the major banks in China as
well as a few foreign ones. But these banks were not interested in the
small sums migrants sent. Migrants who did use banks —mainly people
from Jiaodong (the Peninsula) — turned to traditional local banks or
"money shops" {qianzhuang, qianpu).n In many of the Jiaodong counties
local banks had branches in Manchuria. The Tianhexing qianzhuang, for
example, had its main offices in Yantai, with branches in Jinan, Tianjin,
Beijing, Dalian, and Qingdao. It was run by people from Ye County.79
The Fuxunde qianzhuangh&d its headquarters in Penglai, with branches
in Dalian and several Manchurian towns.80 These banks were reliable
and convenient, but they charged very high fees on each transaction,
sometimes as much as 20 percent.81 It was much cheaper to use other
methods.
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Transfers In Kind
Migrants sometimes sent or took their earnings home in kind, rather
than in cash. In part this was because the rural population, used to
dealing in silver dollars (xianyang) or copper cash (xiantong), distrusted
paper currency. Another problem was the number of currencies in
circulation. In the late Qing, Alexander Hosie, the British consul at
Yingkou, reported, "Many of the labourers returning to Chefoo [Yantai]
before the closing of the port in winter invest their savings in opium and
smuggle it across to Chefoo."82
Sending money, or traveling with it, made one vulnerable to
robbery. One complex scheme to send money home to an area where
banditry was widespread involved sending money orders {huipiad) to a
bank in Jinan, where they were cashed by a Binzhou merchant. He then
used the money to buy inventory in Jinan and paid the families in
Binzhou with cash he had in his Binzhou store.83
Goods were not necessarily safer than cash, nor were migrants
necessarily good at doing business. When Zhao Yonghu's father came
home in 1943, his stratagem of loading himself down with pens and
shoes to sell along the way did not work—they were stolen from him.84
Friends and Connections
Some migrants relied on neither the Post Office nor the banks, but
handled their transactions instead through people they could trust. Hou
Shangjian, for example, sent his money from Harbin through the post to
Jinan, where one of the local merchants picked it up and took it home for
him.85 Others sent money home with "swallows/' This was a relatively
reliable method, but it had the disadvantage that one had to reveal to
one's friend —and therefore to the whole world —how much money one
was sending. Even though they were talking about times long past, many
informants were still reticent to talk about how much they had sent back.
Bringing Money Home Personally
Short-term migrants often brought money home with them in cash.
This seemed the simplest thing to do, and for some it was. Guo Baomeng
came home every year for the New Year, bringing money each time. He
was a tinker and earned good money, but the Japanese authorities never
allowed him to convert more than 50 yuan.86 Sun Hongshan, who had
sent money home to Laiyang through a bank in the early 1930s, brought
money with him when he came back in 1938. He was searched in Dalian
by Japanese border guards, who took all but 50 yuan from him. His only
consolation was that he still had 20 yuan sewn into the sole of his shoe.87
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Migrants bringing money home faced a major difficulty with currency
exchange. The currency situation in Manchuria, as in the rest of China,
was chaotic in the early twentieth century. Coins and notes were issued
under the authority of the Chinese central government, the provincial
governments, private banks, and foreign banks. At the end of 1929 the
most widely circulated currencies in Manchuria included the following:
Table 3.5 Major Currencies Circulating in Manchuria, 1929
Currency Exchange rate
(per 100 silver yuan)
Circulation area
Silver yuan (dayang qian) — silver dollar
coins issued by central government;
generally stable
Silver yuanpiao (dayangpiao) — dollar
notes issued by various banks; based on
silver yuan coins; generally stable
Feng piao—yuan notes issued by
Manchurian government; very unstable
Harbin dayang piao— silver yuan notes
issued by Harbin banks; fairly stable
Heilongjiang dayang piao—silver yuan
notes issued by Heilongjiang Province
government; generally stable
Jilin Yongcheng dayang piao— silver
notes issued by official bank of Jilin
Province; fairly stable
Xiaoyang qian (Jiao) — silver coins
smaller
than 1 yuan, issued by provincial mints;
debased but relatively stable
Yokohama Specie Bank silver yen
notes —issued by Yokohama Specie
Bank branches in Manchuria; stable
Bank of Chosen (Korea) gold yen
notes —
issued by Bank of Chosen branches




























Sources: Sakatani, Manchuria, 20-31. See also "The Currency Situation," in Chinese
Economic Journal 1 (May 1927): 5; Hitano Kenichiro, The Japanese in Manchuria, 265-338.
Note: The "normal' exchange rate for the silver yuan was 0.50 U.S. dollars and 1.00
Japanese yen.
Inevitably migrants returned with earnings in a currency different
than that used at home, which was itself subject to wide and frequent
variation over time and between regions. In his study of western Shan-
dong, Kenneth Pomeranz found persistent and erratic discrepancies in
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exchange rates between copper and silver Chinese currencies at different
market centers in Shandong and other parts of North China between
1905 and 1935.88
Events as distant as the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had
devastating effects on exchange rates in Manchuria and Shandong. A
large proportion of the money that migrants brought to Shandong early
in the century was in the form of Russian rubles because many had
found work on the Russian railways in northern Manchuria. According
to the Longkou Customs report for 1917, the fall in the value of the
rable-from 66 coppers in January to 10 coppers in December-"has
brought the once wealthy emigrant to the verge of bankruptcy and has
seriously affected the prosperity of every village in the district/'89
Most intermediate-size markets in Zouping, serving populations of
eight to nine thousand, had money changers.90 But changing money was
fraught with risks for the inexperienced. People who changed money at
most once a year were easy prey for unscrupulous money changers.
Migrants could lose as much as half of the money they brought back.
Even the seasoned traveler could be caught out. The economist Franklin
Ho recalled his experience in Manchuria in the late 1920s:
. . . when I was carrying out field investigations in Manchuria on the
problems of migration, I found that Manchurian currency differed from
city to city and place to place. I started out with a $10 national bank
note, and exchanged it for local currency at each of the places where I
stopped. When I got back to Tientsin I exchanged it again for national
currency. In the process of exchange the ten dollars in national currency
was reduced to two dollars.91
After 1931 the Japanese ran strict controls on money leaving
Manchuria. Hou Xiaolun lost 40 of the 100 yuan (Manchurian) he had
earned in 1936 when he left Manchuria, through the artificial exchange
rate. He lost again when he made his second return in 1944. The anguish
he suffered at the time was still vivid in his memory forty years later.92
Scale of Remittances
By some accounts remittances from Manchuria made Shandong
rich. According to the statistics of the Chinese Post Office, the total
amount of postal transfers received, in silver yuan, rose from 346,500 in
1910 to 18,535,400 in 1926.93 It is not possible to sort out what percentage
were migrant remittances, and what were other forms of postal traffic. In
any case it accounts for only a small part of the total sums remitted by
migrants. The gazetteer for Deping County claims that in the late 1910s
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and early 1920s, migrant families received more than a million yuan
every year.94 The figure is so vague that it may well mean "a lot of
money" rather than a precise amount. It is highly unlikely that county
authorities knew exactly how much money was coming into their
jurisdiction at a time when few were sure exactly how many inhabitants
they had. Another factor working against precision was that few
migrants would openly declare how much they were bringing back.
They might reveal such information to their nearest and dearest, but they
did not want to invite the attention of eager relatives or the tax collector.
An SMR study of Chinese workers in Manchuria in 1934 estimated
the amount that workers in different occupations could save based on the
differences between incomes and living expenses. The study concluded
that, depending on the occupation, most Chinese workers could remit
between 20 and 50 yuan a year and that the average annual remittance
was probably around 40 yuan.95 The remittances of most informants who
succeeded in sending money home did indeed fall into this range.
How important was a sum of this size to families in Hebei or
Shandong? A study of Chinese rural income distribution in the 1930s,
based on a land survey carried out by the National Land Committee of
China in 1935, concluded that average annual income for rural
households was 88 yuan in Shandong and 124 yuan in Hebei.96 An
annual remittance of 40 yuan would have increased the income of a
typical farm family in Hebei by nearly a third and that of an average
Shandong household by almost half.
We can form a rough idea of the scale of total remittance payments
if we take the SMR estimate of 40 yuan as the typical migrant's potential
annual remittance. In an average year in the 1920s and 1930s, some
350,000 migrants returned home. If they carried 40 yuan, the total would
have been 14 million yuan. If, in addition, around 20 percent of the labor
force remaining in Manchuria (about 12 million in 1927) sent home
remittances averaging 40 yuan each, a further 96 million yuan, the total
remittance flow each year would have been around 110 million yuan.
This was a large amount of money. Indeed, it was enough to cause
considerable concern to the Japanese authorities, who feared that the
wealth of Manchuria was being drained away and therefore imple-
mented restrictions on the amount of cash people could take out of
Manchukuo. However, the total sum was hardly enough to "enrich"
Shandong and Hebei, since it amounted to only about 1.5 yuan per
inhabitant of the two provinces. Nevertheless, for poor rural communi-
ties, the addition of even a few yuan could make a tremendous difference
in family living standards.
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There was variation in how assiduously migrants sent remittances,
even among people with similar incomes. After more than forty years
former migrants from Fucheng, Binzhou were still embarrassed about
who had sent what. Some had sent money regularly, others scarcely at
all. Liu Huanwu, who worked in a factory in Xinjing for ten years, sent
money only once to his wife and parents, even though at his peak he was
earning 70 yuan (Manchurian) a month. Li Dingjie's father, who worked
in the same factory, sent money home every year. Other informants
intimated that Liu might have been spending his money on less virtuous
activities than caring for his family—probably gambling, the curse of
single male migrants. He looked slightly shamefaced when his feckless-
ness was revealed.97
Many migrants failed to send any money home at all. For those who
went as recruited workers (huagong) this was not surprising, because
they were paid a recruitment bonus when they left, and their labor boss
usually took a good part of their wages. People who moved as a family
were unlikely to remit money. Others simply failed to make the amount
of money they had hoped for. Not one of the informants became rich.
Table 3.6 Remittances from Informants
Category











Source: Lary interviews, spring 1984.
It was clearly painful for the informants to admit publicly that they
had brought no money home. Migrants who returned with nothing to
show for their efforts had failed not only themselves, but also their entire
family; and memories of the shame and disappointment that must have
accompanied their return were revived. One informant told of a case that
had gone beyond shame, to despair. Qu Rongyu's father had gone to
Manchuria quite late in life, after losing his job in the Yantai Winery. He
was deeply distressed at returning virtually empty-handed. He had been
unable to continue working as a carpenter in Shenyang because his
eyesight was failing, and he could not exchange the tiny amount of
money he brought back with him because the currency was not
convertible. Since he could not pay his taxes on returning home, he was
put in prison for a few days. When he came out, he hung himself.98
LOCAL CONNECTIONS
HOME AND IDENTITY
A local identity is the birthright of every Chinese; in a formal sense, one
has no identity at all without one. It is the second part of basic personal
identification, after one's name: for example, Chen Zhirang, Sichuan
Chengdu ren (Chen Zhirang, a person of Sichuan Province, Chengdu
City). This identification spells out the province and locality to which a
person belongs; it does not mean the place where he lives, but the place
his family is from. Local identities descend through the male line and
cannot be broken or changed; they endure long after people have left
their native places. In the 1982 national census a majority of the people in
Dalian declared their ancestral affiliation (yuanji) to be a county in
Shandong, even those who were two and three generations removed
from the forebear who had migrated.1
Among the regions of China is a recognized hierarchy of quality,
within standardized categories. Some places are endowed with natural
wealth, such as southern Jiangsu, the land of fish and rice, or the rich
basin of Sichuan, or subtropical Guangdong. Other places offer their
natives special access to connections and influence, none more so than
the great metropolises of Shanghai and Beijing. Some places like
Hangzhou and Suzhou are famous for their beauty. Others are steeped in
history and culture. Shandong's ancient name, Qi-Lu, dates to before the
unification of China. Lu, the native place of Confucius, is considered the
birthplace of China's high culture. No place, however, is so poor, so
barren, or so inconsequential that its inhabitants do not love it. Even
places cheated by nature, such as the saline, lumpy plains around Ling
County or the flood-threatened villages that sit between the two sets of
Yellow River dikes at Binzhou, are loved profoundly by their
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inhabitants—just as much as the ancient pear orchards of Laiyang or the
fertile slopes overlooking the sea at Penglai are loved by theirs. Every
place commands the respect and love of its children, whether it provides
them with a decent living or not.
The migrants who left their families in Shandong to work in
Manchuria were still tied to their home regions with strong bonds of
emotion and tradition. While they were away they remained members of
their home communities, which in turn provided wide networks of
support through relatives, friends, and neighbors.
The Family—Jia
English has no adequate word to describe the object of this powerful
sense of attachment. The English term "home" is quite broad. It may
mean a house, a town, or a country. The Chinese term pa equates home
with family; it can only refer to that precise place where one's family is.
The German term Heimat is larger in scope, but it carries the same strong
sense of emotional attachment to a place whose precise size is not
defined, but which must be small enough for complete familiarity.
In places where there has been little migration, it is hard to separate
the place where one lives from the people one is related to —they are the
same thing. This overlap is often highlighted in village names. Many
villages in Shandong, as elsewhere in China, carry single-family sur-
names—Sunjiacun (Sun family village), Wangjiazhuang (Wang family
village). Actually, only small or fairly remote villages are composed of
families who all share the same surname; two or three surnames are
more typical. Villages of families with many surnames are disparagingly
referred to as zaxingcun or mixed-surname villages, with a definite sense
that "mixed" means something improper. Zaxingcun were often situated
in undesirable places: Chengnancun (South-of-the-Wall Village) in
Laiyang, for example, had been an area of wasteland just outside the city
wall. People who live in mixed villages were often displaced from their
real homes by disaster or personal tragedy, misfortunes that are rather
uncharitably interpreted as symptoms of personal laxity.
Laoxiang— "Fellow Locals"
If the family is the first level of local affiliation, the next level, which
still commands a powerful loyalty, is the xiang. The term xiang has an
administrative reality as a township, the level of administration between
the county and the village. But in another sense xiangh&s a much more
limited focus; it means local connections, an outer ring of personal ties,
one step beyond close relatives. The area covered by this term is not
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precise: It could be a large village or a cluster of villages. The term is
used in expressions like tongxiang or laoxiang, meaning the people who
come from the same locale. While in German these terms are translated
as Landsmann, and in Italian as paesano, English translates them
clumsily as "fellow locals" or "people from the same hometown."
While the laoxiang connection is not as close as immediate family, it
still often involves blood ties and is much closer than other recognized
relationships, such as that between people from the same county or the
same province. The informants clearly distinguished between people
they were closely related to and those who were laoxiang. Close relatives
were very carefully designated, as they have to be in Chinese kinship
terminology. It is impossible to speak generally of "cousins"; one must
distinguish between male and female, maternal or paternal, and between
degrees of relationship (first, second, or third cousin). This means that in
the case of small, single-surname villages, people's laoxiang are probably
not from the same village, and anyone from their village is most likely a
close relative. Laoxiang axe either from the same (large) village or from
the surrounding cluster of villages. They speak the same dialect, go to the
same periodic market (//), have regular, long-standing connections with
each other, know all about each other, and have economic ties that
require a certain amount of trust.
The laoxiang network is the means by which marriages are
contracted, and it defines the radius within which girls can be married.
Since people cannot marry someone of the same surname, girls are
married out from their native villages to villages within the
administrative xiang radius, close enough to maintain some connection
with the family. In Taitou, Martin Yang reported that there had never
been a marriage within the village, though there was more than one
surname. This was because of the feeling that families related by
marriage should not be too close to each other. Marriage to a neighboring
village was the norm, often with several marriages in one family being
contracted in the same neighboring village.2
Attachment to Home
Leaving home does not detach the person who leaves from family,
village, or locality; nor does it cancel obligations to those left behind.
Tradition held that the emigrant thought ceaselessly of the day when he
could go home. The highest ideal was to "return home wearing brocade"
{yijin huanxiang). Once a person made money, he had to go home; the
whole point of going away was to find the means to return in glory.
Returning to one's home was as natural as "the leaves of a tall tree falling
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close to its roots" (shu gao qian zhang, ye luo gui gen). Any other
outcome was a misfortune or a sign of bad character.
The deep-seated attachment to home meant that migrants were
reluctant to resettle permanently elsewhere. While some contemporary
observers of the migration to Manchuria had supposed that emigration
might solve problems of overpopulation in North China, this did not
appear to be the case. As Walter Mallory noted in his important study of
famine in China in the 1920s:
There is an annual movement of labour from Shantung which reflects
to a marked degree the love of home and unwillingness to leave it for
new fields. Every year more than thirty thousand men [a major
understatement] migrate from Shantung to Manchuria. They leave
early in the spring and travel more than 500 miles to the rich lands of
the north where they work during the summer; but in the autumn they
all return to their homes in Shantung. In the days before the
construction of the Peking-Mukden Railway, they made this trip on
foot taking nearly a month on the road each way. It is almost
unbelievable that such a practice continues year after year when good
Manchurian farm lands are available and can be bought on easy terms
and for a phenomenally low price from the railway authorities which
are making an effort to settle this region. It cannot be said that the
people do not realize the benefits, for they see them with their own eyes
and share in them for a short time every summer; but they are
unwilling to change their homes and their mode of life.3
Mallory's criticism of the Shandong farmers' refusal to migrate
permanently contrasts with the widespread fear in the West at that time
that Chinese were only too anxious to emigrate and would flood the
world unless barred from admission abroad. He was writing in the same
period when Canada and the United States passed legislation to bar
Chinese immigration.
Mallory wrote about the migrants' intentions, but not about what
actually happened. Many of those who migrated did not come back, and
the growth in the Manchurian population reflected this. Some stayed
because there was nothing for them to return to at home, others because
political vicissitudes intervened, and still others because they found the
life in Manchuria good enough to warrant staying—for a while. Others
who did well enough to send regular remittances were urged by their
families to stay, because they were a secure source of income. And then
there were those who could not return because they did not make
enough money to come home with their heads held high. On his travels
through Manchuria in the early 1930s, Owen Lattimore found every-
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where the phenomenon of "long-term temporary migration" and the
widespread feeling that:
. . . definite settlement in Manchuria was an expedient only for those
destitute of other resources, a mark of exile, failure and defeat . . . the
successful emigrant, and the one most respected was the one who went
out, made his money and came back.4
Martin Yang reported the same phenomenon for his village, Taitou,
across the bay from Qingdao:
Several decades ago, a single man of a Yang family went to work in
Manchuria. Because of his special ability in reclamation and farm
management, he succeeded in acquiring a large farm of several
hundred acres. He married there and had three or four children.
Recently, however, the head of the family decided to move back to his
ancestors' place. So, five or six years ago, a new family was added to
the village of Taitou. But unfortunately, the local people, including his
own kinsmen, and the land situation very much disappointed the once
successful farmer. He could not buy the amount of land he wanted
because land is more scarce and expensive than in Manchuria. He could
not even get the kindness which he had learned to expect from his own
clanspeople. People who understood the difficulties and losses he has
suffered said that he should not have come back, and he, too, has come
to realize this. However, the northern Chinese peasants have, through
generations, developed a deep-rooted passion for the place of their
ancestors. They cannot resist the idea of coming back home, unless a
whole family or group of families have moved out simultaneously and
sold all their properties, so that they would have nothing to live on if
they should come back.5
The ties to home are as powerful today as they have ever been.
Since the opening of China in the late 1970s, people who have done well
overseas have been encouraged to pour money into their native places. A
suitable donation is found for each person: a university for the super
rich, a major investment for the business man, a school or a clinic for
someone of modest means. The pressure to donate is not subtle, but it
does not have to be. The emigrant plays a role he understands well, and
his native place usually has a sufficiently clear idea of how much he can
afford to be quite specific about what he should contribute. Refusal to
make a donation is seen as antisocial and un-Chinese. The only major
difference between present-day local benefactors and those of fifty years
ago is that today most do not return permanently. In the past, return
meant not only benefiting one's native place, but actually going back
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there to live. Shandong has done less well in terms of donations from
former natives than Guangdong or Fujian, probably because so many
potential donors live in Taiwan, and until the recent thawing of relations,
it was very difficult for people to get back to Shandong for visits.
Roots of Local Attachment
Where does this strong sense of local identity and attachment come
from? Why does the supposed Western propensity to migrate easily and
permanently seem not to have a parallel in China? The most obvious
answer would be that it has to do with stages of development, that
Westerners did not move easily either until the industrial revolution and
urbanization were well under way. This is true but simplistic. It obscures
the fact that when movement did become possible in the West, how far
people went and how long they stayed away were determined by careful
family deliberations. The association of migration with development also
downplays the profound and intense attachment of Chinese to their
native places and the institutional underpinning buttressing that
attachment. The migrant's attachment to home, and his longing for it when
away, was extensively mythologized in traditional China. This emotional
link served many purposes, some instrumental and even quite cynical.
Family and village elders, local authorities, defenders of traditional values
such as school teachers all instilled in the young the idea that they must be
devoted to home, that they must never believe they could separate
themselves from it. To a great extent these efforts persuaded most migrants
that they were sojourners (qiad), who must return home sometime.
Whether the migrants actually did or not was conditioned by a host of
other factors: circumstances at home, the relative success of the migration,
opportunities elsewhere, and personal proclivities. But few migrants felt
comfortable severing their ties with home completely. In part this was
because home did offer comfort and security, but it also exerted a pull on
migrants in other ways.
First, home provided a link to the ancestors. Confucian values
required descendants to stay close to the graves of their ancestors, to
maintain them and sweep them once a year These attentions demon-
strated that the ancestors were not forgotten and that descendants were
trying, through their lives, to please them. A Baptist missionary noted
this devotion in the early 1920s.
The villagers of Shantung cling to their wretched homes with a
passionate love we can hardly understand, and nothing but sheer
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starvation staring them in the face could make them leave their
ancestral farms and their fathers' graves .. .6
Moving away permanently and abandoning the ancestors would be
like deliberately tearing oneself up by the roots, a painful and possibly
fatal process.
Linked closely to the ancestors was the inheritance system, which
required that one be at home to inherit one's rightful share. In his
monumental study of Chinese agriculture, Wilhelm Wagner remarked
that although the inheritance system was based on partible inheritance, it
was complex enough and flexible enough that heirs might do poorly
unless they stood up for their rights.7 They had to be at home to make sure
they got everything they deserved when property was being divided.
The state also had major interests in making sure that people stayed
where they were supposed to be. It needed to foster local identities as a
practical means of organizing and controlling a vast country—a place for
everyone, and everyone in their place. Allowing people to move around
freely was a recipe for trouble and turbulence; keeping them at home
kept them quiet. The state tied people to their localities through systems
of registration and control. The baojia registration system, practiced more
or less efficiently by the Ming and Qing governments, and less so by the
Guomindang, made it difficult for people to move without official
permission. If people did move, it was either because the government
ordered them to, in an officially sponsored migration such as the
movement into Yunnan in the eighteenth century, or because the govern-
ment was too weak to prevent movement. After 1949 the Communist
government pursued the same policies of population control, but more
effectively than had earlier governments. Its hukou system, introduced in
the early 1950s, made migration without prior approval almost impos-
sible until it started to break down under the market-based economic
reforms of the mid-1980s.
The authoritarian harshness of these population control systems was
softened by extolling the virtues and joys of each locality, so that people
could be proud of where they were rather than frustrated by their
inability to move. Pride in local history was instilled officially. It was the
responsibility of the gentry of each county to edit the local gazetteer
periodically. Although the format varied little from one county to
another, with each county described in essentially the same terms, these
gazetteers made a point of extolling the special virtues of each locality.
They served the same purpose from place to place: to make the
inhabitants proud of their own county. In the mid-1980s a new flood of
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gazetteers was commissioned, the first since the 1940s, with the clear
intention of bolstering local loyalty as a substitute for the moribund
ideology of socialism.
Because of their sense of local identity and their family ties, few
migrants believed that they were leaving permanently or going to a place
that might be an improvement over their native place. The expressions
used to describe migration to Manchuria were bleak. Some spoke of
poverty: chuang guandong carries the connotation of straggling off to
Manchuria, driven by poverty at home, to struggle for a miserable
existence beyond the boundary of the civilized world. Others spoke of
the powerlessness and isolation of a migrant: dang huangyu, "to be a
yellow fish," meaning to expose oneself to the horrors of the world with
no protection. Some were simply bald geographical references: shang
haibei, "to go north beyond the sea," that is, from the Peninsula.
Manchuria was usually considered to be a barbarous place; it was
harsh, cold, and dangerous. If it was not full of wild animals, giant
mosquitoes, and brazen bandits, then it was overrun by Japanese
soldiers. The gazetteer of Deping, a major migrant-producing area, gives
a sense of how life in Manchuria was seen: "Buffeted by the wind,
drenched by the rain, thousands of miles away from home, the laborers
go without proper food or clothing, yet endure with fortitude."8
Some people, usually those who were trying to lure migrants, had
glowing things to say about Manchuria. There was the occasional flight
of fancy about creating a new race, combining the physical characteristics
of the Manchus with the culture of the Han to produce "a healthy,
perfect new people." But most potential migrants feared the cold, went
in horror of the food, and loathed the mosquitoes.
Some migrants tried to improve the odds by starting their journeys
only on what were considered locally to be lucky days. They had some
latitude, because a lucky day was any day with a three, a six, or a nine in
it, or a number divisible by three.10 This belief still persists in much of
Shandong: three, six, and nine days are good for departures (sanliujiu
wang wai zou), and the railway authorities put extra carriages on trains
on those days; two, five, and eight days are good to come home on
(erwuba hao huijia).u
The informants were unrelenting in their criticism of the
Manchurian food —sorghum, maize, and beans —as compared to the
culinary delights of Shandong. (They also remarked again and again that
Beijing food was really Shandong food, hijacked by the shameless people
of Beijing.) Although going from Shandong to Manchuria at that time
might have seemed like moving from an area of shortage to one of
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surplus, migrants spoke more in terms of leaving good food for horrible
food, moving from fine Shandong wheat to coarse Manchurian sorghum.
The benchmark of prosperity for many, the demarcation between the old
days and the happier present, was that now they could afford to eat fine
grain and avoid coarse grain altogether.
Migration and Morality
Popular antipathy to migration meant that migrants had to cope
with a widely held view that they were doing something unnatural by
going away. One critique of migration had this to say about people who
left home:
Among people given to migrating, their morality, customs, faith, habits,
moral outlook and behaviour are all unstable and change frequently.
Migration destroys morality and fosters crime and evil.12
Behind this kind of statement was the assumption that people "adhere"
(nianzhud) to their native place naturally, that they belong to a specific
patch of land as much as the land belongs to them. It is a visceral,
physical connection, expressed in self-congratulatory sayings about
people who have never left home, such as laosi bu quxiang (to grow old
and die without leaving home), or antu zhongqian (attached to the soil,
one hates to leave it).
Mallory pointed to another fact of life that made it easier for people
to remain devoted to their native place —they did not expect much from
it. A culture of poverty and hardship had inured people to the harshness
of the natural surroundings of north China:
. . . a cause of the lack of initiative which might induce the residents of
the over-crowded, famine-threatened northern provinces to seek better
opportunities may be traceable to the effects on the race of former oft-
repeated starvation conditions. . . . These northern families . . . have
developed habits of thrift and economy until the acquisitive instinct has
become second nature, for the wasteful and extravagant have long
since been eliminated during the many years of want. These
characteristics are the natural counter-part of conservatism, a desire to
keep at all costs what has been acquired, and they tend to make
abhorrent the thought of leaving home and giving up a plot of land,
however meager and inadequate to support a family.13
Mallory's views may be generalized, but they at least provide
cultural background—not for the specific social and economic climates in
which the migrants lived, but for the patient endurance of hardship so
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characteristic of people in North China. Such behavior was not stupid or
apathetic, but a willing and dignified acceptance of a heavy burden. To
stay home and endure hardship was admirable, to leave was not. Al-
though migration was a routine part of life in much of Shandong, it could
not be recognized as proper or admirable.
With these kinds of deep-seated cultural proclivities, migrants could
admit to themselves, their families, and their laoxiang only that they
were migrating to earn money and that they planned to return as soon as
possible, if not in life then in death:
Grim evidence of this very consequential attachment to the ancestral
soil may be seen in the slow-moving stream of wooden carts, drawn by
horses, mules and oxen in tandem and abreast, southward bound
through the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan [Shanhaiguan] from
Manchuria, each cart piled high with plain wooden coffins lashed
together. These are the remains of the pioneers who have died in the
"foreign land" of Manchuria.14
LAOXIANG AND MIGRATION
Given the prevailing negative attitudes toward migration, few
potential migrants had the courage or enthusiasm to strike out on their
own. In making the painful decision to leave home, they needed reliable
information about where they were going and advice and help from
someone in whom they had confidence. Since no objective sources of
information existed, they turned to the network that would reduce risks
and provide some comfort, their laoxiang connections. The laoxiang
relationship was the principal mechanism for migration.
Migration statistics usually describe movement from one large place
(a country or province) to another. Recent work on Chinese labor, for
example Elizabeth Perry's Shanghai on Strike, discusses regional
recruitment patterns for a province or a large city (Canton, Ningbo,
Yancheng, Hubei, Shandong).15 But this is still too large a pool. Most
migrants moved from one small place to another equally small place.
Their movement may have been from one village to another or from their
village to a specific factory or mine. The references to larger areas are not
false because they do describe the actual movement; but they do not
reflect how migrants saw the transition: They were moving from people
they knew to other people they knew. The distance traveled might be
enormous, but in terms of emotional comfort and social connections, it
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was very short. Owen Lattimore, who knew Manchuria better than any
other foreign observer, had this to say in the 1930s:
The long-established practice of migrating to Manchuria to work for a
season, in order to get funds for going back to China to stay, is one of
the evidences of the negative style of Chinese migration, and illustrates
its characteristic form of drift. On the other hand, it has played a large
part in the establishment of the Shantung [Shandong] element in the
Chinese population of Manchuria, and is also responsible for the fact—
which might at first seem paradoxical — that the Shantung settlers are,
by general recognition, the soundest and most successful of all
immigrants. There is no adequate explanation other than the fact that
the settler who derives from the old system of seasonal migration has
behind him a solid tradition. To him Manchuria means something
definite before he ever goes there, and when he sets out he has before
him a known course of action. This, more than any question of facility
of transport, similarity of agricultural methods, or any other factor
whatever, explains the extraordinary predominance of Shantung men
in Manchuria. A living social tradition has more validity than the most
pressing economic necessity.16
Few people from Shandong who migrated outside the compass of
organized recruitment went off into uncharted territory; they went to
places where they knew people. Relationships were a natural conduit
taking people from one place to another with a minimum of anxiety and
insecurity. For example, many of the migrants from Puchengxiang,
Binzhou, went to Xinjing (Changchun). Almost all the migrants from
Chenhuzhen in Boxing moved to Fuyu, a district just north of the
Songhua River in Jilin. A group of about twenty-five men left Yingjiacun,
Zouping every year after the Spring Festival to go to Fengcheng in
Liaoning; the group's membership varied from year to year, but the
destination never changed.
The pattern of recruitment for migration was familiar to Shandong
people for it resembled the method generally used to recruit men for the
army. Senior soldiers or junior officers would go home to their native
place, pick up a certain number of young men who were willing to enlist,
pay a recruitment bonus to their families, and take them off to the army.
This arrangement had benefits for both sides —the underemployed got
jobs, and the army got relatively reliable men who had at least some
personal connection to keep them loyal to their commander.17
Laoxiang ties were by nature flexible and convenient. They did not
carry the obligations of family ties, but involved a clear sense of
accounting, that there had to be some recompense for services rendered.
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Liaoxiang ties made the great migration to Manchuria possible; they
amplified existing ties to meet new needs and opportunities. Below are
some of the roles that laoxiang played in the migration.
Recruiting
Usually the laoxiang connection first came into play as the means by
which migrants left home. Local ties were often involved in labor
recruitment. Being recruited by a laoxiang was less risky than going
through one of the large Japanese companies, such as the Fuxun Mines,
which ran permanent recruitment offices in most of the large centers in
Shandong. This was generally considered to be the worst way to migrate.
Zheng Fulin and Zhang Shuyun both left Ling County in 1943 for
Dezhou and signed on with the Fuxun office there. They got no
recruitment bonuses, earned almost no money while they were in
Manchuria, lived in appalling conditions, and had to borrow their fares
home —one from a laoxiangand the other from a relative.18
Some companies used laoxiang connections for indirect recruitment.
Local agents out in the countryside would canvass their laoxiang net-
works each spring to find men willing to migrate. The periodic markets
were ideal places to look for recruits. The five-day markets in Shandong,
known as ft, or collections, attracted a good portion of the people living
within a one to two-hour walk from the market. One of the market's key
functions was to spread information—about job opportunities and about
the dangers or opportunities of the political situation.19
In the 1980s the recommercialization of agriculture produced a
resurgence of local markets. Lary observed a great throng at the market
in Huimin. The crowd was relaxed and slow-moving; people had come
to town not only to do a bit of shopping, but to chat, make arrangements,
and generally visit. Like markets in years past, this was a setting for
people to informally exchange information and seek out opportunities.
But laoxiang did not necessarily look out for the best interests of
their fellows drafted to work in Manchuria. The local man who recruited
Hou Shangrui and one hundred others from Fenghuangxiang, Ling
County, in 1941 was a local "bad egg," whose only occupation was
recruiting labor for Japanese enterprises in Manchuria. Hou's group was
recruited for a brick kiln in Harbin. Although Hou did better than many
people from Ling County, and came back with a small amount of money,
he got no recruitment bonus and reported with some relish that his
recruiter had been executed by the local Communist authorities after
they took over.20 In Huimin professional local recruiters, labeled "land-
lords" and "merchants of flesh" by the Communist county authorities,
LOCAL CONNECTIONS 107
worked for Tianjin companies, which maintained extensive networks
through the Shandong countryside.21
These full-time local recruiters were generally unpopular with the
people they recruited. Zhang Wenjie from Caohuli, Huimin, reported
with some pleasure that the man from a neighboring village who had
recruited him in 1943, one Shi Dahu (Big Tiger), who lived by recruiting
labor for the Japanese, had been punished after the arrival of the
Communists.22 Another man whose sordid activities in the recruitment
line caught up with him was Zhang Zhixin, a tailor from Boxing. In 1939
he took Wu Yuzhen and two other laoxianghom. a neighboring village to
Jinan, with the promise that they would get jobs paying 5 yuan per day
as tailors in Manchuria. Instead they were locked up in Jinan and taken
off to a gold mine in northern Heilongjiang. When Wu finally got back
six years later, he went and complained to Zhang about what had
happened. Zhang gave him 30 yuan, which seemed to settle the matter.23
Although there were bad recruiters who passed recruits on virtually
as commodities, there was much less lingering animosity toward men
who recruited laoxiang to be part of a labor gang that they themselves
headed as baton (labor contractor) or gongtou (labor boss). Neither term
is very precise, nor is it clear what the distinction was between a
professional recruiter and a baton or gongtou, except that the informants
assumed that a baton or gongtou would stay with his men, act as their
foreman at their destination, and generally have some concern for them
beyond the purely mercenary.
But even this arrangement did not always work out. In 1940, several
Huimin migrants were recruited by a man they referred to as their
gongtou. Chen Dechang, a local carpenter, recruited twenty other
carpenters and took them to Mishan, Heilongjiang, where he was to be
their foreman. The migration was a disaster. The men had to work as
farmhands because there were no carpentry tools at their destination,
and they returned home with no money, though they had been paid a
recruitment bonus before they left. Chen had not been very scrupulous
about this payment: Some of his recruits got 20 yuan, others only 15. The
money had come from a stake provided to Chen by a Tianjin company,
the Qingshuizu. But Chen was just as much of a nuisance to the company
as he was to the people he recruited. He took about 30 percent of the
company's commission, but did not deliver the equipped carpenters they
expected. The migrants, however, had no hard feelings toward him, and
he was not punished when the Communists arrived.24
Some men who recruited their laoxiang were regarded with
gratitude. When Ceng Zhaolin came home in 1940 to his township in
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Linqu to recruit workers, his Japanese employers, who ran a mine in
Changling, Jilin, paid for his journey. Ceng's arrival coincided with the
beginning of the great drought in Linqu and many people were
desperate to leave. Ceng arranged for not only workers, but whole
families to move north and was regarded as something of a savior.25 This
form of migration, where a man came home specifically to recruit local
people for his employers, was common. In a closely related form,
laoxiang assisted with the journey only. In 1937 Hou Shangyu and eight
others from his village in Ling County were taken to Manchuria by a
laoxiang who had come home and was returning north. The laoxiang
only escorted Hou and company on their journey; he had no jobs lined
up at the other end. Hou moved around, doing odd jobs wherever he
could find them, and eventually was quite successful. He sent money
home regularly and brought money with him on each visit home during
the eleven years he was away.26
Finding Jobs
A major challenge for first-time migrants who had not been
recruited was finding a job. There was usually plenty of work available,
but it was widely dispersed. The distances between places were
enormous, and the cost of extensive rail travel was out of reach for poor
migrants. Timing was also a critical issue. The work season for outdoor
jobs in Manchuria was short—roughly April to October —so unless a
migrant started work early in the season, his chances of covering his
costs were limited. An equally important issue was the type of work.
Migrants had the lowest opinion of jobs where they worked directly for
Japanese employers in the mines or on the railways. They preferred jobs
in factories that did not close down for the winter or in stores — usually
Chinese-run—or on farms or in the forests, where the living conditions
tended to be better.
Laoxiangconnections were important in finding work. The connection
in Puchengxiang, Binzhou, was Li Dingjie's father, a foreman in a flour
mill in Xinjing. He lived in Xinjing for twenty years, beginning in 1925,
and was a magnet for people from his home area. He did not arrange
their migration or come home to recruit them, but when they showed up
he acted as guarantor to get them jobs. With the jobs came accom-
modation in the mill's dormitories. Anyone from Puchengxiang and the
surrounding villages could move to Xinjing and find work.27
In the same way, Zhang Xuefu was able to find jobs in Fenghuang
(now Fengcheng), near Dandong, for anyone from Yingjiacun and the
surrounding villages in Zouping. Each year a group of about twenty-five
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men from the village of 200 people, plus a number of people from
neighboring villages, left for Fenghuang. There was no prearrangement;
it was a locally understood pattern that lasted from the mid-1920s to the
Japanese defeat. It did not originate with Zhang because he did not move
north until 1939; he must simply have taken over the activity from
another job-finder. Zhang himself never came home; he could hardly
have done so since he had abandoned his family in Zouping and set up
another in Fenghuang. It was not clear whether he made money finding
jobs for others. While he had two families, which normally suggests
affluence, he did not send remittances to his family at home, so he was
not supporting both of them. Nevertheless there seemed to be nothing
but warm feelings toward him, and when his Manchuria-born children
wanted to move into his village in the early 1980s —Zhang had been long
dead — they were welcomed.28
Some laoxiang migrations were quite casual. Hou Xiaolun, from
Fenghuangxiang, Linqu, went off in 1936 with a group of seven laoxiang,
one of whom had a friend who might be able to find them work in
Mishan, Heilongjiang. There must have been a fairly high degree of
certainty that the connection would work, given the distance to Mishan—
nearly on the Soviet border in southeastern Heilongjiang. And the
connection did work, though not in a very coherent way. Each of the men
was found a job, but in different places. Hou managed to earn 100 yuan
(Manchurian) in the first year he was there.29
Arranging Accommodations
One of the commonest forms of assistance provided through
laoxiang relationships was finding accommodations. Laoxiang were not
expected to provide free accommodation or cover living expenses except
in emergencies, but they were expected to give newcomers a fair deal.
Most single male migrants wanted to live as cheaply as possible. This
usually meant sharing living quarters with large numbers of people.
Sharing created major security problems. Migrants had few possessions,
and the ones they did have became by consequence more important.
They could not afford to be robbed. If one had no relatives, living with
laoxiang was the obvious solution. The preexisting relationship reduced
the risk of being cheated in rent or having possessions stolen.
Many informants reported that they had lived with laoxiang in
Manchuria, sometimes in rooming houses run by laoxiang, sometimes in
dormitories run by their employers. Zhang Hongbao of Sunzhenxiang,
Zouping, was recruited in 1938 with a group of a dozen or so from his
village and shipped to Dalian. While there he worked as a docker and
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lived in a dormitory whose inhabitants were all laoxiang. He earned
enough and lived cheaply enough to send money home each year and to
marry as soon as he returned in 1943.30 His was a classic example of
temporary migration, where the migrant's whole focus is to spend as
little money as possible, go through no acculturation at all, and get home.
Providing Emergency Help
The laoxiang relationship was not normally a charitable one. People
expected only a fair deal and some emotional warmth from their lao-
xiang. But there was usually an understanding that in emergency
situations charity would come into play. This might mean a good deed
done in the expectation of future considerations, or an interest-free loan,
or help that would not be given to a stranger. In 1934, when Li Yunsheng
of Sunzhenxiang, Zouping, had to flee from creditors at home, he went
unannounced to a laoxiang \n Hunjiang, Jilin, on the border with Korea.
He knew that when he got to Jilin, he would not be completely on his
own. And in fact, the man did find him a carpentry job, although that
was the extent of his help.31
Victims of disasters needed more extensive help. They tended to
arrive destitute, in family groups. They were not particularly welcome
arrivals, especially in places where local people were not doing well
themselves. But there was an understanding that they should be helped.
Xiao Lianhe's family, from Chenhuzhen, Boxing, moved to Fuyu in 1941
after several of its members had died of cholera. The family had fled,
pawning their house to pay their fares as far as Tianjin. A relative there
gave them enough money to go on to Fuyu. They moved into what
seemed a remote, inhospitable area, but was not because it was heavily
settled with laoxiang. Although no one took overall responsibility for the
family, they were able to move from one household to another and get
odd jobs on the land or fishing in the Songhua.32 Their case illustrates the
difference between relatives and laoxiang-- relatives had to help with
money, laoxiang only with shelter and work opportunities.
Another common form of help was lending people the money to get
home. Those whose migrations had failed had little choice but to go
home. To do this, they needed to borrow the fare—unless they were
willing to walk, which some did. Zheng Fulin of Zhangxilou, Ling
County, went to work in the Fuxun coal mines in 1943. He earned almost
no money, and at the end of two years he was so desperate that he
borrowed 80 yuan from a laoxiang to get home. His action coincided
with the closing of the mines after the Japanese defeat, but that was not
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the reason he gave for wanting to return to Shandong.33 No one but a
relative or a laoxiang would be willing to make such a loan.
The harshness of the Manchurian climate made the need to help
newcomers more compelling than it would have been in warmer regions.
Failure to shelter people in Manchuria might condemn them to death. In
northern countries hospitality has a special flavor, because in winter
offering or refusing hospitality is a life-and-death matter. Migrants from
Shandong had to adjust their long-established habits of assistance to
accommodate a new physical climate. This generally meant that they had
to do more than they would have at home, even if they lacked the extra
resources.
In the course of migration, increased demands on personal ties are
common. Sometimes a formal means is found to deal with the challenges,
such as the migrant associations developed in North America to provide
business contacts, lodging, health care, emergency aid, education, and
protection. China had long had such associations, the huiguan, generally
translated into German as Landsmannscha/ten.34 These existed in
Manchuria, in the provincial capitals, and almost always represented
provinces, not cities or counties.35 They tended to serve only a restricted
clientele, principally merchants, and would not have been places to
which rural migrants could turn for help. Rural migrants set up few
formal organizations for mutual aid. They seem to have relied much
more on informal connections and meeting places, such as restaurants or
stores run by laoxiang or railway stations, which still serve as important
informal meeting places today.
Communicating
Laoxiang connections also performed the key function of trans-
mitting news and money. People heading home would carry letters, report
on how well or badly things were going, and convey news of the activities
of any locals in their area in the north. Some people also asked laoxiang
to carry money for them. Lan Runde, from Beigouzhen in Penglai, sent
money home every year from 1934 to 1944 through laoxiang. He found
them cheaper and more reliable than either the Post Office or a bank.36
The streams of communication home made it difficult for people to
disappear unless they went to an area where they had no laoxiang. Home
villages had a remarkably precise knowledge of where their permanent
migrants were, if they were still alive, how many descendants they had,
and what jobs they were doing. This knowledge did not come from any
formal system of reporting, but from the extended network of laoxiang.
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The apparent anonymity of the migrants in the great movement
from Shandong to Manchuria does not tally with the facts. Almost all of
the migrants moved along paths trodden before them by people they
knew. Although far from home, they could spend their time with people
from their home areas, bound together by the same bonds that at home
tied them to their native place.
RETURN MIGRATION
The official term Chinese authorities use to refer to people living abroad
is qiao, sojourners. Migrants are implicitly assumed to be people who in
their hearts never leave home, for whom migration is only a temporary
expedient to get through hard times. Return migration is then the
inevitable outcome of migration. The majority of the migrants who went
to Manchuria did in fact return promptly to their homes in North China
(see Figure 5.1). The timing of their returns, however, was often as
complex as the original decision to migrate and depended on their
intentions before they migrated, their successes or failures in Manchuria,
and circumstances at home.
REASONS FOR RETURN
Very few data were collected in the course of the migration to
determine who left Manchuria and why. However, one source that deals
with a small sample of people returning to Shandong and Hebei in 1934
and 1935 only points to some of the reasons people did return. Although
the author intended to show that people were driven out of Manchuria
by Japanese brutality, the answers he got did not fit this supposition.
The figures in Table 5.1 give an indication of the range of possible
causes for return migration, but with an "other" category that accounts
for more than 50 percent of the responses, they hardly seem complete.
Another claim, made in late 1934, that an economic downturn was
driving migrants out of Manchuria, with a thousand people a day
coming home through Qingdao, was weakened by the fact that it was
based on activity at the beginning of the normal return season, late
autumn, as the winter begins to take hold in Manchuria.1
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Source: Huang Jinyan, "Jiuyiba hou Shandong Hebei liang-
sheng laiwang Dongbei sansheng zhi nonggong shuzi tongji,"
Zhongguoshiyezazhil.9 (1935): 1662.
The informants for the present study were quite precise about why
they had come home; usually they gave a specific reason, and it was
always colored by their attachment to home. Although travel between
Manchuria and Shandong was easy, only rarely interrupted by distur-
bances, it was always expensive and time-consuming, since the travelers
often had to walk long distances to or from the nearest port or railway
station at either end of their journey. Moreover, their relatives would
expect them to bring something back with them, either money, gifts, or
both, so the idea of a casual return was not realistic.
Returning Laborers
The most common reason for return migration, and the one that
kept the figures high, was the seasonal return as the Manchurian winter
started and preparations for celebrating the New Year at home got under
way. On the Shandong Peninsula, annual migration by the swallows was
a long-established tradition. In Ye County, going to Manchuria in the
spring and returning in the autumn was a normal routine for young men.
The same pattern was common in Huang County.2 A 1929 SMR study
found that almost half (47.5 percent) of the migrants landing at Dalian in
1927,1928, and 1929 arrived in the first four months of the year, while 45
percent of departures took place in October, November, December, and
January.3
The "swallows'' frequently moved in gangs, either formally
recruited through a labor company or traveling with their own boss (see
page 111). In some villages boys learned a specific skill that would help
them earn money when they went north. Guo Baomeng, like many
young men from his village in Zouping, was a tinker {xiaolujiang),
skilled in repairing metal utensils. He went to Manchuria every year
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for five years, from the time he was twenty-one until he was twenty-five,
always with a small group from his village, quite often his brothers. He
married after his fourth trip, went out one more time, and then came
home permanently. He managed to bring back about 50 yuan each time.4
Other villages specialized in training carpenters, men who could
easily get casual work outside the village. Some went to Manchuria,
others worked closer to home. They followed established routes and
specialized in particular forms of carpentry: some made marriage
furniture, others worked in construction. The older carpenters from
Yangji Village, Boxing, for example, often took their apprentices with
them. The young men thus got their first experience of migration very
early and had little choice about going if they wanted to finish their
apprenticeship. They were not paid as apprentices, which must have
made taking them along an attractive proposition for the master.5
Those men who worked on short contracts in roving labor bands
usually returned to spend the New Year at home. Other men hired on
site in Manchuria where they worked outdoors would often be let go
sometime in the fall. Their employer would not want to keep them idle
through the winter. Of almost 2,000 men recruited in Huimin in the
spring of 1940, eighty-seven came back within six months. The men were
recruited by a local labor contractor and worked through the summer on
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the railway in Heilongjiang. They were then jammed into box cars,
shipped as far as Cangzhou on the Hebei border, and walked the rest of
the way home.6
Many of the swallows went to Manchuria only once. Poor wages
and maltreatment from their employers or their batou deterred them
from making repeat trips. Some, on the other hand, made all the money
they needed in one trip. SMR statistics on northbound migrants in 1930
showed very few repeat migrants. Of 2,571 groups (11,284 people), only
735 included repeat migrants.7 In 1925 a report on Shandong migrants
described men who worked 250 days straight through, without any
breaks, to earn as much as they could before they returned for the
winter.8 Most, however, stayed longer than a year, since one season in
Manchuria was usually not long enough to make a sum of money suffi-
cient for their purposes, whether getting married or buying land. In 1927
SMR researchers found that among the migrants they surveyed only 10
percent returned home within a year, while 20 percent remained for two
years, 40 percent for three years, 15 percent for four years, and 15 percent
for five years or longer.9 A typical example was Zhang Hongbao of Zou-
ping, who worked in Dalian as a docker for five years and then returned
home to get married. One of four brothers, he had no choice but to earn
the bride price himself. By living in a dormitory he was eventually able
to send home the needed amount.10
Martin Yang's report on his native village described a pattern of
return that was characteristic of many poorer areas of Shandong:
Almost all the single men who went to Manchuria, or elsewhere, have
come back sooner or later, after they have made some money. They
come back to marry, to buy land, and to settle down. More than a
dozen men have come home from Manchuria in the last ten or fifteen
years. But not all of them came back with fortunes. Unlike emigrants
from Hwanghsien [Huang County], Penglai and other counties on the
eastern Shantung Peninsula, who, by and large, went to Manchuria as
merchants, people of Taitou went there as farmers, vegetable gardeners,
or other kinds of laborers. Therefore, this village has not been
conspicuously benefited by those dozen adventurers, except in the case
of two or three families.11
Migrants might not come home if they failed to make the money
they had hoped for. Failure was such a humiliation that it had to be
avoided, even if that meant staying longer than intended in Manchuria.
The Ling County gazetteer reported in 1935 that almost all young men
went out (mostly to Manchuria) intending to stay for only a short period,
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but that, like the yellow cranes, many did not come home after they left.12
The inability to make money might mean staying on forever. Liu
Zhangtai's father migrated from Penglai to Yingkou in 1894. At first he
sent money home regularly and came home every few years for a visit,
but as he sank deeper and deeper into opium addiction, the remittances
dried up, and he no longer came home for visits. He eventually died
alone in Yingkou.13
Migrants Fleeing Disaster
Refugees from disaster usually returned home as soon as possible.
Destitute people were seldom welcome in neighboring counties, and
their state of debilitation made it difficult for them to move elsewhere
unless they received assistance. Such migrations were arranged from
time to time by national and provincial authorities,14 but the confusion of
Republican China made this an infrequent scenario. As a result of the
1935 Yellow River and Grand Canal floods, the provincial flood relief
committee moved 451,000 victims in southwestern Shandong into camps,
but the vast majority (1,876,000) had to fend for themselves. All were
expected to go home as soon as possible, and those who survived did.15
Some disasters lasted too long for a quick return. Beginning in 1940,
Linqu was gripped by a terrible drought; this mountain county saw no
rain for four years. Villages had to be abandoned; many people died of
starvation, while others fled. Forty-nine percent of the population
(168,000), left during the drought; most went to Manchuria, to wait out
the disaster with relatives there. Over 100,000 of those who stayed in the
county died. By the end of the drought only 80,000 people remained.
Almost all the people who had left returned by the end of 1945, and by
1949 the population was almost back to predrought levels.16
Sometimes disasters occurred at the other end of the migration. In
1934 Liu Guangpu of Gaomi and his family returned from Tonghua, Jilin,
where they had led a tough life as pioneer settlers. After cholera swept
through the area, taking the lives of all the women in the family—Liu's
mother, two sisters, and his wife —the men fled home, anxious to leave a
place haunted by grief.17 Some unlucky people encountered disaster at
both ends. Gao Puchun's family fled from Linqu to relatives in Jilin in
1942 because of the drought at home, only to flee the other way the next
year when plague, endemic in parts of Manchuria, broke out and killed
two people they knew.18
Some disasters that forced people to move were manmade. Many
families who settled on the land in Manchuria were terrorized by gangs
of bandits known as honghuzi. Wang Yuxiang of Laiyang and his family
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had homesteaded in Laipigou, in the mountains of eastern Jilin. They
were quite successful, but through the early 1920s the demands of the
honghuzi became more and more onerous. Finally, in 1927 they
abandoned their farm and returned to Shandong.19 Jiang Xiuxiang,
whose parents had come from Gaomi, was born on her parents' home-
stead in the mountains of Tonghua, Jilin. After her parents were killed by
honghuzi, she and her new husband hung on for a few years, but in 1934
they gave up under the incessant harassment and returned to Gaomi.20
The honghuzi were not strangers to the farmers. Most of them came from
the same background as the families they harassed, the Shandong
countryside, but they saw in the "wild west" atmosphere of Manchuria a
chance to make money without the tedium of cultivating the land.
In 1931 came the Japanese conquest of Manchuria and the beginning
of all-out hostility between Japan and China. An international border
was drawn within China, and Chinese living in Manchuria found
themselves under alien rule. One might expect this to have precipitated
massive return migration, but in fact only two informants gave this as a
reason for their return. Wang Duxian of Gaomi and his family rushed
home as soon as the Japanese took over, giving up a successful business
selling sheepskins for a miserable one selling fish at home.21 Liu Zhangtai
of Penglai, who had made five trips to various places in Manchuria,
decided not to go again in 1933 because life under the Japanese was too
precarious, and he was afraid of being arrested or press-ganged.22
Personal or family disasters sometimes provided the reason for
return. The loss of a key family member might make it impossible to
continue in Manchuria. Gao Honghuang and his family returned to
Boxing from a village in the wilderness of the Heilongjiang and Inner
Mongolia border after his father died. Gao was still an infant, and his
mother could not farm on her own. She had no choice but to return to her
husband's family. She never got over the thought of her husband buried
so far away from home and was constantly looking for an opportunity to
bring his bones back. It came during the Cultural Revolution. As a rather
elderly Red Guard, Gao seized the chance to travel for free, "exchanging
revolutionary experiences." He surreptitiously dug up his father's bones
and brought them home hidden beneath his jacket, always fearing that
other Red Guards might discover his feudal mission.23
The same fear of being buried alone in an alien land prompted the
family of Zhang Xuelun to return to Zouping. His grandfather, son of the
original migrant, was suddenly seized in his late sixties with the fear that
he was going to die. He felt a great need to die at home, and so he
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uprooted his family and took them south in 1947.24 The fear of dying
away from home was frequently cited as a reason for return to Gaomi.
In the case of Kang Guangwen, it was the death of his first wife in
childbirth in Tonghua, Jilin, that brought him home. Initially he returned
just to look for a second wife, and he succeeded in finding one. But his
new wife would not go with him to Tonghua, so he had to settle down at
home. The marriage enhanced their local prestige: He was respected for
having managed to find a second wife, and she was respected for having
taken such a strong stand.26
R E T U R N R A T E S
Return Rate Variations
The firm intention to return home at the earliest possible date
expressed by virtually all of the informants is consistent with the data on
return migration. Two-thirds of all migrants who went to Manchuria
between 1891 and 1942 ultimately returned to their homes, and in most
years the ratio of returnees to out-migrants hovered near or below this
rate (see Figure 5.2). Most sharp deviations in the return ratio were
related to specific events or changes in conditions in the home areas of
North China, Manchuria, or both.
The beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 caused a wave of
return migration to escape the fighting. In 1896,1897, and 1898, however,
construction of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchuria railway lines
drew an influx of workers and pushed the return ratio down once more.
Higher return rates between 1901 and 1906 were caused first by a harsh
Russian military response to the Boxer Uprising in 1901 and then by the
Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, most of which was fought in southern
Manchuria.
A long period of relatively low annual return rates from 1907 to
1920 reflected steady economic growth in Manchuria and a series of
disruptions in North China. The year 1911 was marked by the turmoil of
the Republican Revolution, and 1914 saw the landing of Japanese forces
at Longkou to launch an attack on the German holdings in Shandong at
the beginning of the First World War. Both events precipitated waves of
banditry and unrest, which were exacerbated by the attempt of Yuan
Shikai to restore the Manchu monarchy in 1915 and 1916. Yuan's bid for
power failed and accelerated the deterioration of the central government
and its ability to deal with the banditry, disease, and drought that
afflicted much of Shandong and Hebei in 1917 and 1918.
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From 1921 to 1923 the annual return ratios were near the long-term
average, as banditry, famine, disease, and recurring warlord conflict in
North China were largely balanced in Manchuria by a major plague
epidemic in Heilongjiang in 1921 and extensive bandit activity of the
kind that caused Wang Yuxiang and his family to abandon their Jilin
farm a few years later.
Low return ratios in the late 1920s were caused mainly by negative
developments in North China: civil war between Nationalist and warlord
forces, conflict at Jinan in 1928 between Nationalist and Japanese troops
(the "Jinan Incident"), and extensive drought and famine in Hebei and
western Shandong. The numbers of migrants arriving in Manchuria
peaked at over a million each year in 1927,1928, and 1929, and far fewer
migrants opted to return home.
Return ratios shot up between 1931 and 1937 after the seizure of
Manchuria by the Japanese military. As the number of migrants entering
Manchuria fell to less than half the level of peak years, the average rate
of return rose to over 90 percent. The Japanese officials who controlled
the new puppet state of Manchukuo first discouraged immigration of
"foreign" (Chinese) laborers, then actively enforced tight immigration
restrictions beginning in 1935.
Out-migration rose and return ratios fell again after 1938 when the
Japanese authorities realized they would have to reverse their stand and
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encourage immigration to meet the labor requirements of the Manchu-
rian economy as it strained to satisfy Japan's wartime demands. At the
same time the economies of Hebei and Shandong were devastated by the
effects of the Japanese invasion.
Home Area Return Rate Differences
Return rates varied from district to district across Shandong. Rates
seem to have been high for the province as a whole. One recent source
cites a return rate of 56 percent for the whole Republican period, 10.4
million of 18.4 million migrants.27 This overall rate disguises local varia-
tions. In Linqu, where the only large-scale migration was caused by a
single disaster, the return rate was almost 100 percent, whereas at the
other end of the spectrum only about 30 percent of the 23,000 migrants
from Laiyang returned. Most Laiyang migrants went in search of land in
Manchuria, settled down, and did not think of coming back to an
overcrowded place where there was little chance of acquiring land.28 The
local authorities in Huimin and Boxing reported return rates of more
than 50 percent, but it is difficult in each case to distinguish short-term
migrants from longer-term ones.29 Gaomi had a much lower return rate.
The local authorities estimated that of the 28,000 who migrated during
the Republican period only 7,000, or 25 percent, had returned. This figure
is misleading because it excludes the swallows, who migrated annually
for the work season; it looked only at people who had migrated
intending not to return.30 In Penglai the situation changed over time.
Between 1911 and 1942 departures and returns balanced each other; the
rate was quite steady, about 31,000 in each direction per annum. After
1942 there was a mass migration when over 120,000 people left, either
grabbed as forced labor or in flight from the fighting between the puppet
government and Communist forces; only 41,000 returned, or about 30
percent.31
On a larger scale the migrant data indicate broad regional differ-
ences in return ratios between migrants from the Shandong Peninsula,
most of whom traveled to Manchuria by way of the ports of Longkou
and Yantai, and those from Hebei and other parts of Shandong, most of
whom either took ships from Qingdao or Tianjin or else followed the
land route. The highest average annual rate of return over the entire
period between 1891 and 1942 occurred at Longkou and Yantai, where
the annual number of returnees typically reached 85 percent of the
number of migrants leaving for Manchuria. Longkou and Yantai served
most of the Shandong Peninsula, including Penglai and Laiyang. Most
migrants who did not travel through Longkou or Yantai came from areas
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of Shandong and Hebei located on or near the North China Plain,
including Ling County, Huimin, Binzhou, Boxing, Zouping, Linqu, and
Gaomi. The long-term average annual return ratio for the routes that
served the North China Plain regions was 67 percent (see Figure 5.3).
Fig. 5.3 Annual Return Migration Rates by Home Area, 1891-1942
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The higher return rates for migrants from the Shandong Peninsula
compared to those from areas on or near the North China Plain reflect
their relative distance from Manchuria. A shorter trip meant lower travel
costs and a higher likelihood of meeting a migrant's financial goal. The
1927 SMR study of the migration found the migrant travel costs listed in
Table 5.2. These were special discount fares for migrants that were 35 to
40 percent of normal fares.
The lowest cost—except for migrants who walked all the way—was
the 1.59 yuan steamer fare paid by the small portion of ship passengers
from Yantai who went no further than Dalian.32 The shortest journeys
also involved the smallest expenses for food and lodging. At the upper
end of the cost range was the trip from Western Shandong: by rail from
Jinan to Tianjin (3.90 yuan), by steamer from Tianjin to Dalian (3.50
yuan), by rail from Dalian to Changchun (5.15 yuan), and by rail from
Changchun to Harbin (1.92 yuan), a total of 14.47 yuan in fares alone.
These migrants also faced higher expenses for food and lodging because
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of their longer time on the road, as well as transportation to Jinan at the
beginning of the trip, and the expense of traveling beyond Harbin for
those headed to remote areas in northern Heilongjiang.33
Table 5.2. Migrant Fares between North China and Manchuria















































































Sources: MMTKK, Minkoku jurokunen no manshu dekasegi sha, 19-29, 171-76; and F. L.
Ho, Population Movement, 5-6. Note: The steamship fares to Dalian are the average of the
fares charged by the major companies on each run; two companies ran from Tianjin, three
each from Longkou and Yantai, four from Qingdao. Some of the steamship fares are given
in "small coin (xiao yang) denominations, they have been converted to "big coin {da
yang) yuan at the rate of 1.14 "small coin" yuan = 1.00 full value yuan (see Sakatani,
Manchuria, A Survey, 22). The fares were given in yen and have been converted here to
yuan at the exchange rate implied by the haiguan tael exchange rates for yuan and yen in
1925: 0.7255 yuan = 1.00 yen (see Sakatani, Manchuria, A Survey, 295). "Average fare" is
the weighted average of the fares with the percentages of passengers as the weights.
Migrants from the north coast of the Shandong Peninsula enjoyed a
travel cost advantage of 0.41 yuan over people from Qingdao, if they
were headed for the Dalian region. Travelers from the Jinan area
destined north of Shenyang faced costs higher than those incurred by
people from Yantai by 2.61 yuan each way if they took the Qingdao
route, or by 3.59 yuan each way if they went by land. They also had to
cover food and lodging expenses for several additional days en route.
Thus migrants who wished to return home to western Hebei, western
Shandong, and southern Shandong faced a financial barrier over twice as
high as migrants returning to homes on the Peninsula.
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POSTWAR RETURNS
No aggregate data exist on annual migration levels after 1942, but
individual county records and interview accounts indicate that two
major waves of return migration took place after the end of the Second
World War. The first came in the years immediately following the
Japanese surrender in 1945, and the second occurred in the 1980s.
1940s Returns
Several Shandong county histories report very high levels of return
migration in the middle 1940s. In some areas the 1940s returns coincided
with the end of major natural disasters —in Ling County, Huimin, and
Linqu the terrible drought finally broke in 1944. But for many migrants
the reason for return was quite different—the economy in Manchuria
collapsed after the Japanese defeat in 1945. The people most affected
were those working in the cities of Manchuria; people settled on the land
had a better chance at surviving. Migrants flooded back to Shandong as
factories and businesses in Manchuria closed and their livelihoods disap-
peared. The defeat was particularly disastrous for Penglai. Between 1944
and 1949, 41,000 people returned, 30 percent of the migrants from that
county. Most of them were destitute.34
The collapse coincided, in some places, with the Communist
takeover in Shandong. A few areas were liberated as early as 1945. Some
informants came home at that time and in the years that followed, not so
much to participate in glorious revolution as to be present when the land
was divided during land reform. It was important to be physically on
hand to get one's fair share. There was another great attraction of the
Communist takeover —the forgiving of debts. People who had stayed
away from home because they owed money and feared their creditors
could now safely return.
People who tried to return after 1945 were sometimes stymied. By
1947 the Guomindang held the cities and ports of Shandong and the
Communists the countryside. People trying to get back to Shandong
could find themselves trapped in the ports. Some people returning to
Linqu got stuck in Qingdao and found themselves in refugee camps,
where inhabitants were a mix of poor migrants back from Manchuria
and more prosperous people fleeing from the Communist occupation of
the countryside.35
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Post-1949 returns
Migration and return migration continued long after 1949. Many
young people were sent up to Manchuria in the middle and late 1950s to
"open up the wilderness." Other people went north in hard times,
especially the early 1960s, to seek shelter with relatives. Some people went
during the Cultural Revolution to escape political trouble at home.
Whatever the scale of migration, return migration also continued, and this
delayed state plans for the rapid growth of the Manchurian population.
Return migration followed several patterns. Many of the young
people sent north during the Cultural Revolution came back as soon as it
was over and return became possible. Others came back to retire, some
from Manchuria, but some from the south, where many Shandong cadres
had been sent in the early 1950s. The return migration most closely
related to Manchuria followed a different pattern and was directly
connected to the agricultural reforms begun in 1978. Shandong entered
an economic boom period, which gradually transformed it from a very
poor province into a much more affluent one. Word of the new pros-
perity made its way to Manchuria and aroused a great deal of interest
among migrants and their descendants. Their desire to return was flatter-
ing to people in Shandong—what better proof of the innate superiority of
the province—but it also caused problems.
The spring of 1984, when many of the interviews for this study took
place, was a time of change in the Shandong countryside. Local govern-
ment organization was in transition. Some counties still had communes,
while in others communes had already been replaced by xiang (town-
ships). Much more important to the farmers, fifteen-year land leases were
being handed out, and to get land, one had to be at home.
News of the land distribution reached Manchuria rapidly, and,
together with the general economic improvement, triggered a major
return movement. The return movement to Ling County started in 1981;
three years later 8,900 people had already come back, and many more
were expected.36 In some communities the return rate was very high
indeed: The village of Zhangxilou in Ling County had already grown by
30 families —with another 10 to 20 expected —beyond the existing popu-
lation of 132 households.37 Return migration on this scale required careful
thought and planning—profound decisions had to be made on who had
the right to come back. Many villages actually began to define what it
meant to "belong," and to decide whether there was a scale of rights.
Most concluded that the right of return was not universal, and different
places defined who belonged differently. Although the decisions seem to
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have been made at the village level, there were clear local patterns that
took into account factors such as land supply as well as family ties.
Gaomi took a generous view of who could return—-former inhabi-
tants and their descendants up to the second or third generation. They
could afford to do so because very few people had applied to come
back.38 Laiyang took the same view: Descendants up to the third gener-
ation could come back, but few wanted to. In fact Laiyang was having to
recruit former locals with special skills to work in their many new
enterprises, especially the canning of the famous Laiyang pears. The local
authorities had been out to look for skilled former Laiyang natives,
offering them substantially higher wages than would be paid to locals.39
Ling County, under great pressure from would-be return migrants, was
fairly restrictive about who could come back. Bianjianzhen would accept
only people born there; Fenghuangxiang would accept both people born
there and their first-generation descendants, provided they still had
relatives there. A number of descendants without living relatives had
been refused. Those who were allowed to returned only after formally
contacting the village officials; people willing to work in the new
enterprises rather than as farmers were the most welcome.40 Huimin was
even more restrictive; only people born in the county could return, and
they had to be willing to live with relatives. Farmers were discouraged
from coming home, given the land shortage, and only people with useful
skills were welcomed.41 Boxing, with its surplus of agricultural labor,
was equally discouraging, though in some cases county officials would
consider letting descendants come back.42
In other parts of Shandong return migration went quite poorly. One
village in Juye, in the southwest of the province, had to expand by about 50
percent, building houses and infrastructure, to accommodate all the people
who came back. Both there and elsewhere major anxieties surrounded the
return of so many people, and the fact that they arrived without warning,
expecting to be assigned land. A survey conducted in 1984-1985 in various
parts of the province found that very few of the returnees were doing well'43
Individuals were reluctant to admit that return was not a pleasure; all
the informants maintained they were glad they had come home. None spoke
of Manchuria with any affection. Besides the obvious things they disliked—
the food, the climate, and the mosquitoes—they also felt the place had let
them down—not one of them had returned a rich man. The only person who
came home in glory {dang hongren—''to be the fair-haired boy") was Li
Chuanzhen, who returned to his village in Ling County as a soldier in the
People's Liberation Army.44 The game had changed—coming home in glory
no longer meant wearing brocade, but a cotton army uniform.
NOT FOR POLITICS OR GLORY
The migration to Manchuria took place in the midst of tremendous
political turmoil, as both Russia and Japan repeatedly tried to gain
control over Manchuria, while Japan relentlessly encroached on Chinese
territory. After the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, the
migration continued in the midst of a politically charged atmosphere,
first during the nation-building drive of the 1950s, then during the ultra-
socialist frenzy of the Cultural Revolution. Yet, as was true twenty years
earlier, the migrants were moved neither by political fervor, nor by any
sense of excitement or destiny. They were driven overwhelmingly by the
narrow concerns of the family economy, and Manchuria just happened to
be the place that best met their needs.
In its essence the modern history of Manchuria has revolved around
imbalances in the classical economic trilogy of land, labor, and capital. At
the end of the nineteenth century Manchuria had one of the richest
endowments of natural resources in all of East Asia, but it lacked the
labor force and capital equipment required to convert these raw
materials into a thriving economy. Labor was abundantly available in the
villages of North China, but there was little incentive for workers to
move north until railways, steamships, roads, and factories created new
jobs and made the products of Manchuria accessible to Chinese and
world markets. Once the shipping lines and railways were in place, the
irresistible force of family interests combined with Manchuria's hungry
labor market drove the migration through all political vicissitudes except
for interludes of active warfare. The fact that much of the investment and
technology came from Russia and Japan made little difference to the
migrants and their families.
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The importance to the migration of economic conditions in
Manchuria is best illustrated by three instances. First, the commitment of
North Chinese workers to pursue family interests regardless of political
concerns was dramatically demonstrated by the extraordinarily high
level of migration that occurred in the late 1930s and early 1940s, despite
the fact that China was at war with Japan, and Manchuria was
dominated by the Japanese army. The second instance came in the 1950s
when the socialist government of the People's Republic, which rejected
market-driven economic forces, promptly resumed the transfer of
population to Manchuria on a very large scale as soon as it began to
rebuild China's national economy. Exploitation of Manchuria's natural
resources was just as important to the planned economy of the PRC as it
had been to the capitalist system of the Republic, and labor was still in
short supply. The third instance was the remarkable reverse flow of
migrants from the Northeast to their families' home villages in Shandong
in the 1980s, when economic reform suddenly caused prospects at home
to look more promising than conditions in Manchuria, where the supply
of labor was finally sufficient for the region's needs.
MIGRATION AND P O L I T I C S
China's most wrenching political issue during the Republican
period was Japanese encroachment and then invasion. Slowly at first,
then with gathering speed and intensity, the Japanese Empire swallowed
up one piece of China after another. Japan merely suffered an early
setback after the Sino-Japanese War (1885), when the intervention of
Russia, France, and Germany forced the return of territory won from
China. After defeating Russia in 1905, Japan accelerated economic
activities in various parts of China. During the First World War it tried to
seize Germany's holdings in Shandong and to consolidate a strong
position on the coast. This move eventually failed because of public
protest in China and heavy pressure from the remaining Powers,
especially at the Washington Conference in 1922. These rebuffs did not,
however, prevent Japan from intervening again in Shandong in 1927
during the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek's effort to unify China
militarily.
Shandong was important to Japan, but the real focus of interest was
always Manchuria. Japanese pressure there grew and grew, culminating
in 1931 with outright takeover. Manchuria became the symbol of
Japanese aggression. The League of Nations faltered, and the question of
China's appeasement or resistance to Japan was the most emotional and
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potent political topic in China during the 1930s.1 It was the issue over
which the first significant mass movements developed in China, among
students, merchants, and workers. The progressive Japanese encroach-
ment through the 1930s was covered exhaustively in the press, and the
heroes of the day were Chinese military leaders like Ma Zhanshan and
Cai Tingkai who put up resistance.
The migrants from Shandong seem to have been little touched by
this political turbulence; they were for the most part politically passive.
This seems strange, given that they were moving into the crucible of
Japanese expansion and economic development. Indeed, they were the
true foot soldiers of imperialism. Without their labor the Japanese would
have been able to do very little, since plans to settle large numbers of
Japanese and Koreans in Manchuria had failed. The migrants were also
victims of persistent abuse from the Japanese; the conditions in which
they worked, in mines or on the railways, guaranteed physical maltreat-
ment. They were often cheated, routinely humiliated, and treated as
Untermenschen by a society riding a wave of racial supremacy.
One might expect the migrants to have stood at the forefront of anti-
Japanese activity, and in fact there were displays of anti-Japanese
hostility in Manchuria. After the surrender of Manchuria to Japan in
1931, a number of the Manchurian soldiers became irregulars (or
guerrillas) and continued to fight the Japanese, especially in the far
north. The urban Chinese population had little chance to resist, though
some rural migrants did. The world of anti-Japanese resistance was
captured by Xiao Jun in Village in August Troops evicted from
Manchuria played an important role in anti-Japanese activities in North
China, notably in the Xian Incident (1936), when troops under Zhang
Xueliang kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek and forced him to finally face the
Japanese rather than pursue the Chinese Communists.
Among the civilian inhabitants of Manchuria, however, there was
little resistance. Few universities and colleges in the region meant few
students to demonstrate, a role students played powerfully elsewhere in
China. There was no free press. Most of the Chinese elite who stayed in
Manchuria after 1931 collaborated with the Japanese, as did the
substantial White Russian population. Surviving Manchus became the
mainstay of the puppet state set up in 1932, Manchukuo. But most
ordinary people, including migrants from North China, seem to have
been inert. Why did those who suffered most from the Japanese not fight
them?
One reason might have been that the migrants did not actually
know what was going on, that they were unaware of the bigger political
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picture and of being exploited. This seems impossible. It is true that the
Japanese did not penetrate as deeply into local society as other nations
did,2 but they were highly visible. Shandong was the site of some of
Japan's earliest shows of aggression. The Twenty-one Demands of 1915
were intended to entrench Japan in Shandong, and there were major
clashes in Shandong between Chinese and Japanese forces in 1927 and
1928. Japanese encroachment in Manchuria was aggressive and obvious,
at least in the cities and along the railway lines. Someone in a remote
village might be unaware of the conflict, but a migrant who left a
Shandong village and traveled to Manchuria would have to be aware
that China was under assault. By the 1930s the anti-Japanese movement
in China was vociferous and highly visible, with trade boycotts and the
wide distribution of cigarette brands named after the heroes of anti-
Japanese resistance, Ma Zhanshan and Cai Tingkai. Ignorance cannot
explain the migrants' noninvolvement in anti-Japanese activity.
A more plausible explanation is that whatever the migrants felt
about Japanese aggression, they could do very little to oppose it. For
workers living in prison-like barracks, any kind of political organization
would have been almost impossible. Even if one group of workers had
been bold enough, organizing resistance in a single factory or mine
would not have made much difference. Significant resistance would have
required leadership and coordination, and this was not forthcoming from
the Manchurian side. Much of the political and military elite had left
with the "Young Marshall" Zhang Xueliang, putting up no resistance at
all. Some who stayed became guerrillas, but others collaborated. The
Chinese Communist Party was not much in evidence in Manchuria until
the civil war after the Japanese defeat. How could poor, illiterate labor
migrants organize themselves against tough, well-organized occupiers
who had an excellent intelligence system and a modern army?
Another logical source of resistance, trade unions, did not exist in
China at the time. The failure of the trade union movement has often
been put down to ferocious Guomindang attacks on the Communist-led
unions, especially in 1927. But Elizabeth Perry has shown that class-
based unions stood little chance because other elements were so much
more important in worker organization, especially regional and local
associations.3 This would certainly seem to be the case with the Shan-
dong migrants to Manchuria, whose organizations were informal, based
on laoxiang ties, and inward-looking to provide mutual protection; they
were not geared to external activity.
Fear also played a role in discouraging migrants from anti-Japanese
activities. The Japanese could act against opponents either directly, using
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their army or police, or indirectly, through bands of thugs (ronin) who
acted as unofficial enforcers in Manchuria. Any visible resistance would
almost certainly lead to an unpleasant death. The Japanese demonstrated
their willingness to crush opposition even before they took over
Manchuria. The "Old Marshall" Zhang Zuolin, chief warlord of
Manchuria and loyal ally of the Japanese, met a nasty end after he was
seen becoming friendly with the Guomindang; he and his train were
blown up in 1928.
Another concern that deterred migrants from political activity was
their obligation to family at home. Most migrants had a specific duty to
perform: to earn money they could send back to the family. Getting
involved in dangerous activities that risked their lives would compro-
mise their ability to fulfill this primary duty. As long as their mindset
was short-term, even if they actually stayed in Manchuria for a long time,
resistance on any level was counterproductive. Migrants simply wanted
to go home, and so they could put up with a great deal of hardship in the
short run.
A final explanation was that the migrants saw no reason to rebel.
They had grown up with abuse from landlords, soldiers, and bandits, in
a world where there was little law or justice. The treatment they received
in Manchuria from their Japanese employers was no worse. In this harsh
world they learned to get through life by keeping to stoic, heads-down
behavior (chiku nailao); they were not accustomed to political activism or
the idea of fighting for their country. They were willing to put up with
maltreatment so long as they could fulfill their own goal of improving
the lives of their families.
The informants said little about Japanese aggression against China,
though most recalled Japanese brutality toward themselves and other
migrants. This was particularly true of those who went to Manchuria in
the early 1940s, many of whom were treated as forced labor.4 Perhaps
they felt a sense of shame for having worked for the Japanese, but even if
they blamed themselves, others did not seem to share that view.
Although insulting terms (piglets, gold worshippers) are often used in
Shandong for emigrants to southern provinces, and although there are
epithets for people who directly collaborated with the foreign aggressors
(hanjiari), no one applied such terms to the Manchuria migrants. Rather,
both the literature of that time and modern commentators tended to pity
them for their poverty and the exploitation they suffered. In Shandong
they are associated with the huge number of slave laborers who were
taken to Japan and Korea during the war, never to return.
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If the migrants did not take part in anti-Japanese activities in
Manchuria, they might have been expected to do something when they
returned to Shandong. Their direct experience of Japanese imperialism
might have turned them into political activists. There were different
reasons at different periods why this did not happen. In the 1920s
Shandong was divided among warlords and bandits, and the situation
was too chaotic for anti-Japanese action. By the 1930s, a Guomindang-
allied governor, Han Fuju, brought order to the province, but he was not
a loyal supporter of Nanjing. He pursued a friendly policy towards the
Japanese and did not permit anti-Japanese activity.5 By the late 1930s
Shandong was under direct Japanese occupation. The experience of
Japanese oppression in Manchuria does not seem to have led to
enthusiasm for political action in Shandong, whether anti-Japanese, pro-
Communist, or traditional; even the relatively recent Boxer tradition had
disappeared. The Japanese occupation was harsh and long, extending
from the end of 1937 to the middle of 1945. A mass grave where
thousands of people were executed during the Japanese occupation is
marked at Pipashan near Jinan. Such atrocities have been detailed since
the 1980s in local publications.6
The Communist Party initially had only a tenuous existence in
Shandong. Communist uprisings between 1928 and 1935 were minimal;
of nine incidents listed, one was an attack on a German Catholic mission
(Yanggu, 1928), and another (Yishui, 1933) is described as a Big Sword
(secret society) uprising. The longest, at Richao in 1933, lasted thirteen
days; the others all collapsed instantly.7
During the Japanese occupation, parts of Shandong became major
base areas for guerrilla warfare against the Japanese, usually under
direct control of the Eighth Route Army. Base areas dotted the Central
Massif and the marshy land created when the Yellow River changed
course in 1938. Shandong seemed to recover some of its reputation as a
province of fighters, but the returned migrants seldom turned into
guerrillas. One report from West Shandong about anti-Japanese guerrilla
activity indicates that returnees from Manchuria were not identifiable
participants in the activity.8
Once civil war started in 1946, parts of Shandong were liberated
almost immediately, and the Communist movement developed quickly
there. But again, there was no obvious connection between the fighting in
Shandong and returning migrants; indeed, many migrants did not return
until after the Communists had won, and then only to benefit from land
reform. Several informants said they returned specifically because the
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Communists had taken over their home district, the land was being
divided, and they thought they should be there to get their share.
VIEWS ABOUT MIGRATION
Not the Promised Land
Manchuria in the 1920s and 1930s was a harsh, unromantic place.
The northern region especially could be compared to the Wild West of
North America—tough, testing, and lawless. In Manchuria, bandits took
the place of outlaws, and opium was used instead of whiskey. But the
Northeast lacked the glamour of the West—there were no cowboys,
sheriffs, or Diamond Lils.9 It was not a place that promised riches, except
for the few who went after gold, ginseng, or furs. The common settler
was guaranteed only hard labor. Settlers had to squeeze a growing
season into the brief summer and harvest enough food and collect
enough fuel to see them through the winter. Winter brought virtual
hibernation when only the loggers and carters worked. Many of the
swallows who worked for the factories, mines, and railroads, did not
stay for the winter; to make their departure possible, they had to work
straight through the spring, summer, and autumn without a single day of
rest, for 250 days or more.10 The physical harshness was compounded by
political insecurity; many Chinese migrants lived at the mercy of
arbitrary, brutal Japanese officials and their collaborators. The migrants
had no official or legal protection; their only "protection" from political
instability was to return home to Shandong, which they did in large
numbers in bad years like 1931 and 1945.
Many migrants transcended the difficulties they encountered and
settled down in both the countryside and in the cities, but those who
encountered setbacks saw them as proof that Manchuria was not a good
place to be. The timing of individual moves was critical to their outcome.
The chances of permanent settlement were greater for those who moved
before the mass migration in the 1920s and 1930s. The pioneer migrants
who settled on the land in the late Qing did well; some of them got into
lucrative pursuits such as opium growing or banditry in Jilin and
Heilongjiang.11 Later migrants were less likely to have these oppor-
tunities for "entrepreneurship."
But Manchuria's greatest drawback was the severity of its climate.
Nowadays carnivals, ice carving, and sports put winter in a better light,
but in the 1920s and 1930s there were no distracting activities to lessen
the severity of the season.12 Settlers in Manchuria did, however, enjoy
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that solace of many northern peoples—hard liquor. Manchuria is famous
for a great range of potent home brews.
The Ideology of Sacrifice for the Family
The people who went to Manchuria did not do so to find a new
world, nor were they stimulated by an ambition to make their fortune.13
Migration had more to do with the lives of their families at home than
with the pursuit of individual hopes. The central issue for migrants was
the survival of the family in a tough world. They did not make decisions
in their own individual interest, nor were they inspired by a political
ideology; they went away under the instructions and moral pressure of
their elders to make money and spare the family at home from having to
feed them. This pressure was precisely balanced by pressure to return to
the family at home. This made permanent departure and the long-term
alienation of a migrant's income-earning capacity unlikely.14
The migrants moved within a very traditional world. They were not
like some of Europe's pioneering migrants; they did not see their
destination as an opportunity for liberty, riches, and modernity; they
were not shaking the dust of the old world off their feet. They may more
aptly be compared with migrants from another very traditional society,
the people who moved from Quebec to the milltowns of Massachusetts
in the late nineteenth century. Migrants from Quebec also operated
within a tight familial structure, which managed their departure, their
time away, and their eventual return. Their lives were governed by a
powerful duty:
The sense of duty was a manifestation of family culture —a set of values
that entailed not only a commitment to the well-being and self-reliance
or survival of the family but one that took priority over individual
needs and personal happiness.15
This sense of family obligation involved sending money home to
contribute to the family economy. In China it also involved financing key
family rituals. Often an individual migrated to raise money for a
marriage, or a funeral, or to pay off debts incurred by family rites. Only
wealthy families could expect to generate a large enough surplus from
farming to pay for the enormous costs associated with ceremonies.16
Eventually the migration came to be a rite in itself, the rite of passage for
young men, when they first began to make a major contribution to the
family economy. Migration became a stage between childhood and
marriage in a society that had no adolescence.
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The Shandong migrants were not viewed critically as they once
might have been—as people who had abandoned their familial duties.
An ultraconservative description of migrants written in the 1930s referred
to them as beggars, rascals, rogues, petty thieves, big thieves, soldiers,
bandits, and toughs (haohan). But this description no longer applied in a
region where migration had become fully integrated into the economic
and social fabric.17 The purpose of migration was not to achieve
permanent change, but to support the family's traditional life in its
traditional home. Often, as we have seen, the actual outcome was quite
different, but preservation of the family remained the basic motivation.
P O S T - 1 9 4 9 MIGRATION
Migration to Manchuria broke off in the last stages of the war
against Japan and did not resume during the civil war, which dragged on
until 1949. The Manchurian economy was in ruins; much of the industry
that had survived was dismantled and shipped off to the Soviet Union
by the occupying forces. Some of the earliest and most ferocious fighting
of the civil war took place in Manchuria and revolved especially around
lines of communication. It was not a good time to migrate to Manchuria
and the only people leaving Shandong were substantial numbers of
Guomindang supporters and army units, who fled to Taiwan.
Policy and Migration in the People's Republic
What happened to Shandong's long tradition of migration under the
planned socialist economy of the People's Republic? Under Communist
control migration patterns apparently changed dramatically. The official
version holds that international movement was virtually outlawed, and
spontaneous internal movement was increasingly restricted under the
hukou registration system. Only after the reforms started in 1978 did
migration cease to be a government-controlled exercise. In reality, however,
migration actually continued throughout the Maoist era, often at very
high levels.18 What changed was that it had become less visible.
State-Managed Migration. As soon as Manchuria was firmly under
Communist control in late 1948, migration resumed, but in a different
manner. Some of it was state-managed, with large groups of people
recruited in Shandong to "open up the wilderness and settle the
frontiers." Thousands of technicians, engineers, managers, cadres, and
planners were sent to Manchuria from other liberated areas all over
China to begin the task of rebuilding and expanding the infrastructure
and industrial base that were so important for China's modernization.19
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The PRC turned to Shandong for a ready supply of hardy, uncom-
plaining people.20 In the second half of the first Five Year Plan, the
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Labor and Agricultural
Settlement put together a huge project intended both to relieve overpopu-
lation in the south and west of Shandong and to open up northern parts
of Heilongjiang. Between 1955 and 1960 over a million people moved, 75
percent of them to Heilongjiang.21 Although the aim of the project was to
fill young people with a sense of adventure and revolutionary enthu-
siasm for developing the Great Northern Waste (bei da huang), there were
major problems at every stage, and the state had great difficulty keeping
people in Manchuria. The return rate sometimes went as high as 50
percent.22 Organized migration looked uncomfortably like forced migra-
tion, and even revolutionary hyperbole could not make the Great Northern
Waste more attractive than its god-forsaken name.
Specialized migrations, movements of experts and technicians to
provide the skills needed on new projects, occurred in tandem with the
mass movements. Although few of these skilled migrants came from
Shandong, Shandong did provide one special export: reliable cadres. As
the Communists established control over the recalcitrant provinces of the
south and southwest, they found that they needed honest, hard-working,
and committed cadres from outside those regions. These people came to
be known as the southbound cadres (nanxia ganbu).
Within the province of Shandong the race for socialist construction
created its own demands for migration, especially during the Great Leap
Forward (1958-1960). The construction of roads, railways, and especially
dams led to the massive displacement of people. Some were sent directly
to the border regions, others were resituated close to their old homes, but
almost always in undesirable places, given the shortage of good land.
These were some of the most painful moves. Executed by authorities in
the white heat of enthusiasm for the Leap, they forced families to leave
ancestral homes that were about to be inundated. People's sense of loss
was intense. Added anguish came later when it became clear that many
of the dams had been poorly planned and were in fact of little use. The
land and the villages were nonetheless lost forever.23
Voluntary Migration. Voluntary migration also continued throughout
the thirty years from 1949 to 1978, on a much larger scale than was
apparent to foreigners at the time. The PRC authorities introduced the
hukou system in the mid-1950s largely to stem the flow of farmers into
the cities and towns. They were much less concerned about people
moving from one rural area to another, especially when the migrants did
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not try to use the heavily controlled trains. A tremendous amount of
"self-starter" migration continued in Shandong after 1949, which meant
that people moved without official sanction. Shandong farmers
continued to circulate north to Manchuria and back again, using well-
established channels of personal connections. This kind of movement
reached its height with the huge migrations of the early 1960s to escape
the ravages of famine in Shandong. Many of these were family migra-
tions, though at other periods the practice of young men going off for
short periods was probably the norm.
These voluntary movements were carefully observed by local
officials, and the migrants seem to have been counted. According to one
fairly authoritative source for Shandong, out-migration exceeded in-
migration by about four million.24 Most of the self-starter migration was
by no means haphazard; it followed established personal patterns and
involved people moving back and forth within well-known settings.
Local authorities were probably even glad to see people leave during
times of dire food shortage.
Of course, the Maoist era migrations were different in motivation
from the earlier movements. To enrich the family or to provide cash for a
bride price or wedding celebration was no longer appropriate, though a
recent study from Jilin suggests that these practices did not disappear as
absolutely as was once thought.25 The idea of migrating to save money to
buy land became irrelevant once land was no longer saleable. The fact
that migration continued, however, suggests that it continued to serve as
a way of easing the normal economic pressures on rural families, even in
the context of the Communist economic system.
The Reform Era
Migration in the reform era after 1978 had its own special charac-
teristics, though it resembled that of the Republican period much more
closely than that of the Maoist era. The element of coercion disappeared,
while the desire for remittances reemerged as a key issue, with the added
twist that remittances not only helped support the family at home but
also provided capital to start small businesses after the migrant returned
home. The biggest change for Shandong was the reversed direction of the
migration. In the early 1980s, almost for the first time in its history,
Shandong experienced a boom economy, which made it a receiving
rather than a sending province.
Domestic Movements. There were many return migrants from
Manchuria in the late 1970s and 1980s, people coming back to their
villages to take up land leases or to work at specialized jobs (see pp. 124-
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126, chapter 5). Unskilled labor also flowed into the new boom towns of
Jinan, Qingdao, Zibo, and Yantai, much of it from within the province. In
addition, there was considerable movement within the rural areas of the
province, as township and village enterprises in the richer counties
looked for labor. A knitting factory in Penglai employed girls from the
nearby hill counties, who worked under tight controls and were specifi-
cally forbidden to marry young men from the village in which they
worked. Migrants with special skills moved into Shandong from other
provinces. A Yangzhou barber in Jinan was one of a large number of
young men who had fanned out over China, capitalizing on Yangzhou's
famed barbering tradition. Very few migrants were recruited outside
Shandong, but they came on their own, looking for work. Most were
neither appreciated or admired; their receiving communities considered
them a nuisance and —like the denizens of China's major cities —tended
to blame them for local disorders and crime.
The 1980s also brought a substantial return of cadres who had gone
to the south but had never acculturated. These were happy homecomings
for both migrants and their home communities; most of these returnees
received state pensions, a useful additional income in poor villages.
Overseas Ties. One group of anticipated return migrants seems not
to have come back—the people who either went abroad or to Taiwan in
1949. At various times the provincial government has tried to encourage
people to come home from abroad. New housing developments have
been built in the coastal cities to attract people home, notably in Yantai
and Qingdao, where settlements for overseas Chinese were started even
before the Cultural Revolution. The 1980s and 1990s have seen many
return visits from abroad, and the revival of travel from Taiwan in the
late 1980s has brought many Shandong natives back to the homes they
had to leave four decades ago. But few visits have led to permanent
returns. These visitors received mixed receptions: The joy of reunion
with long-lost family was often soured by the bitterness of relatives who
had suffered major persecution, especially during the Cultural Revolution,
simply because they had family members in Taiwan. This bitterness was
understandable. The nephews and nieces of a Maoming man who was
transported to Taiwan in 1949 as part of the defeated Guomindang army
were denied education because of their absent uncle.26 The brother of a
man who had left Jinan in the 1930s and then moved to Taiwan was kept
under long-term surveillance by people who moved into his house after
1949, to make sure that he did not spy for Taiwan. The surveillance
lasted almost thirty years, far longer than the brothers had known each
other in their youth.27
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Although they have not returned to settle, Shandong people in
Taiwan and abroad have made substantial investments and business
contracts with their native province. One Shandong native in Canada,
Xie Peizhi, even managed to convince the government of Saskatchewan
to establish a sister province relationship with Shandong.
The Shandong homeland lives on in the memories of the people
who left it, but their children are much less likely to feel its pull. Migration
beyond the mainland of China seems to result in permanent resettlement.
The leaves no longer fall close to the roots.
Post-1949 Migration Data
There is no aggregate statistical record of interregional migration
since 1949; no counterpart of the systematic SMR surveys has been
carried out under the People's Republic. The PRC has, however, taken
pains to track China's population through a series of censuses that have
improved in quality and sophistication over time, particularly since the
census of 1982.28 With reasonably reliable data on birth rates, death rates,
and population totals, a rough measurement of the overall size and
distribution of migration can be gleaned from provincial population
figures that reveal differences between natural increase (births minus
deaths) and actual population change.
Table 6.1 shows that the scale of net migration to Manchuria
between 1950 and 1989 was as large as in the early years of the twentieth
century. For the entire forty-year period total net migration came to 8.2
million, nearly as many as the 8.8 million who arrived in the fifty-two
years from 1891 through 1942. It is also apparent that by far the greatest
part of this movement occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, when Manchuria
received a total of nearly 6 million migrants in a twenty-year period.
Table 6.1 Net Migration by Decade in
Manchuria, 1950-1989 (in thousands)


























Sources: Appendix Tables 12-19. Note: Migration is calculated as the difference
between natural increase (births minus deaths) and total reported population
growth. Figures for Liaoning and Heilongjiang do not include 1950-1953.
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The table also reveals interesting distinctions between the three
provinces of Manchuria in the timing of migration. Liaoning Province,
which was already densely populated before 1949, apparently received
irour 781,000 migrants in the 1950s, but experienced net out-migration
of wei over a million in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s the flow
reversed and a gradual but steady stream of in-migration added 808,000
to the population. During the period between the censuses of 1953 and
1982, the province's average annual rate of population growth was 1.9
percent, only slightly above the national rate of 1.89 percent.29 It is likely
that much of the reduction in population growth was due to the high
proportion of Liaoning's population that lived in urban and suburban
areas. In 1980 about 42 percent of the province population lived in cities,
and around two-thirds of the total lived in the massive urban-industrial
complex of Shenyang, Fushun, Anshan, Benxi, and Liaoyang.30
Population growth in Jilin, on the other hand, was very close to the
national average of 2.31 percent in the 1950s, when the province
experienced a net outflow of 85,000 people. In the 1960s Jilin received a
net inflow of over a million migrants, followed by almost 300,000 in the
1970s. The 1980s saw little significant net migration, with a ten-year
balance of 57,000 in-migrants.
Heilongjiang was the destination of the majority of migrants
entering Manchuria in the first three decades of the People's Republic.
Between 1953 and 1982 the population of Heilongjiang grew at an
average annual rate of 3.48 percent, almost twice the national rate.31 In
the 1950s Heilongjiang received nearly 3 million net in-migrants, in the
1960s over 2.1 million, and in the 1970s nearly 2 million. Only in the
1980s did the movement finally reverse, with a net outflow of 150,000,
the majority undoubtedly "sent-down youth," returning to their homes
in provinces like Liaoning, Hebei, and Shandong from the grim
settlements of the Great Northern Waste.
The disparity between Liaoning's post-1949 record of little
migration and the heavy flow of people into Heilongjiang up to the 1980s
reflects the differences between the economic structures and develop-
ment patterns in northern and southern Manchuria. In the early 1950s the
area that is now Liaoning had roughly one-third the land area of
Heilongjiang, but almost twice the population. It was already the site of
China's premier iron and steel facility, Anshan, and was the nation's
leading center of heavy industry. In 1982 Liaoning produced S.5 percent
of China's gross industrial output value, exceeded only by Shanghai
(11.4 percent) and Jiangsu (9.0 percent). In heavy industry Liaoning
accounted for 11.1 percent of the national total, more than any other
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province or municipality.32After an initial injection of new labor in the
1950s, the development of Liaoning was primarily based on technology
improvements, capital construction, and rising labor productivity —
"capital deepening"—rather than further exploitation of new sources of
raw materials. In other words, by the 1960s Liaoning did not need addi-
tional workers.
Heilongjiang, on the other hand, followed a development path that
was much more extensive in nature, relying heavily on additions to the
labor force as well as large infusions of capital construction to tap vast
reserves of natural resources, particularly land, oil, and lumber. Among
the main destinations of migrants were the numerous state farms
established in northern Heilongjiang as part of the effort to tame the
Great Northern Waste, China's last large area of untilled arable land. In
1982 there were 872 state farms in Heilongjiang, farming two million
hectares of land. This constituted 23 percent of the province's total
cultivated land area, and 40 percent of the area under state farms in the
entire country.33 The other main focal points in the development of
Heilongjiang were timber and petroleum. Although Harbin has become
an important industrial center, the value of industrial output for the
entire province as recently as the early 1990s was still dominated by the
extraction and processing of primary products, particularly petroleum
and natural gas (26.8 percent), as well as lumber (3.7 percent), coal (5.9
percent), and food, beverages, and tobacco (12.5 percent).34
By the early 1980s, however, the economy of Heilongjiang had also
reached a point where further development required increased
productivity rather than further expansion of the scope of economic
activity. The need for capital investment was most evident in the trans-
portation sector. Agriculture and coal mining, in particular, were capable
of substantial increases in output through improved management and
mechanization, but the capacities of the railways, highways, and
waterways were already strained.35 The cessation of net migration into
Heilongjiang in the late 1970s signaled the transition from an era of
extensive development to one of intensive development, a turning point
that Liaoning had reached some twenty-five years earlier.
Migration has had some role to play in post-1949 changes in the size
of the Shandong population, though nothing like the degree to which it
has been influenced by natural growth. Migration, voluntary or involun-
tary, was spread unevenly over the years. Although 6.17 million people
left the province between 1950 and 1984-most of them for Manchuria-
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Table 6.2 Net Migration by Decade in



















Sources: Appendix Tables 12-19.Mote: Net migration is calculated as
the difference between natural increase (births minus deaths) and total
reported population growth.
1.63 million went in one year alone, 1960, the lowest point of the agri-
cultural crisis caused by the Great Leap Forward. That year many people
fled in desperation from near starvation in Shandong to join relatives in
Manchuria, in a reprise of the famine migrations of the Republican
period (see Appendix Table 15). Over two-thirds of the migrants in that
year were the so-called self-starters.36 There has also been a substantial
return movement since 1949, which gained in magnitude as Shandong's
economy has picked up with the post-1978 reforms. While 6.17 million
migrated out of the province between 1950 and 1985, over 3.8 million
moved in, a large portion returning from Manchuria.37
The effects of migration on the area within the province boundaries
of Hebei—including the municipalities of Beijing and Tianjin, which have
the status of separate provinces in the People's Republic —are considerably
less clear than those in Shandong. The largest difference from Shandong
occurred in the 1950s, when the Hebei region experienced in-migration
totaling 5.75 million. The largest part of this influx was to Beijing, the
national capital, which alone added nearly 4 million people (see
Appendix Table 18). In the 1960s Hebei-Beijing-Tianjin lost over 1.5
million out-migrants, largely as a result of the "sending down" of urban
youth to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s
and early 1970s.38 Net migration for the area in the next two decades
came to a total of 1.53 million in-migrants, almost exactly equal to the
outflow of the 1960s and in all likelihood made up to a considerable
degree of "sent-down youth" returning home. Thus migration did affect
the Hebei-Beijing-Tianjin population after 1949, but unlike Shandong this
region does not seem to have been a significant source of migrants to
Manchuria in this period.
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MIGRATION IN THE 1990s
Population movement in China no longer focuses on Manchuria, but
migration continues to be a vital element of economic and social change.
As in the past, it continues to be driven by family-centered motivations to
make the best of new opportunities in China's rapidly evolving markets.
The explosive growth and dramatic transformation of China's
economy in the 1990s have produced the largest migrations in Chinese
history, with as many as 120 million people at a time living away from
their homes.39 Much of this is short-term labor migration, often referred
to by the term "blind flood" (mangliu). The migrants are primarily
young rural workers who travel to the industrialized cities of the eastern
coast. In some respects this movement is very different from the migra-
tion to Manchuria. The migrants of the 1990s are not moving from one
geographic region to another, but from rural areas all over China, to the
cities. The present migration shows age concentrations similar to the
earlier movement into Manchuria. Most of the migrants are young
people who send most of their earnings home to their families and put
together a stake to marry or to set themselves up in a small business
when they go home. Today, however, a large portion of the migrants are
young women.
The migrations of the 1990s carry much the same risks as the
migration to Manchuria: There is some possibility of becoming rich, some
possibility of incurring major losses, and a probability that the migrants
will simply do slightly better away from home than they would if they
had not left.40 The certain beneficiaries of their migration are their
employers and the consumers of the goods they produce. Their employers
may be unknown to them and are often foreigners or overseas Chinese.
They may have as little contact with them as the Manchurian migrants
had with the upper strata of Manchurian society. Their world is bounded,
as was the world of the Manchuria migrants, by their laoxiang, fellow
workers, and labor contractors.
Contract labor continues to satisfy an economic rationale. For the
seasonal work that most migrants to Manchuria performed, labor
contracting was for many the most practical way of meeting fluctuating
employer and laborer needs. For young girls today going from the
interior to the factories of the coast, contract labor has the attraction of
security. It also comes with a long tradition: It has been a key means of
organizing labor since at least the Song period (A.D. 960-1279).41
Convenience and tradition, however, do not mitigate the exploitation
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involved in this arrangement. Contract labor remains a dream-come-true
for low-wage employers.
In its underlying causes as well, migration in the 1990s resembles
the migration to Manchuria in several respects. Now, as in the early part
of the century, workers are moving—flowing—from an overcrowded
rural labor pool into places where economic growth is more rapid, jobs
more plentiful, and incomes higher. And as with the earlier migration,
the shortage of urban labor is due in part to barriers created by previous
government policies that hindered the ability of workers to move in
response to economic opportunities. Finally, the motivation of today's
migrants again comes not from an ambition to break new ground or
make history, but simply from a desire to help their families get ahead.
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Sources: MMTKK, Minkoku juroku nen no manshu dekasegi sha) "Shi ichigatsu ita
gogatsu dairen keiyo santo jikirei kuri ido soku tokei" (Statistics on migration of laborers
from Shandong and Zhili through Dairen, from January to May 1928) in Mantetsu chosa
geppo 8.7 (July 1928): 174-99; "Showa san nendo kami hanki minami manshu ni okeru
santo jikirei kuri ido soku tokei" (Statistics on migration of laborers from Shandong and
Zhili in South Manchuria in the first half of 1928) in Mantetsu chosa geppo 8.9 (Sept. 1928):
117-51 and 8,10 (Oct. 1928): 78-104; MMTKK, Minkoku jushichinen no manshu dekasegi
sha) MMTKK, Minkoku kuhachinen manshu dekasegi imin ido jokyo, MMTKK, Minkoku
jukyunen manshu dekasegi imin ido jokyo; MMTKK, Manshu no kuri, 15-17; Manshu
kezai tokei nempo 1937-38 (Annual Report on Manchurian Economic Statistics, 1937-
1938) (Dairen, 1939); Kita shina keizai tokei teiyo (Summary of North China Economic
Statistics) (Dairen, 1943); CMC, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, annual reports on
Qingdao, Chefoo, Longkou, Tientsin, Newchwang, Dairen, and Andong.
Notes: Derivation of the series is explained above in chapter 1. It is presented in full detail
in Gottschang, "Migration/' 91-100.
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Table A.2
Estimated Migration to Manchuria by









































































































































































































































Sources: See Table A.I, and Gottschang, "Migration,
refers to Jiaodong District of Shandong Province.
Province minus Jiaodong District.
" 101. Note: The Shandong Peninsula
West Shandong refers to Shandong
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Source: Gottschang, "Migration," 81-84,109-112.
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Table A.4











































































































































































































































Sources: Tables A.I and A.3.
Averages: Shandong Peninsula: 13.085 Hebei and West Shandong: 5.178
Hebei and Shandong Total: 6.711
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Table A.5








































































































































Sources: David D. Buck, Urban Change in China (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978),
44-7; Cheng, Lin [H. Lin Cheng], The Chinese Railways, A Historical Survey (Shanghai:
China United Press, 1935), PAGES?; CMC, Decennial Reports 1922-1931, 153; CMC,
Returns of Trade and Trade Reports for Kiaochow, each year; Newchwang, 1901, 1903;
Tianjin, 1892,1893,1897,1901,1903,1904,1905,1910; China, Ministry of Railways, Bureau
of Railway Statistics, Statistics of Chinese National Railways 1915-1929 (Nanking, 1931),
158-173; The China Yearbook, Y)Yl, 1913, 1914, 1916, 1921-1922, 1923, 1924-1925, 1932
editions; Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China 1840-
1937{Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 62; "Ko-sai tetsu do" (The Jiao-Ji
Railway), Mantetsu chosa geppo 16, 3 (March 1936): 144; The Manchoukuo Year Book,
1934 (Tokyo: Toa-keizai Chosakyoku, 1934), 486-522; Sakatani, Manchuria, 48-80;
Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism, 104-24; Yan Zhongping, comp.,
Zhongguo jindai jingji shi tongji zhiliao shuanji (Selected statistics on China's modern
economic history) (Beijing: Kexue, 1955), 207.
Notes: Railways serving Hebei and West Shandong. The Beijing-Hankou (Bei-Han)
Railway: 1,317 kilometers. Construction begun 1897, completed 1906. The Beijing-Liaoning
(Bei-Ning) Railway: 1,538 kilometers. Construction begun 1878, completed 1907. Also
known as the Peking-Mukden Line and the Beijing-Shenyang Line. The Tianjin-Pukou
(Tian-Pu) Railway: 1,106 kilometers. Construction begun 1908, opened to traffic 1910,
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completed 1912. The Shandong (Jiao-Ji or Kiao-Tsi) Railway. 446 kilometers. Construction
begun 1899, opened to traffic 1901, completed 1904.
Railways serving Manchuria. The South Manchuria Railway (SMR): 1,075 kilometers.
Construction begun by Russia in 1896, completed in 1901, reconstructed by Japan, with the
addition of a branch to Andong, completed in 1907; the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER).
1,727 kilometers. Construction begun 1897, completed 1901. The Jilin-Changchun (Ji-Chang)
Railway: 171 kilometers. Completed 1912. The Jilin-Tunhua (Ji-Tun) Railway: 266 kilo-
meters. Completed 1928. The Sipingkai-Taonan (Si-Tao) Railway: 502 kilometers. Completed
1918. The Taoan-Ananji (Tao-An) Railway: 259 kilometers. Completed 1927. The Shenyang-
Hailongzheng (Shen-Hai) Railway: 415 kilometers. Completed 1928. Also known as the
Fenghai line. The Hulan-Hailun (Hu-Hai) Railway: 298 kilometers. Completed 1928. The
Dahushan-Dongliao (Da-Dong) Railway, 256 kilometers. Completed 1927.
Freight tonnage carried on the Beijing-Liaoning Railway is counted in both totals
because it reflects economic activity in both areas. In some cases tonnage of railways in
Manchuria was estimated on the basis of the lines' revenues, which are reported in the
Manchoukuo Year Book, 1934. The revenue figures were converted to a constant price













































































































































Sources: Tables A.3 and A.5.

















































Total Net Trade, 1891-1931

















































































































































Sources: CMC, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, annual. Nankai Institute of Economics,
Nankai Index Numbers, 1936 (Tientsin: Nankai University 1937), Table VII. Chi-ming
Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China 1840-1937 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard, 1965), 232. Gottschang, "Migration/' 183-94.
Note: Shandong Peninsula: Trade at the ports of Longkou and Yantai (Chefoo). Hebei and
West Shandong: Trade at the Hebei ports of Qinhuangdao and Tianjin, plus the Shandong
port of Qingdao. Manchuria: The total of trade at all Manchuria ports, including Andong,
Dalian, and Yingkou on the southern coast, and in the north the border crossing points at
Manzhouli, Aihe (Aigun), and Suifenhe, and the river ports of Sanxing and Harbin. 1897-
1907: There were no Customs reports from Dalian or the northern Manchuria border and
river ports until 1908. Trade values for these years are estimated on the basis of reported
rail traffic and trade at other ports.
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Table A.8
































































































































































































Sources: Appendix Tables 3 and 7.
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Table A.9
Total Migration from North China to Manchuria,























































































Total Return Ratio: 0.66
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Table A.10
Migration from Hebei and West Shandong to
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Table A.ll
Migration from the Shandong Peninsula to


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Hsueh Tien-tung, Li Qiang, Liu Shucheng, eds., Chinas Provincial
Statistics, 1949-1989 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 100.
Note: Population figures are year-end. Natural growth is calculated as the
rate of natural increase (birth rate minus death rate) times the previous
year's population. Migration is calculated as total increase minus natural
growth. The data have been adjusted to exclude the portions of Liaoning
that were added to Inner Mongolia in 1979. See Hsueh et al, xii.
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Table A.13
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Source: Hsueh et al., China's Provincial Statistics, 118. Note: See Table A.12.
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Table A.14





















































































































































































































Source: Hsueh et al., China's Provincial Statistics, 136. Note: See Table A.12.
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Table A.15























































































































































































































Source: 1950-1985: Wu Yulin, Zhongguo renkou: Shandong fence (Beijing,
1989), 95-6; 1986-1989: Hsueh et al., China's Provincial Statistics, 262.
Note: See Table A.12.
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Source: Hsueh. et al., China's Provincial Statistics, 10 (Beijing), 28 (Tianjin),
46 (Hebei). Note: See Table A.12.
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Table A.17























































































































































































































Source: Hsueh et al., China's Provincial Statistics, 46. Note: See Table A.12.
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Table A.18























































































































































































































Source: Hsueh et al, China's Provincial Statistics, 10. Note: See Table A.12.
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Table A.19
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Source: Hsueh et al., China's Provincial Statistics, 28. Note: See Table A.12.
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